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Abstract
This dissertation contributes to the theoretical and empirical understandings of international
transmissions of exchange rate shocks. It consists of three chapters.
The first chapter extends Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and further allows for competitions
in retail networks. In the model, there are four types of firms interacting with each other
including retailing manufacturers, non-retailing manufacturers, specialised retailers and
nontradable good producers. The equilibrium depends on the interaction among these
four types of firms, which leads to a dynamic and incomplete exchange rate pass through
(ERPT) depending on the firms’ share of retail networks. With the standard calibration,
the model can generate a high (4-5) long-run trade elasticity without conflicting with a low
(0.5-1) short-run elasticity, suggesting that the dynamics of retail networks offer a potential
explanation of the trade elasticity puzzle.
Chapter 2 investigates the ERPT of Chinese exporters. We propose an estimator that
utilises orthogonal dimensions to control for unobserved marginal costs and estimate desti-
nation specific markup adjustments to bilateral and multilateral exchange rate shocks. Our
estimates suggest that the cost channel accounts for roughly 50% of conventional EPRT
estimates. We offer new channels of heterogeneity in firms’ pricing behaviour and provide
supporting evidence on the international pricing system.
Chapter 3 aims to bridge the gap between theoretical and empirical works on ERPT.
I propose a machine learning algorithm that systematically detects the determinants of
ERPT. The proposed algorithm is designed to work directly with highly disaggregated firm-
level customs trade databases as well as publicly available commodity trade flow datasets.
Tested on the simulated data from a realistic micro-founded multi-country trade model,
my algorithm is proven to have accuracies around 95% and 80% in simple and complex
scenarios respectively. Applying the algorithm to China’s customs data from 2000 to 2006, I
document new evidence on the nonlinear relationships among market structures, unit value
volatility and ERPT.
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Chapter 1
Optimal Price Setting and Exchange
Rate Pass Through - The Role of the
Retail Capacity
This paper studies the role played by the dynamics of retail capacity in determin-
ing exchange rate pass through (ERPT), trade elasticity and volatility of import
price. As shown by Corsetti and Dedola (2005), local cost components in the
form of distribution may contribute to explaining incomplete pass through, as
they tend to make the trade elasticity depend on the relative distribution margin.
I model distribution as an investment in retail capacity, inducing a difference
between short and long run demand elasticities. The slow adjustment of retail ca-
pacity offers a possible explanation for the “international trade elasticity puzzle”.
The model can generate a high (4-5) long-run trade elasticity without conflicting
with a low (0.5-1) short-run elasticity.
2 ERPT and Retail Capacity
1.1 Introduction
Two important puzzles have been shaping the debate in open macro in recent years. One
is the so-called elasticity puzzle: macro and short-run estimates tend to show that trade
elasticities are very low.1 The other one concerns the determinants of the local currency
price stability of imports, i.e., the low degree of exchange rate pass through. In this paper, I
underline the importance of the dynamics of retail capacity for understanding exchange rate
pass through and trade elasticity and show how these two puzzles can be explained in a
unified framework.
This paper builds on Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and models the local component as
the result of optimal investment decisions on building local retail networks. I consider
a market structure with three types of producers and a single type of distributing firms.
The first type of producers, denoted as “retailing manufacturers”, sell directly to home and
foreign consumers by building their own local retail networks. The second type of producers,
denoted as “non-retailing manufacturers", sell their products to local retailers. The third
type of producers specialise in local nontradable goods and no distribution is needed. Local
distributors, denoted as “local retailers”, buy a range of home and foreign tradable goods,
set the retail price for each product and adjust their investment in retail networks according
to all products they sell.
The perceived demand elasticity is firm-specific, depending on a firm’s share of retail
networks. A larger share enables the firm to access a larger consumer base, reduce its per
unit distribution cost and lower its distribution margin. By selling to local retailers, non-
retailing manufacturers benefit from the large retail network accumulated by local retailers
at the cost of the additional markup charged by local retailers. Non-retailing manufacturers
are not in control of the retail network. They price their products taking decisions made
by local retailers as given, resulting in a high ERPT. Retailing manufacturers internalise
their investments of retail networks. These firms have two means to boost their sales. At
the equilibrium, they trade off between a more costly method which leads to a long run
gain in sales by investing in their retail networks and a less costly method by temporarily
cutting their prices. At their optimal choice, ERPT is relatively low compared to that for
non-retailing manufacturers. Aggregate ERPT and trade elasticity depend on firms’ share of
retail networks and the corresponding vertical market structure. In this aspect, my model
1The quantitative analyses of international real business cycle models and international trade models have
made significant progress over the last two decades. Nonetheless, the trade literature [e.g. Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007)] needs to set a high Armington (1969) elasticity of substitution between
imports and home produced tradable goods to capture the long-run adjustment of intensive and extensive
margins. In contrast, international real business cycle models, Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) and Heathcote
and Perri (2002) for example, need a small elasticity to generate observed volatility of terms of trade and the
negative correlation between trade balance and terms of trade. This tension is referred to as the “international
elasticity puzzle”.
1.1 Introduction 3
contributes to the literature on how vertical or horizontal market structures affect prices and
ERPT2 by adding a novel aspect on how firms compete for retail resources.
The difference between short-run and long-run trade elasticities can be explained through
two channels. The first channel is similar to the mechanism of Drozd and Nosal (2012)3
where changes in consumption are restricted by the firm’s retail capacity in the short run,
and trade elasticity goes up as this restriction is released gradually in the long run. All
quantity adjustments are driven by price changes in the short run, while in the long run the
retail capacity extends gradually and the relative consumption shifts more. In the second
channel, changes in retail capacity influence the per unit cost to distribute a product and
alter the wedge between consumer and producer prices (the distribution margin), resulting
in dynamics of the firm’s elasticity of demand. In contrast to intuitive judgements, the
model shows that the short-run difference in demand elasticity between home and foreign
products is larger with the second channel. As the retail capacity adjusts in the long run,
this difference becomes smaller, and the trade elasticity goes up gradually. Combining
these two channels, the model can generate a high (4-5) long-run elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign products without conflicting a the low (0.5-1) short-run elasticity.
While most trade literature attributes the difference between short-run and long-run trade
elasticities to extensive margin movements, my model emphasises the rule of intensive
margins.
As an extension of the analysis, I investigate the role of retail capacity in explaining
the connection between price volatility and ERPT. Empirical findings by Berger and Vavra
(2013) document a positive relationship between price volatility and pass through4. I show
analytically and quantitatively that this empirical pattern is consistent with differences in
retail capacity and distribution margin across firms. In the short run where the retail capacity
fails to adjust, ERPT of a firm is positively correlated with the volatility of its import price if
(a) the size of idiosyncratic shocks is large and (b) its distribution margin is low. An increase
in average distribution margin reduces the correlation between price volatility and ERPT.
This correlation also depends on whether the exporter is in control of its local retail network.
Simulation results suggest that the change of distribution margin contributes little to the
2Section 1.2 reviews the related literature.
3Drozd and Nosal (2012) provide a possible explanation of the elasticity puzzle based on slow adjustment
of consumer list. Due to the adjustment cost on the investment of the market share, the producer cannot raise
their market share to the steady state level immediately and the consumer list thus does not update much. This
gives a low trade elasticity in the short run because the change of relative price is high and that of relative retail
quantity is low. In the long run, the consumer list adjusts and trade elasticity increases. However, in their model,
the consumer demand is always equal to the consumer list holding by the producer and the change of prices
has no influence on consumer’s choice. The equilibrium retail price is determined through the inverse demand
function once the demand is chosen. My model differs from theirs in the sense that the consumer demand in my
model is jointly determined by the producer’s retail price and its retail capacity. The producer can attract more
consumers through either a lower price or marketing activities that extend its retail capacity.
4New empirical findings on the relationship among firm level characteristics, market structure, price volatility
and ERPT are presented in my third chapter.
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variance of the price for those firms that are not in control of their local retail networks. In
contrast, the variance of retail capacity explains 40% of price volatility for those firms directly
controlling their retail networks. Furthermore, aggregate shocks are important in explaining
the price volatility of retailing manufacturers but not that of non-retailing manufacturers.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief literature review
on research modelling local component and strategic interactions. Section 1.3 presents new
empirical evidences on distribution margin and ERPT. Section 1.4 introduces the basic model.
Section 1.5 extends the basic model and discusses the role of retail capacity in explaining the
link among trade elasticity, price volatility and ERPT. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Discussion on international relative prices using two-country open-economy DSGE mod-
els can be traced back to the early 1990s. At that time, a large number of international
macroeconomic models imply the law of one price holds for tradable goods sold across
countries and ERPT is perfect [e.g. Backus et al. (1992), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and
Stockman and Tesar (1995)]. However, the increasing evidence suggesting the failure of
the law of one price and the purchasing power parity gives rise to a new group of studies
characterising the "pricing to market" behaviour of firms5. The term “pricing to market” was
first used in Krugman (1986) to indicate that markets are segmented and firms discriminate
and charge different markups across countries6. In line with Krugman (1986), a large number
of literature emphasises the pricing to market behaviour and attributes the incomplete pass
through to local nominal rigidities [e.g. Betts and Devereux (2000)]. However, to generate
the observed low pass through, they need to set a very high degree of nominal rigidities.
Moreover, their models give wrong implications of the relationship between the terms of
trade and the exchange rate as critiqued by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).
Later studies started to consider reasons apart from the nominal rigidity. These studies
can be mainly divided into three groups. The first group emphasises the importance of the
local component of consumer price.7 The existence of the local component drives a wedge
between consumer and producer prices, making the elasticity of demand an increasing
function of the producer price and resulting in incomplete EPRT at both producer and
consumer prices. The second group focuses on variable demand elasticities and markups
under different market structures. The difference in the price elasticity of demand across
countries motivates producers to charge different markups. The firm’s optimal markup
5Rogoff (1996) provides a very good literature survey on the failure of the law of one price and the purchasing
power parity.
6The segmentation of markets may come from various reasons which imply that the cost of arbitrage is not
zero. For example, in Goldberg and Verboven (2005)’s survey on the car market, manufacturers prevent local
dealers from exporting the car to other countries by threatening to withdraw their franchise.
7These studies can also be viewed as literature characterising vertical interactions.
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often depends on its horizontal or vertical interaction with other firms. As a result, the
import price changes less than one to one with the change in the firm’s marginal cost and the
nominal exchange rate. The third group studies the exchange rate pass through at the border
and has developed models in which exporters can choose whether to price their exports in
home currency or in foreign currency, knowing that price updates will be subject to certain
frictions8. A number of factors such as the local monetary policy stability, the market share
of exporters and the exchange rate regime play a crucial role in this choice.
The importance of local components to price discrimination across markets was first
pointed out by Corsetti and Dedola (2005). Intuitively, local components produce a wedge
between the consumer price and the import price at the border and reduce the sensitivity of
consumption to the producer price at the consumer level. The price elasticity of demand with
respect to the producer price is a function of distribution margin. As different distribution
margins imply distinct demand elasticities across markets, it is optimal for producers to
discriminate and charge different prices across countries. An increase in the wholesale price
of the firm lowers the distribution margin and increases the demand elasticity. As a result,
the desired markup narrows. The optimal wholesale price moves less than one to one in
response to a exchange rate shock and ERPT is incomplete. The observation that ERPT at
consumer prices is lower compared to ERPT at import prices can be easily explained using
this setting. Therefore, models with local components can generate observed low ERPT
without assuming huge local nominal rigidities. In addition to incomplete pass through,
Corsetti et al. (2008a) based on this setting can generate high volatility of real exchange rates
and low volatility of terms of trade relative to real exchange rates, which standard business
cycle models fail to capture.
This explanation is highly appreciated by empirical studies. Goldberg and Verboven
(2001) conduct a empirical analysis for automobile retail prices in five European countries.
They attribute around 38% pass through of the nominal exchange rate to local distribution
cost. Hellerstein (2008) builds a structural model to fit panel data in beer industry. He finds
the optimal markup adjustment of producer and the existence of local distribution cost
equally explain the price stickiness. He argues that foreign exporters bear a greater cost in
response to an appreciation of home exchange rate compared to local producers and local
retailers.
The intuition of the local component of price can be applied to other contexts. For
example, Alessandria (2009) develops a consumer searching model where the searching
process is costly but gives the possibility of buying goods at a lower price. The real consumer
price can be viewed as producer price with an additive component, i.e. the corresponding
searching cost. Following the same logic, a higher searching cost leads to a higher markup
and ERPT is incomplete due to the additive term to producer prices. Similarly, Drozd and
8Since my theoretical models are not directly linked to the optimal currency choice, the detailed literature
review of this group is omitted in the literature review section.
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Nosal (2012) assume that producers and local retailers conduct a Nash bargaining with total
profit of sales. As a result, exporter’s wholesale price Px denoted in the home currency equals
a local component ηεP∗c plus a portion of the marginal cost where η is the fixed bargaining
power for the local retailer.
Research modelling different market structures and ERPT can be categorised into hor-
izontal and vertical interactions. In terms of horizontal interactions, Dornbusch (1987)
explains the incomplete ERPT by considering oligopolistic markets in which the optimal
adjustment of the markup depends on market structures and the underlying curvature
of the demand curve. Atkeson and Burstein (2007) present a simple Ricardian model of
international trade where exporters charge a price equal to the marginal cost of their local
competitors and thus the ERPT is incomplete. De Blas and Russ (2015) generalise Atkeson
and Burstein (2007)’s Bertrand competition setting with multi-countries in which the degree
of the price rigidity and the incomplete ERPT depend on the distribution of markups which
is in turn determined by the number of competitors.
Among the literature studying horizontal interactions, Atkeson and Burstein (2008)
appears to be a very successful explanation. They extend Dornbusch (1987) to capture the
fluctuations in the international relative prices. They consider a market with a continuum of
sectors and a finite number of differentiated products under each sector. The elasticity of
demand across sectors is assumed to be smaller than the elasticity within the same sector.
The firm chooses its retail price to maximise its profit subject to the inverse demand function
and takes into account that the sector demand will be affected by its price. The demand
elasticity is decreasing in the market share. Therefore, a firm with a high market share in its
sector assigns a higher weight to the low substitutable competitors across industries and
thus has a lower elasticity. Correspondingly, the optimal markup is increasing in the market
share. In addition, any price changes of a firm in the industry will change the aggregate
industry price and its market share. The elasticity of demand alters accordingly and ERPT
is incomplete. They argue that pricing to market behaviour is heterogeneous across firms.
The within-sector cost dispersion is central in their paper in the sense that it pins down the
distribution of markups and thus the pricing behaviour. In the equilibrium, only large firms
choose pricing to market.
Amiti et al. (2014) confirm this result using the data of Belgian exporters. They find that
exporters with larger market share in the destination market have a lower pass through.
Moreover, a higher import intensity of inputs lowers the response to exchange rate shocks.
That is, shocks of exchange rates are partially offset by the adverse adjustment of marginal
cost due to the change of input prices. They find that the distribution of importers is quite
skewed in the sense that large importers are also large exporters. The effect of a depreciation
of home currency with respect to all trade partners on export prices is partially offset by the
increase in the cost of buying inputs for exporters. They construct a model by combining
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Atkeson and Burstein (2008) with Halpern et al. (2011) and attribute half of incomplete ERPT
to varying markups with the change of the marginal cost accounting for another half.
Corsetti et al. (2007) explicitly model strategic vertical interactions among upstream
and downstream firms, explore the possible interactions between optimal price setting and
nominal rigidities and study their implications on optimal monetary policy. In their model,
upstream producers exercise their monopoly power and set different prices for downstream
retailers at home and abroad. Local monopolistic downstream firms using one intermediate
traded good to produce nontradable final goods then sell the good to the consumer. The
nominal rigidity is modelled using Calvo pricing, where only a fraction of upstream produc-
ers and downstream retailers can change their price. Therefore, downstream retailers face
different marginal costs depending on whether their upstream producer changes price. In
addition, upstream producers updating their price will need to consider that only a fraction
of downstream firms buying their products will also reoptimise in the same period.
The optimal price depends explicitly on the demand elasticity. The perceived demand
elasticity is market-specific, depending on differences in industry-specific inflation rates
and the degree of price dispersions in the local market. Therefore the deviation from law
of one price comes not only from the nominal rigidity but also from the vertical interaction
among upstream and downstream monopolists. Furthermore, the vertical interaction among
firms with sticky prices lowers the demand elasticity. Nominal rigidities at the retail level
do not necessarily lower the equilibrium reaction of final prices to exchange rate movements
due to the strategic substitutability between upstream and downstream firms. They show
analytically that upstream nominal rigidities lead to a lower short-run ERPT irrespective
of vertical interactions. Nevertheless, downstream nominal rigidities induce a larger price
response to exchange rate changes because of strategic substitutability. Under reasonable
calibration, the effect of upstream nominal rigidities dominates the effect of downstream
ones and the pass through is incomplete.
1.3 Empirical Evidence on Distribution Margin
As an increasing number of papers draw attention to the importance of distribution cost
in interpreting EPRT, understanding the property of this local component is vital to the
analysis. This section provide new evidence on distribution margin across industries and
countries.
The distribution margin is estimated based on the Supply Table at current prices of the
National Accounts from the Eurostat database. The data is available at the industry level at
annual frequency from 1995 to 2010 for most European countries. However, this database
is largely incomplete such that the relevant data for distribution margin are unavailable
for most countries during the reporting periods with the exception of the year 2008. Indus-
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tries are categorised by classification of products by activities (CPA) system. 65 industries
including 22 goods sectors and 43 service sectors are reported in the dataset.
The dataset reports, among others, "the distribution margin and trade cost" and "the
total supply at purchasers’ prices". Following Goldberg and Campa (2010), the distribution
margin is calculated as "the distribution margin and trade cost" divided by "the total supply
at purchasers’ prices". The calculated distribution margin for the UK from 1997 to 2010
is shown in Table A in the appendix. As expected, the calculated distribution margin for
service sectors is close to zero. Thus, only distribution margins for 22 goods sectors are
presented9.
Fig. 1.1 Estimated distribution margins of selected industries in the United Kingdom
As can be seen from figure 1.1, there is strong evidence on heterogeneity in distribution
margins across industries. Final goods show relative bigger distribution margins compared
to intermediate products and raw materials. Furnitures, textiles and wearing apparels have
a high distribution margin which ranges from 0.36 to 0.47. Food, beverages and tobacco
products have a distribution margin slightly above the average (denoted with "Total"). Basic
energy products, such as coke and refined petroleum products, and mining and quarrying
products have a relatively low distribution margin. Although the distribution share differs
substantially across industries, the annual average distribution margin within the industry
is relatively stable with only a small increase trend during the period from 1997 to 2010. The
aggregate distribution share starts from 18.9% in 1997 and reaches 22.4% in 2010.
9The aggregate distribution share (denoted as "Total") is calculated by dividing the sum of trade and
distribution costs for 22 goods sectors by the sum of their total supply at purchasers’ prices.
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Fig. 1.2 Estimated aggregate distribution margins across countries in 2008
The estimated distribution margin for 18 European countries in 2008 are presented
in Table B in the appendix. Figure 1.2 visualises the aggregate distribution margin in
these countries. The estimated distribution margins of these 18 countries show strong
heterogeneity across industries. A more important finding is that even in the same industry,
there exists huge differences in distribution margins across countries. For instance, the
most astonishing distribution margin difference lies in fish and fishing products, where
the lowest distribution margin is 6.79% in Germany and highest distribution margin is as
high as 61.00% in Romania. In addition, the magnitude of the difference in the industrial
distribution margin across countries varies for different industries. The distribution margin
difference (highest minus lowest) for food, beverages and tobacco products is only 12.92%,
which is much smaller than that for fish and fishing products. The third observation is
that the difference of distribution margin at the aggregate level is smaller across countries
compared to the industry level. As shown in figure 1.2, the aggregate distribution margin
of most countries lies in the range from 10% to 20%. The difference between the highest
aggregate distribution margin 23.37% (Greece) and the lowest 9.43% (Czech Republic) is
only 12.94%.
The differences in distribution margins may be caused by various reasons. According
to the data from the Supply Table, the costs incurred by the distribution sector could be
divided into two parts, namely the transportation cost to the retail store and the cost involved
in operating and sustaining the retail network. Distribution costs may differ for various
products due to distinct inherent qualities and even for the same product due to different
geographies and business structures across countries. The operating cost may differ due to
country and industry specific situations, such as the related tax rate and economic conditions.
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In order to investigate the variance and correlation of distribution margin cross industries,
series of monthly prices are needed. Since the Input-Output table is available on an annual
basis, I use sector retailer price margin series from U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics.10 The
price margin is calculated as the current selling price minus the current acquisition price.
Table 1.C.5 in the appendix presents variance calculated from percentage change of the price
margin index. These variances demonstrate a high degree of heterogeneity. The volatility
of the aggregated retail margins (0.0019) is much smaller than that for individual sectors.
However, the across sector covariance matrix of price margin changes does not show any
clear pattern.
To sum up, three patterns can be extracted from data. First, distribution margins differ
greatly across industries within a country. Second, while the difference in distribution
margin is relatively large for the same industry across countries, this difference is much
smaller at the aggregate level. Third, the variance of the retail price margin shows high
degree of heterogeneity.
1.3.1 The empirical relationship between ERPT and distribution margin
In this subsection, I provide a preliminary empirical investigation on the relationship be-
tween distribution margin and ERPT.
I run regressions to estimate ERPT across countries and industries following the regres-
sion specification of Goldberg and Campa (2005), Goldberg and Campa (2006) and Mumtaz
et al. (2008):
△ log(MPi,dt ) = Ci,d + βi,d△ log(NERi,dt ) + γi,d△ log(MC∗,i,dt ) +
3
∑
ι=1
χi,dι △ log(MPi,dt−ι) + εi,dt
where MP denotes the import price, NER denotes the bilateral nominal exchange rate,
MC denotes proxies for the marginal cost, and the superscripts i,d represent the industry
and destination countries respectively. I estimate sectoral level bilateral ERPT of imports
from the United Kingdom to 10 European countries including Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
The import prices are approximated by monthly industrial level bilateral import unit
value index11 from the United Kingdom to the destination country. The marginal costs
are approximated by the sectoral export unit value index from the destination country to
the United Kingdom12. Data are available at a monthly frequency from January 1995 to
10US BLS started to release monthly sector level of retailer price indices from Jan 2009. Please see the following
link for detailed description: http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-1/pdf/wholesale-and-retail-producer-
price-indexes-margin-prices.pdf
11The unit value index is less preferable than the price index. However, due to data availability, the unit value
index is often used in empirical estimations [see Goldberg and Campa (2006)].
12Empirical ERPT studies face problems of finding a good proxy for marginal cost. My second chapter
discusses this issue and provides a sequential fixed effect estimator to address this problem.
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December 2004 at COMEXT (Eurostat). The regression sample periods range from 1995:01
to 2001:12 for all countries except for Sweden where the full sample period (from 1995:01 to
2004:12) is used.13
The parameter for short-run ERPT is given by βi,d and the long-run ERPT can be calcu-
lated as β
i,d
1−∑3ι=1 χi,dι
. Short-run ERPT estimates are reported in Table C in the appendix. Among
200 short-run ERPT estimates, 73 and 50 estimates reject the t-test with null hypothesis of
zero at 10% and 5% significance level respectively. The adjusted R-squared ranges from
0.097 to 0.785 with a large proportion of adjusted R-squared lying in the range between 0.2
and 0.4.
Third, using the estimated short-run ERPT and estimated distribution margin, I run
simple OLS regressions to examine their relationship. The relevant distribution margin data
used are estimated distribution margins across countries in 2008. The regression equation is
specified as below:
ERPTi,d = 0.443983
(0.070757)
− 0.886
(0.394291)
∗ DMi,d + ε i,d
or
ERPTi,d = 0.103349
(0.111251)
− 0.099
(0.052347)
∗ log(DMi,d) + ε i,d
After matching the estimated ERPT with the distribution data available, 143 observations
are used in the above regressions. Both equations give a significant negative relationship
between ERPT and the distribution margin. The estimated coefficients on distribution
margin for the first and second equation reject the null hypothesis of zero at 5% and 10%
significance level respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Admittedly, these two regressions are free from measurement error and omitted variable
bias only under the following three conditions. First, the industry-level distribution margin
is country specific and not influenced by other variables such as volatility of exchange rate
and price levels. Second, the industrial distribution margin in the year 2008 represents the
average distribution margin in the period from January 1995 to December 200114. Third,
distribution margin does not differ between import goods and local produced goods15.
As a robustness check, I calculate the correlation between the distribution margin and
ERPT using ERPT estimations of Goldberg and Campa (2005) and Goldberg and Campa
(2006). Goldberg and Campa (2005) estimate ERPT for goods of five categories namely
food, energy, raw materials, manufacturing and non-manufacturing using quarterly data
for 23 OECD countries from 1975Q1 to 2003Q4. Goldberg and Campa (2006) report ERPT
13Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with a time trend are performed for time series of each country and each
industry in the sample. At the 5% significance level, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit
root for 290 of total 370 series including the import prices, bilateral exchange rates and proxies of marginal costs.
The number of lags for import prices is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion.
14As shown in figure 1.2, the distribution margin at industry level is relatively stable over time. Even if there
is a measurement error, this error is unlikely to be correlated with ERPT.
15As the imported goods are distributed using the local distribution sector, this is likely to be true. However, I
haven’t found relevant empirical studies for reference.
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for products classified by 1-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) during
the period from 1989:m1 to 2001:m3. I reconcile the distribution margin data available to fit
their classifications16 and find negative correlations for both pairs with –0.111 and –0.068
respectively.17
1.4 The Basic Model
This section uses a simplified model to introduce my key settings and explain the two
channels driving the difference between short run and long run trade elasticities. The world
economy consists of two countries, home and foreign, of the same size. The representative
household in the home country consumes three types of goods, namely home tradable goods
C (h) , foreign tradable goods C ( f ) , and nontradable goods C (n). I restrict my analysis to
two types of firms, namely retailing manufacturers and non-tradable goods producers. A
richer and more realistic model is studied in section 1.5.
I model the building of retail networks as an investment in the retail capacity k and
embed the effect of changing retail networks through the following CES aggregator, i.e.,
CH,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
(
kt (h)
KH,t
) 1
θH θK
Ct (h)
θH−1
θH dh
] θH
θH−1
, CF,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
(
kt ( f )
KF,t
) 1
θH θK
Ct ( f )
θH−1
θH d f
] θH
θH−1
KH,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
kt (h)
1
θK dh
]θK
, KF,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
kt ( f )
1
θK d f
]θK
where θH is elasticity of substitution among home tradable goods and the elasticity of
substitution among foreign tradable goods is assumed to be the same as its home counterpart,
i.e., θF = θH. θK reflects the intensity and effectiveness of retail capacity accumulation on
consumer’s preference. If θK is equal to unity, aggregate consumption is just a capacity
weighted average of consumption of single products. A higher θK indicates that the marginal
return of consumption demand in investing retail capacity is low.
The idea of this setting is that a firm should be able to affect consumer’s demand through
a channel other than price. The investment in the retail network can be viewed as a proxy for
all local promotion efforts which increase the demand without affecting the retail price and
quality of the product. For example, the producer can advertise their product, which affects
the consumer’s preference ex ante18. A higher retail capacity can be interpreted as more retail
16The reconciliation of Goldberg and Campa (2005) follows their ”Appendix Table 3: Industry Names”. Due
to the availability of distribution data, only 12 countries are left in the dataset. The concordance between SITC
and CPA for Goldberg and Campa (2006)’s estimations is done by using the Combined Nomenclature (CN)
reported by Eurostat.
1749 and 130 observations are used in the first and second calculation respectively.
18Many empirical marketing studies have made it clear that advertising and marketing can change the
consumer’s preference on top of the price and quality of the product. See Baker, Hutchinson, Moore, and
Nedungadi (1986) and Borzekowski and Robinson (2001) for examples.
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stores, which makes the product more accessible and reduces the consumer’s searching cost.
A higher retail capacity may be viewed as a strategy to increase the effectiveness of matching.
In the context of Alessandria (2009), it increases the consumer’s probability of getting a price
quote for the firm. After the purchase of the product, it could be an investment that improves
customer services, which affects the demand of the product next period for a reason similar
to the deep habit by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2006). Mechanically, it provides a
simple setting which bypasses the difficulty of using inequality constraints to restrict the
demand below the retail capacity.
The aggregation between home and foreign goods can be defined as usual:
CT,t ≡
[
(SH)
1
ρ C
ρ−1
ρ
H,t + (SF)
1
ρ C
ρ−1
ρ
F,t
] ρ
ρ−1
where ρ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods, and the
shares of the retail network (SH,t,SF,t) are given by
SH,t =
(KH,t)
1
θK
(KH,t)
1
θK + (KF,t)
1
θK
, SF,t =
(KF,t)
1
θK
(KH,t)
1
θK + (KF,t)
1
θK
With the retail network share in the CES aggregator, the change in demand of home
tradables, CH,t = SH,t
(
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
CT,t, is driven by two forces. In addition to the conventional
mechanism via price, the change in the retail network share plays a nontrivial role. The con-
sumer’s demand from the CES aggregation without the retail network share,
(
Pt(h)
PH,t
)−θH
CH,t,
can be regarded as the potential demand. Without any retail capacity (SH,t = 0), the producer
cannot sell anything to the consumer. The classical market share measure, which is defined
as PHCHPTCT , can be viewed as a weighted average between the retail network share and the
conventional price driven market share.
I take the conventional setting that nontradable goods do not need to go through the
distribution process and producers sell directly to buyers.
CN,t ≡
[∫ 1
0
Ct ( f )
θN−1
θN dh
] θN
θN−1
, Ct ≡
(
C
ϕ−1
ϕ
T,t + C
ϕ−1
ϕ
N,t
) ϕ
ϕ−1
The corresponding price aggregators can be derived as
PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
(
kt (h)
KH,t
) 1
θK
pt (h)
1−θH dh
] 1
1−θH
, PF,t =
[∫ 1
0
(
kt ( f )
KF,t
) 1
θK
pt ( f )
1−θH d f
] 1
1−θH
PT,t =
[
SH,tP
1−ρ
H,t + SF,tP
1−ρ
F,t
] 1
1−ρ
, Pt =
[
P1−ϕT,t + P
1−ϕ
N,t
] 1
1−ϕ
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1.4.1 The exporter’s problem
The production function of producers is assumed to be linear in labour L and productivity Z,
i.e., Y = ZL. As this production function has constant returns to scale, the pricing problem
of the producer of home tradables for the domestic and foreign markets can be analysed
separately.
In the foreign market, the home producer h chooses its price denominated in local
currency P∗t (h) and its investment in the local retail network i∗t (h) to maximise its expected
total profit subject to its marginal cost MCH,t, its demand given by the CES aggregator
D∗t (h),and the accumulation process of retail capacity (1.3).19
max
P∗t (h),i∗t (h)
Et
∞
∑
ι=t
Qt,t+ι
{
[ε ιP∗ι (h)− MCH,ι]D∗ι (h)− [i∗ι (h)] ε ιP∗N,ι
}
subject to
D∗t (h) =
(
k∗t (h)
K∗H,t
) 1
θK
(
P∗t (h)
P∗H,t
)−θH
C∗H,t (1.1)
MCH,t =
Wt
ZH,t
(1.2)
k∗t+1 (h) = i
∗
t (h) + (1− δ)k∗t (h)− χ (k∗t (h))D∗t (h) (1.3)
The component χ (k∗t (h))D∗t (h) in equation (1.3) is the second key feature of my model.
The idea is to model the effectiveness of distribution as a function of existing retail capacity.
For each product being sold, χ (k∗t (h)) units of nontradable goods are required to distribute
the product to the consumer. The function χ(k) : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) measures the efficiency of
distribution and is assumed to be decreasing in the retail capacity at a decreasing rate.20
This setting penalises a firm that attempts to temporarily sell at a quantity above its retail
capacity. Instead of shutting down the price channel in the short run and letting the demand
be completely determined by the retail capacity as in Drozd and Nosal (2012), my setting
enables a short-run boost in sales by cutting prices and leaves the firm to trade off between
the high cost on distribution and the short-run boost in sales.
Substituting the investment constraint into the objective function, the optimisation
problem can be rewritten as:
max
P∗t (h),k∗t+1
Et
∞
∑
ι=t
Qt,t+ι

[
ε ιP∗ι (h)− MCH,ι − χ (k∗ι (h)) ε ιP∗N,ι
]( k∗ι (h)
K∗H,ι
) 1
θK
(
P∗ι (h)
P∗H,ι
)−θH
C∗H,ι
− [k∗ι+1 (h)− (1− δ)k∗ι (h)] ε ιP∗N,ι

19The foreign variables are denoted with asterisk and all prices are denominated in the local currency.
20In this analysis, I choose an analytically convenient functional form for χ(.): χ(k) = φk + ϑ, χ
′(k) = − φk2 .
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The wholesale price P∗H,t is defined as the consumer price P∗H,t net of the per unit distri-
bution cost χ(k∗H,t)P
∗
N,t :
P∗t (h) = P∗t (h)− χ(k∗t (h))P∗N,t
As in Corsetti and Dedola (2005), the demand elasticity with respect to the wholesale
price εD∗t (h),P
∗
t (h)
is increasing in the wholesale price and decreasing in the distribution
margin δt (h) ≡ χ(k
∗
t (h))P
∗
N,t
P∗t (h)
. This satisfies the sufficient condition for incomplete pass through
proposed by Marston (1990). As the wholesale price goes up, the optimal markup decreases
due to a higher price elasticity of demand.
εD∗t (h),P
∗
t (h)
= −∂D
∗
t (h)
∂P∗t (h)
P∗t (h)
D∗t (h)
= θH (1− δ∗t (h))
The optimal price is given by
P∗H,t =
θH
θH − 1
[
MCH,t
εt
+ χ(k∗H,t)P
∗
N,t
]
The optimal markup for retail price P∗H,t is given by
θH
θH−1
[
1+
εtχ(k∗H,t)P
∗
N,t
MCH,t
]
=
P∗t (h)+χ(k∗t (h))P∗N,t
MCH,t
and is decreasing in retail capacity. The analytical ERPT can be derived as
−
MCH,t
εt
MCH,t
εt
+ χ(k∗H,t)P
∗
N,t
(1.4)
Both wholesale price and retail price move less than one to one to exchange rate shock
due to the additive local component21. Given the optimal price, the demand elasticity with
respect to retail capacity can be derived as follows:
εD∗t (h),k∗t (h) =
1
θK
+ θH
χ(k∗H,t)P
∗
N,t
MCH,t
εt
+ χ(k∗H,t)P
∗
N,t
The first part represents the marginal benefit from owning a higher retail market share,
while the second part represents the gain in demand by having a lower price. Note that the
second part is a function of the distribution margin and the elasticity of substitution among
home tradable products. If the price competition is intense (θH is high), it is optimal for the
firm to invest more in retail capacity and lower its prices. Nevertheless, a higher level of
retail capacity weakens the benefit of investing per effect of a lower distribution margin.
Although it is clear that ERPT is an increasing function of the retail capacity holding, the
21Note that the elasticity of price with respect to marginal cost is the same expression but with different signs.
A home appreciation lowers εt and increases the price of home product denominated in foreign currency and an
increase in marginal cost has the same effect if the retail capacity k∗H,t remains constant.
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direction of retail capacity adjustment depends on the types of shocks and choices of other
firms.
Compared to Corsetti and Dedola (2005), the size of this component is governed by the
firm’s choices. The optimal investment is governed by the following expression:
εtP∗N,t = EtQt,t+1

 1θH−1 [MCH,t+εtχ(k∗H,t)P∗N,t]θKk∗t+1(h)
−χ′ (k∗t+1 (h)) εt+1P∗N,t+1
D∗t+1(h) + (1− δ)εt+1P∗N,t+1
 (1.5)
This equation states that the producer chooses to invest in the distribution capacity until
the marginal cost of retail capacity (the left hand side) equals the expected marginal benefit in
the future. For the right hand side,
1
θH−1 [MCH,t+εtχ(k
∗
H,t)P
∗
N,t]
θKk∗t+1(h)
reflects the per unit marginal gains
from an increase in demand due to a higher market share and−χ′ (k∗t+1 (h)) εt+1P∗N,t+1D∗t+1(h)
represents the marginal benefit per unit from being more efficient in distribution. Under
reasonable assumptions on the distribution efficiency function χ(k), it can be shown that
these two terms, which are multiplied by the demand D∗t+1(h), are both decreasing in the
retail capacity. (1− δ)εt+1P∗N,t+1 is simply the value of the invested retail capacity next
period after the depreciation. For each individual firm, the price of nontradable goods is
exogenous. An increase in k∗t+1 reduces the first two expressions in the brackets but increases
the demand via a lower price and a higher retail market share. There is a trade off between
the decrease in the per unit benefits and the increase in the units sold.
1.4.2 The consumer’s problem
The home representative household chooses the optimal consumption C, labour supply L,
money holding M, international bonds holding BH, BF to maximise his lifetime expected
utility22:
Ut = Et
∞
∑
ι=t
βι−t
 C1−σι1− σ + ξ
(
Mι+1
Pι
)1−σ
1− σ + α
(1− Lι)1−ν
1− ν

subject to
Mt+1 + BH,t+1 + εtBF,t+1 ≤ Mt + (1+ it)BH,t + (1+ i∗t ) εtBF,t
+WtLt − Tt − PtCt +
∫ 1
0
πt (h)dh +
∫ 1
0
πt (n)
22As the utility function is separable in real money balances and consumption, money demand is determined
residually. Therefore, the parameter in front of the real money balances does not affect the result of my analysis,
thus ξ is arbitrarily set equal to 1.
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where σ measures the degree of risk aversion on consumption; ν measures the disutility
of labour; β is the discount factor and the risk aversion parameter on the real money holding
is set equal to σ. Two international bonds BH,t+1 and BF,t+1 are denominated in home and
foreign currency respectively. The representative household owns all home firms and
receives the profit from all home producers
∫ 1
0 πt (h)dh +
∫ 1
0 πt (n)dn.
The government spending is assumed to be 0 such that
Mt − Mt−1 + Tt = 0
All seigniorage revenues are rebated to households through lump-sum taxes. Throughout
the analysis, I assume that monetary authorities adopt a strict inflation targeting such that
nominal price changes are equivalent to CPI based real price changes.
1.4.3 Calibration
The remaining settings of the basic model and their associated equilibrium conditions are
presented in appendices 1.A and 1.B.23 The model is simulated under symmetric conditions
where the value of foreign parameters is assumed to be the same as their home counterparts.
A summary of calibration is available in table 1.B.3. The calibration of most parameters
(θH,θN ,σ,β,δ,ν) follows directly from Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008a). The retail share
aggregation factor θK is the key parameter which controls the size of the market share channel.
I set θK equal to 1.4 such that, with a trade elasticity ρ equal to 2, the benchmark model
specified in section 1.5 produces a short-run elasticity (0.5-1) consistent with the business
cycle literature and a long-run elasticity (4-5) consistent with the empirical estimations of
Marquez (1990) and Simonovska and Waugh (2014). The elasticity of substitution between
tradable and nontradables is set to be 0.74 based on the estimation of Mendoza (1991). The
value of the friction parameter γ on the capacity adjustment does not change the direction of
impulse responses but slows down the capacity adjustment. I choose γ such that the average
adjustment cost is around 0.5% of the current retail capacity.
1.4.4 IRFs and trade elasticity
Figure 1.3 presents impulse responses to a one percent positive permanent productivity
shock on home tradable goods. Upon the shock, the marginal cost of home tradable goods
decreases. The price of home tradable goods lowers less than one percent due to the existence
of the distribution cost. As the productivity shock is permanent, expected lower price means
a higher expected future consumer demand. This leads to additional marginal benefits from
investing in the retail capacity. Producers of home tradable goods act according to equation
23The basic model is a special case of the generalised model where the proportion of retailing manufacturers
is 1.
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Fig. 1.3 In response to a 1 percent positive permanent productivity shock on home tradable
goods
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Note: The model with and without using the retail network CES aggregator are denoted with blue and black lines respectively.
Elasticities are measured in the absolute value. All other impulse responses are measured in percentage deviations from the
steady state. The horizontal axis denotes quarters after the shock.
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(1.5) and increase their retail capacity gradually. The price of home tradable goods at the
foreign market follows a similar pattern, but at a lower magnitude due to the appreciation of
the exchange rate24. The change in monetary stance is reflected by the price of nontradable
goods, since no distribution service is required for nontradable goods and the producers
charge a constant markup over its marginal cost. As there is no shock to the productivity of
nontradable goods, the rises in their prices in both countries simply reflect the increase of
nominal wages. Intuitively, monetary policy in the home country inflates the nominal wage
to counteract the deflation of home tradable prices and the appreciation of nominal exchange
rates. The foreign monetary stance extends slightly to offset the deflation caused by the
decreased price of imports. Foreign exporters lower their retail price due to the appreciation.
ERPT is incomplete as a 0.5% appreciation leads to a 0.15% decrease in price. Since the price
decrease is triggered by the exchange rate change rather than the change in marginal cost,
the effect of the increasing demand is dominated by the rise in the local distribution cost.
Therefore, a small decrease in home retail capacity for foreign exporters is observed. As to
the foreign tradable goods selling in the foreign market, only a very small increase in its
price is observed due to a slight rise of its marginal cost25. Nevertheless, a lower demand
reduces the incentive of holding retail capacity and KF decreases over time.
To understand how trade elasticity evolves after a shock, it is helpful to decompose the
wholesale price elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods into three parts:
−
∂ log
(
CF
CH
)
∂ log
(
PF
PH
) = −∂ log
(
SF
(
PF
PT
)−ρ
CT
SH
(
PH
PT
)−ρ
CT
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∂ log
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PH
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∂ log
(
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(
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(
PF
PH
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(
PF
PH
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(
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PH
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PF(
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(
PF
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∂ log
(
KF
KH
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∂ log
(
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PH
) + ρ∂ log
(
χ(kF)
PN
PF
+1
χ(kH)
PN
PH
+1
)
∂ log
(
PF
PH
) + ρ (1.6)
In addition to the conventional price effect of demand ρ, the change in relative demand
is affected by two additional channels reflecting the effect of changing retail capacity. The
first term in equation (1.6) captures the “retail market share channel” of demand where the
change in the relative price affects the optimal retail capacity and alters relative retail network
24Due to the strict inflation targeting, the change of the real exchange rate is the same as that of the nominal
exchange rate.
25Due to the strict inflation targeting, the foreign monetary stance extends slightly to offset the deflation
introduced by a decreased price of imports.
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shares. The second term reflects the “distribution margin channel” where the wholesale
price does not move one to one with the retail price due to the existence of the distribution
margin. It is easy to verify that this part is negative with a given price of nontradables and
constant retail capacity.
Similarly, the elasticity of substitution measured at the consumer price can be derived as
follows.
−
∂ log
(
CF
CH
)
∂ log
(
PF
PH
) = − 1
θK
∂ log
(
KF
KH
)
∂ log
(
PF
PH
) + ρ (1.7)
I now compare the model using the conventional CES aggregator, denoted as CES (black),
with the model using the retail network CES aggregator, denoted as RNCES (blue). For
the CES model, the trade elasticity with respect to the producer (wholesale) price is low
in the short run and gradually back to the calibrated value in the long-run. The relative
distribution margin decreases immediately after the shock but gradually returns to zero in
the steady state. However, the trade elasticity with respect to consumer prices stays constant
since this elasticity is not affected by the distribution margin channel.
The RNCES model amplifies the difference between shot-run and long-run trade elastici-
ties. It is important to note that this amplification effect does not necessarily work through
enlarging the magnitude of responses. It is the relative magnitude of relative changes that
matters. The lower panel of graphs in figure 1.3 shows that the magnitude of responses mea-
sured by their percentage deviation from the steady state is actually smaller for the RNCES
model. For the CES model, the relative consumer price of imports over home products
increases gradually by a large amount. However, the increase in the relative consumption
is even bigger. The increase in the relative consumption is twice as much as the increase
in the relative consumer price, resulting in a constant trade elasticity at consumer prices of
2. For the RNCES model, the change in the relative price is much smaller than that for the
CES model but the difference in changes in the relative consumption between RNCES and
CES models is relatively small, resulting in a steady increase in the trade elasticity at the
consumer and producer prices over time.
1.5 The Full Model
This section considers a more realistic market structure and allows for four types of firms
interacting with each other, namely retailing manufacturers, non-retailing manufacturers,
local retailers and nontradable goods producers. For each type of tradable goods, there is
a proportion of non-retailing manufacturers who sell to local retailers and do not manage
their own retail network. Local retailers sell a range of home and foreign tradables goods,
set the retail price for each product and adjust their retail networks according to all products
they sell.
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The optimisation problem of foreign local retailer r is as follows. The foreign local retailer
r buys a range of imports and home products and sets the retail price P∗t (hr,r), P∗t ( fr,r)
to maximise its profits subject to the demand of product D∗t (hr,r), D∗t ( fr,r) and chooses
this optimal investment i∗t (r) for all products it sells subject to the law of motion of retail
capacity. For each individual product hr, fr the marginal cost is P∗im,t (hr,r), P
∗
local,t ( fr,r). The
total profit is constructed by aggregating profits and subtracting the total cost of investments
made i∗t (r)P∗N,t to extend retail capacity.
max
{P∗ι (hr ,r),P∗ι ( fr ,r),i∗ι (r)}∞ι=t
Et
∞
∑
ι=t
Qt,t+ι

∫ 1
x
[
P∗ι (hr,r)− P∗im,ι (hr,r)
]
D∗ι (hr,r)dhr+∫ 1
x
[
P∗ι ( fr,r)− P∗local,ι ( fr,r)
]
D∗ι ( fr,r)d fr − i∗ι (r)P∗N,ι

subject to
D∗t (hr,r) =
(
k∗t (r)
K∗H,t
) 1
θK
(
P∗t (hr,r)
P∗H,t
)−θH
C∗H,t
D∗t ( fr,r) =
(
k∗t (r)
K∗F,t
) 1
θK
(
P∗t ( fr,r)
P∗F,t
)−θH
C∗F,t
k∗t+1 (r) = i
∗
t (r) + (1− δ)k∗t (r)− χ2 (k∗t (r))
∫ 1
x
D∗t (hr,r)dhr − χ (k∗t (r))
∫ 1
x
D∗t ( fr,r)d fr
The law of motion of retail capacity is similar to (1.3) where χ2 (k∗t (r))
∫ 1
x D
∗
t (hr,r)dhr
and χ (k∗t (r))
∫ 1
x D
∗
t ( fr,r)d fr are the distribution costs for the sales of all imports and local
products respectively.26 In this case, home product hr competes with other home products
based on retail networks of its embedded local retailers and has a retail market share of k
∗
t (r)
K∗H,t
.
The cost of selling to local retailers is the drop in sales because the product is sold at a higher
price due to the additional markup charged by local retailers.
The optimal retail prices are given by
P∗t (hr,r) =
θH
θH − 1
[
P∗im,t (hr,r) + χ2(k
∗
t (r))P
∗
N,t
]
P∗t ( fr,r) =
θH
θH − 1
[
P∗local,t ( fr,r) + χ(k
∗
t (r))P
∗
N,t
]
The optimal price reflects two components that affect ERPT, namely the double marginalisa-
tion and the distribution margin.
26I allow for different distribution cost functions to promote local and foreign products, χ(.) and χ2(.).
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The optimal retail capacity for foreign local retailers hinges on the purchase price and
demand of all home and foreign products.
P∗N,t = EtQt,t+1

∫ 1
x
[
P∗t (hr ,r)−P∗im,t(hr ,r)−χ2(k∗t (r))P∗N,t
θKk∗t+1(r)
− χ′2
(
k∗t+1 (r)
)
P∗N,t+1
]
D∗t+1(hr)dhr
+
∫ 1
x
[
P∗t ( fr ,r)−P∗local,t( fr ,r)−χ(k∗t (r))P∗N,t
θKk∗t+1(r)
− χ′ (k∗t+1 (r))P∗N,t+1]D∗t+1( fr)d fr
+(1− δ)P∗N,t+1

For a home exporter hr its demand is the sum of demand of all foreign local retailers:
D∗t (hr) =
∫ 1
0
D∗t (hr,r)dr =
∫ 1
0
(
k∗t (r)
K∗H,t
) 1
θK
(
P∗t (hr,r)
P∗H,t
)−θH
C∗H,tdr
Substituting P∗ι (hr,r) with the price set by local retailers and using the assumption that
local retailers are homogeneous, the demand can be written as
D∗t (hr) =
(
K∗R,t
K∗H,t
) 1
θK
 θHθH−1
[
P∗im,t (hr) + χ2(K
∗
R,t)P
∗
N,t
]
P∗H,t
−θH C∗H,t
Given the demand from local retailers, the non-retailing exporter’s problem is therefore
max
P∗im,t(hr)
[
εtP∗im,t (hr)− MCt (hr)
](K∗R,t
K∗H,t
) 1
θK
 θHθH−1
[
P∗im,t (hr) + χ2(K
∗
R,t)P
∗
N,t
]
P∗H,t
−θH C∗H,t
Its optimal price is given by
P∗im,t (hr) =
θH
θH − 1
[
1
θH
χ2(K∗R,t)P
∗
N,t +
MCt (hr)
εt
]
Similarly, the optimal price for local products can be derived as
P∗local,t ( fr) =
θH
θH − 1
[
1
θH
χ(K∗R,t)P
∗
N,t + MCt ( fr)
]
The retailer’s price expressed in terms of producer’s marginal cost and distribution
margin is:
P∗t (hr,r) =
(
θH
θH − 1
)2 [
χ2(k∗t (r))P∗N,t +
MCt (hr)
εt
]
where
(
θH
θH−1
)2
reflects double marginalisation. The ERPT at retail prices is given by
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MCt(hr)
εt
χ2(k∗t (r))P∗N,t +
MCt(hr)
εt
The analytical ERPT of the retail price is similar to the expression of equation (1.4)
implying that double marginalisation does not affect ERPT at the consumer price. ERPT
will be the same if retailing and non-retailing manufacturers have the same retail capacity.
However, simulation shows that local retailers accumulate the largest amount of retail
capacity, followed by home retailing manufacturers and foreign exporters. By selling to the
local retailer, non-retailing exporters are able to utilise the large retail network accumulated
by local retailers and lower their distribution margin, resulting in a high ERPT.
The home bias in tradables arises naturally under two circumstances: (1) There exists an
iceberg trade cost or trade barriers which increase the optimal prices charged by exporters.
The increase in price lowers the demand and thus lowers the gain from investing in the retail
capacity. As a result, the foreign retailing exporters optimally reduce their retail capacity,
which lowers the market share of foreign goods and leads to home bias. (2) Ceteris paribus, it
is more costly to promote and sell the foreign good, i.e., distribution cost function for foreign
products χ2 (k) first order stochastically dominates that for home products χ (k) . The higher
cost for each unit of product sold leads to a lower level of the retail capacity for foreign
retailing exporters. In this case, the lower market share reflects the difficulty to promote and
distribute imported goods in the local market if domestic tradables and foreign tradable
goods have the same quality. With an iceberg trade cost of 3% and 10% additional cost of
distributing foreign products, the benchmark model gives an import share of 8%.
The rest of the model and their associated equilibrium conditions are presented in section
1.A in appendix. All equilibrium conditions for the extended model are summarized in
section 1.B in appendix.
1.5.1 Calibration and key statistics
On top of the calibration of the basic model, seven additional parameters need to be cali-
brated, namely τ, φH , φF, ϑ, ζ1, ζ2 and the proportion of retailing manufacturers Ξ. Following
Ghironi and Melitz (2005), the iceberg trade cost τ is set to 3%. The fixed part of the distribu-
tion cost function ϑ is calibrated such that the distribution margin is in the range of 40% to
60%. With 10% additional distribution cost for distributing foreign products (φF = 1.1φH),
the model could generate a high degree of home bias and give an import share of around 8%.
The proportion of retailing manufacturers Ξ is a parameter which may differ across markets.
I have not found enough empirical evidence to calibrate it. In the benchmark model, I select
the Ξ which matches the best with the calculated moments from data.27 ζ1 and ζ2 are related
27The basic model analyses the response of the economy assuming Ξ = 1.
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to endogenous discount factors.28 ζ1 controls the variance of the discount factor and ζ2
is chosen such that the steady state real interest rate is around 1 percent per quarter. In
figure 1.C.1, I plot simulated series of βt for different values of ζ1. Technology shocks are
assumed to follow a trend-stationary AR(1) process, Z ′t = ψZ
′
t−1 + ut,where Z t = [ZT,t, ZN,t]
is a vector of the productivity of tradable and nontradable goods respectively. I use the same
auto-correlation and variance-covariance matrices as in Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008a).
Table 1.C.3 in the appendix estimates ERPT for all types of firms using data generated by
the model. Estimation regressions take the same form as the empirical estimation regression
(1.3.1). Together with the average distribution margin reported in the key statistics table,
it can be seen that a higher distribution margin reduces the pass through. This result is
consistent with the analytical expression where the level of pass through is negatively
correlated with the distribution margin. Furthermore, the difference between the short-run
and the long-run ERPT increases in the level of the distribution margin.
The model’s ability to match data patterns of international business cycles and interna-
tional relative prices is summarised by tables 1.C.1 and 1.C.2 in the appendix. Empirical
moments are calculated based on quarterly data from 1980:1 - 2013:2. The model performs
better in terms of the correlation of international prices. In addition, the benchmark model
can successfully generate a smaller international consumption correlation compared to the
output correlation. With reasonably small frictions on distributing foreign products and a
standard iceberg trade cost, the model can generate a sizeable home bias per effect of the
retail resource competition. Introducing frictions on capacity adjustment to the benchmark
model lowers the variance of investment and further improves the fitness.
1.5.2 The analysis of impulse responses
The response to a positive productivity shock on tradable goods
Figure 1.4 presents impulse responses to a persistent positive productivity shock in the
benchmark model with frictions on capacity adjustment. The productivity shock is assumed
to follow an AR(1) process with a persistent parameter equal to 0.95. Upon the shock,
home producers of tradable goods face a lower marginal cost and choose to lower their
prices. At the equilibrium, more products are produced and the demand for labour increases,
which in turn increases the equilibrium wage. As a result, the representative household
consumes less leisure, supplies more labour and earns more. Due to the wealth effect,
the representative household consumes more domestic products as well as imports. The
real exchange rate depreciates and home products are sold more in both domestic market
and foreign markets. As tradable goods and nontradable goods are complements, more
28Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008a), the extended model
introduces the endogenous discount factor for the representative household taking the following form:
βt = ln
{
ζ1
[
1+ ζ2
(
Ct +
Mt+1
Pt + α (1− Lt)
)]}
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Fig. 1.4 In response to a positive persistent productivity shock on home tradables
0 20 40
0
0.05
0.1
w
0 20 40
0
0.5
c
0 20 40
0
0.05
0.1
pn
0 20 40
0
0.2
0.4
rex
0 20 40
−0.2
0
0.2
ca
0 20 40
−1
−0.5
0
mch
0 20 40
−0.2
−0.1
0
khd
0 20 40
0
0.5
1
chd
0 20 40
−0.4
−0.2
0
phd
0 20 40
−1
−0.5
0
pl
0 20 40
−0.02
0
0.02
mcf
0 20 40
0
0.5
kfd
0 20 40
−1
0
1
cfd
0 20 40
0
0.5
pfd
0 20 40
0
0.2
0.4
pim
0 20 40
0
0.2
0.4
kr
0 20 40
0
1
2
chr
0 20 40
−0.5
0
0.5
cfr
0 20 40
−0.4
−0.2
0
phr
0 20 40
0
0.5
pfr
0 20 40
0
0.5
1
ch
0 20 40
−0.5
0
0.5
cf
0 20 40
−0.4
−0.2
0
ph
0 20 40
0
0.5
pf
Note: The black dashed line denotes the impulse response of the benchmark model with frictions on capacity adjustment.
Impulse responses are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state. The horizontal axis denotes quarters after
the shock. Please check table 1.B.2 for references of variable names.
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Fig. 1.5 In response to a positive persistent productivity shock on home nontradable goods
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Note: The black dashed line denotes the impulse response of the benchmark model with frictions on capacity adjustment.
Impulse responses are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state. The horizontal axis denotes quarters after
the shock. Please check table 1.B.2 for references of variable names.
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nontradable goods are needed as sales of tradable goods rise. The price of nontradable goods
goes up. The expected increase in sales for home products drops over time as the technology
shock dies out. Similarly, the price of nontradable good falls gradually after a large impulse
increase. Knowing that the price of nontradables is high today but low tomorrow, home
retailing manufacturers choose to disinvest today and increase their investment when the
price of investment is at a relatively low level. This gives an example where a lower price
and a higher expected demand are not accompanied by an increase in the retail capacity due
to horizontal competitions of retail resources with local retailers.
Due to the spillover effect, foreign exporters face an increase in marginal cost. Upon the
shock, foreign retailing manufacturers increase their price and face a drop in demand of
around 5%. As a result, the consumption of home products increases while the consumption
of foreign products goes down. The relative consumption drops. The foreign exporters will
have a large drop in quantities sold in home markets if they do not adjust their distribution
capacity. Although the price of investment is relative high now, the benefit of the gain
in demand outweighs the cost of investment, and foreign retailing manufacturers invest
gradually to increase their retail market share. In this case, the relative retail capacity goes
up gradually. The positive effect of a higher retail market share on demand dominates the
negative effect of a high price. The demand for foreign products increases.
As specified in the previous section, the investment decision of local retailers depends on
the quantity and price of both home and foreign products. Non-retailing manufacturers do
not have controls over their retail networks and their prices decrease proportionally to the
marginal cost shock. Similarly, import prices of foreign non-retailing manufacturers increase
slightly per effect of the exchange rate depreciation and the small increase in their marginal
cost. The relative price of retailing manufacturers decreases. Retailers face an increase in
demand for home produced products and a decrease in demand for imported goods. At
equilibrium, they end up choosing to extend their retail networks to amplify the gain from
home products and partially make up their loses from imports.
Shock on nontradable goods
A positive and persistent shock on nontradable goods reduces the marginal cost of producers
of nontradable products. The price of nontradables thus decreases and sales of nontradables
increase. The demand of labour increases, giving rise to a higher wage. At the equilib-
rium, the representative household supplies more labor and consumes more, increasing the
demand of all products.
Local retailers, home and foreign retailing manufacturers choose to expand their retail
capacity subject to two effects, namely the demand effect and price effect. On the one hand,
expected demand increases, which gives rise to larger total benefit of investment in retail
capacity and thus induces a higher retail capacity holding. On the other hand, the price of
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investment is low at the moment and is expected to increase. It is optimal to invest now and
disinvest when the cost is high. Due to frictions on adjusting retail capacity, the capacity
cannot adjust directly to the desired level. Simulation shows that the price effect outweighs
the demand effect with the retail capacity reaching the highest after 15 quarters.
The marginal cost of home tradable goods increases and home retailing manufacturers
increase their price. However, the price increase of home retailing manufacturers is less than
the drop in their marginal cost as the distribution cost drops. Prices of imports increase
more than home prices due to the depreciation of real exchange rates. Note that the pass
through for import prices is very high. Given a small increase in the marginal cost, the
import price almost increases one-to-one to the real exchange rate. At the consumer level, the
price of these products increases less than the price of imported products does. The relative
price of local retailer selling products rises. As a consequence, sales of foreign retailing
manufacturers drop initially. To prevent a further decline in their demand, it is optimal for
them to invest more in the retail capacity compared to home retailing manufacturers. Their
sales gradually go up as their retail networks expand. The choice of expanding the retail
capacity is also based on fact that the expected demand in the future is relatively high as
the exchange rate of home country depreciates. The relative demand is initially lower than
the steady state value but gradually goes up as the foreign retail capacity expands until the
depreciation stops.
1.5.3 Trade elasticities
Table 1.1 presents OLS estimation results of elasticity of substitutions based on simulated
series. In the benchmark model without frictions on adjusting investment, any shock that
changes the desired retail capacity will be adjusted instantly. In column (1) , regressions
controlling for relative retail capacity (part a) reflect the short-run trade elasticity. This
elasticity is captured by the coefficient on the change of relative price, e.g. | − 1.9782|.
Regression results of part (b) imply the long-run trade elasticity.
The first set of regressions estimate the trade elasticity between home and foreign trad-
ables goods. These goods include products of both retailing and non-retailing manufacturers.
The estimated short run trade elasticity is around the calibrated value of 2. The coefficient on
the relative change in retail capacity is positive, consistent with the analytical decomposition
in equation (1.6). The second set of regressions estimate the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign retailing manufacturers. This elasticity in the short-run is slightly lower
than the calibrated value and the implied long-run elasticity is as high as 4.22. The last set of
regressions measure the elasticity of substitution between retailers selling home products
and imports. Estimations of part (c) and (d) in the bottom panel are based on relative retail
prices and relative producer prices respectively.
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Table 1.1 Estimated elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products
(1) (2)
Dependent
Variable
Explanatory
Variables Benchmark
Benchmark + Capacity
Adjustment Friction
Y : log CF,tCH,t
(a):
log PF,tPH,t -1.9782 -2.0367
(0.0110) (0.0010)
log KF,tKH,t 0.6857 0.7141
(0.0050) (0.0006)
R2 0.9810 0.9981
(b):
log PF,tPH,t -3.2442 -1.9029
(0.0076) (0.0110)
R2 0.9476 0.7504
Y : log CFD,tCHD,t
(a):
log PFD,tPHD,t -1.7962 -0.8125
(0.0161) (0.0200)
log KFD,tKHD,t 0.8549 0.4982
(0.0044) (0.0079)
R2 0.9539 0.3323
(b):
log PFD,tPHD,t -4.2215 -0.6137
(0.0226) (0.0267)
R2 0.7777 0.0647
Y : log CRF,tCRH,t
(c):
log PRF,tPRH,t -3.5466 -3.7320
(0.0462) (0.0148)
R2 0.3710 0.8634
(d):
log PIM,tPL,t -2.1369 -2.2249
(0.0277) (0.0146)
R2 0.3749 0.8620
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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The column (2) presents results of the model with frictions on retail capacity adjustments.
The short-run trade elasticity is estimated to be 2.03, similar to the benchmark model. Since
the retail capacity cannot be adjusted immediately, estimates of part (b) are similar to those
of part (a). Note that adding frictions on retail capacity adjustment changes the dynamics of
responses of home and foreign retailing manufacturers. Decisions on prices and optimal
capacity are more complicated as these firms react based on their expectations of future
nontradable price and their shares of retail networks. The estimated trade elasticity reacts in
a smaller magnitude compared to the benchmark model due to a stronger competition effect
from local retailers. The associated R-squared is much lower compared to the benchmark
model, indicating that there exists non-pricing explanatory factors and that the current
regression specification fails to capture the adjustment process of relative consumption.
In the bottom panel, the estimated coefficients are very similar in two model specifica-
tions. This is due to the separation between pricing and retailing decisions. Non-retailing
manufacturers only make price decisions at each period, taking the local retailer’s decision
on the optimal retail capacity as given. In addition, when the local retailer adjusts its retail
capacity, home and foreign non-manufacturers are affected equally as they share the same
retailing network.
1.5.4 Price volatility and distribution margin
In this subsection, I discuss the model implications on the connections among distribution
margin, price volatility and ERPT. Specifically, I derive the short-run analytical expression of
the correlation between price volatility and ERPT in terms of the distribution margin, and
explore the long-run relationship using simulated data from the model.
Recall that the optimal price of home retailing manufacturers at the foreign country can
be expressed as:
P∗t (hd) =
θH
θH − 1
[
MCH,t
εt
− χ2(k∗t (hd))P∗N,t
]
This expression can be approximated by
p∗t (hd) ≈ −
MCt(hd)
εt
MCt(hd)
εt
+ χ2(k∗t (hd))P∗N,t
(zt (hd) + et) +
χ2(k∗t (hd))P∗N,t
MCt(hd)
εt
+ χ2(k∗t (hd))P∗N,t
(ωt (hd))
where p∗t (hd) is approximated at the first order around time t, and p∗t (hd) ,zt (hd) , et,
ωt (hd) represent the first difference of logged variable P∗t (hd) , Zt (hd) , εt and distribution
cost χ2 (k∗t (hd))D∗t (hd).
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Define ηt (hd) ≡ χ2(k
∗
t (hd))P
∗
N,t
MCt(hd)
εt
+χ2(k∗t (hd))P∗N,t
which is proportional to the distribution margin at
time t and the analytical pass through equals 1− ηt (hd). The short-run variance around t
can be written as
var (p∗t (hd)) =
[1− ηt (hd)]2 var (zt (hd) + et) + ηt (hd)2 var (ωt (hd))
−2ηt (hd) [1− ηt (hd)] cov (zt (hd) + et,ωt (hd))
Note that both short-run pass though and price volatility are functions of distribution
margin. Although the retail capacity fails to adjust in the short run, the price of nontradables
may not be constant. With idiosyncratic shocks that do not alter the price of nontradables,
the second and third terms on the right hand side are nearly zero and the exchange rate pass
through is perfectly correlated with price volatility. In order for short-run pass through to be
positively correlated with the short-run price volatility, the following expression must be
true:
∂var (p∗t (hd))
∂ [1− ηt (hd)] =
2 [1− ηt (hd)]var (zt (hd) + et)− 2ηt (hd)var (ωt (hd))
−2 [1− 2+ 2ηt (hd)] cov (zt (hd) + et,ωt (hd))
> 0
Since idiosyncratic shock is unlikely to be correlated with change in aggregate prices and
exchange rates, we have
var (zt (hd)) >
1
1− ηt (hd) [var (ωt (hd)) + cov (zt (hd) + et,ωt (hd))]
−var (zt (hd) + et +ωt (hd))
In the short run where the retail capacity fails to adjust, the exchange rate pass through
of a firm is positively correlated with the volatility of its import price if (a) the size of the
idiosyncratic shocks is very large and (b) its distribution margin is low. According to (b), an
increase in distribution margin reduces the correlation between ERPT and price volatility,
i.e.,
∂2var (p∗t (hd))
∂ [1− ηt (hd)]∂ηt (hd) =−2 [var (zt (hd) + et) + var (ωt (hd)) + 2cov (zt (hd) + et,ωt (hd))]< 0
According to Berger and Vavra (2013), firm idiosyncratic shocks account for more than
90% of the total variance of prices, which suggests a high correlation between ERPT and
exchange volatility. If the relationship holds in short run, the long-run volatility of price
must be decreasing in the distribution margin.
To understand the long-run properties of price volatility, I run several regressions of
simulated response of prices to idiosyncratic shocks as well as aggregate shocks. I examine
additional idiosyncratic shocks of different sizes to individual firms and calculate firms’
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responses over 10000 periods based on simulated aggregate variables. Variances are calcu-
lated based on logged and first differenced variables. p f r, pim and p f d denote home retail
prices of foreign non-retailing manufacturers, home import prices of foreign non-retailing
manufacturers and home retail prices of foreign retailing manufacturers respectively. Results
are summarised in table 1.2. The first regression for each price is similar to the one run by
Berger and Vavra (2013). In the first set of regressions (labelled with (1)), the corresponding
coefficients on the variance of nominal exchange rate are always significant. However, the
low R-squared of these regressions suggests that the change in exchange rate only explains a
very small part of the variance of the import prices.
The second set of regressions (labelled with (2)) add the variance of marginal cost of the
firm and its distribution margin. Coefficients on marginal costs are highly significant for all
three prices. The contribution of the variance of distribution margin is low for p f r and pim.
Note that these types of firms sell their product through local retailers and cannot adjust
their retail capacity under the idiosyncratic shocks. These two regressions illustrate that
the change in nontradable prices does not affect the variance of the price significantly for
non-retailing manufacturers. On the contrary, the variance of distribution margin explains
40% for retailing manufacturers.
The last set of regressions (labelled with (3)) separate the idiosyncratic shocks from
aggregate shocks and separate the change in retail capacity from the change in nontradable
prices. Results show that idiosyncratic shocks are important in explaining variance of prices.
The effect of aggregate shocks is significant for non-retailing manufacturers but not for
retailing manufacturers. In addition, the coefficient of variance of aggregate productivity
shock on retail prices of non-retailing manufacturers is lower compared to the second set of
regressions, suggesting that local retailers partially adjust their retail networks.
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1.6 Conclusion
Understanding movements of international prices lies in the heart of open macroeconomic
studies. The degree of ERPT, the trade elasticity and the volatility of import price are three
key measures that govern the behaviour of international prices. This paper explores the
role of the dynamics of local distribution margin in explaining the connections among these
three measures.
I investigate the empirical property of distribution margin and find the following patterns.
First, distribution margin differs greatly across industries within a country. Second, while
the difference in distribution margin is relatively large for the same industry across countries,
this difference is substantially smaller at the aggregate level. Third, the variance of the retail
price margin shows a high degree of heterogeneity. Fourth, I find a positive relationship
between estimated distribution margin and ERPT for 10 European countries as predicted by
theoretical models.
I extend Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and model distribution as an investment decision in
retail capacity. The slow adjustment of retail capacity restricts the change in demand in the
short-run and gives a natural explanation to the trade elasticity puzzle. I show that the trade
elasticity can be decomposed into 3 channels and estimate the quantitative importance of
each channel in explaining the short-run and long-run discrepancies in the trade elasticity.
The model contributes to the literature on market structures with strategic vertical and
horizontal interactions. In the extended model, retailing manufacturers compete for retail
resources with local retailers. The optimal decisions of retailing manufacturers depend on
the responses of local retailers and non-retailing manufacturers. Since the price elasticity
of demand is a function of the distribution margin, the aggregate level of ERPT and trade
elasticity are sensitive to the proportion of each type of firms.
As an extension of the analysis, I investigate the role of retail capacity in explaining the
empirical positive relationship between price volatility and ERPT. With the proposed model,
I show analytically and quantitatively that an increase in the long-run average distribution
margin reduces the correlation between price volatility and ERPT. In the short run where
the retail capacity fails to adjust, ERPT of a firm is positively correlated with the volatility of
its import price if (a) the size of idiosyncratic shocks is large and (b) its distribution margin
is low.
Appendix
Appendix 1.A Derivations
1.A.1 Solve for the consumer’s problem
The representative household’s problem can be rewritten as:
Ut = max Et
∞
∑
ι=t
ι
∏
ω=t
βω

1
1−σ
 Mι+1Pι + (1+ iι) BH,ιPι + (1+ i∗ι ) ε ιBF,ιPι + ∫ 10 πι(c,j)dcPι
+
∫ 1
0 πι(h,j)dh
Pι +
WιLι
Pι − TιPι − MιPι −
BH,ι+1
Pι −
εtBF,ι+1
Pι
1−σ
+ 11−σ
(
Mι+1
Pι
)1−σ
+ α (1−Lι)
1−ν
1−ν

First order conditions:
The Euler equation:
BH,t+1,BF,t+1 :
C−σt
Pt
= βt (1+ it+1)Et
(
C−σt+1
Pt+1
)
εtC−σt
Pt
= βt (1+ i∗t+1)Et
(
εt+1C−σt+1
Pt+1
)
Foreign counterparts:
B∗H,t+1,B
∗
F,t+1 :
(C∗t )
−σ
εtP∗t
= βt (1+ it+1)Et
[(
C∗t+1
)−σ
εt+1P∗t+1
]
(C∗t )
−σ
P∗t
= βt (1+ i∗t+1)Et
[(
C∗t+1
)−σ
P∗t+1
]
Optimal money holding Mt+1 :
Mt+1 =
(
χt
1+ it+1
it+1
) 1
σ
PtCt
Labour supply Lt :
WtC−σt
Pt
= α (1− Lt)−ν
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Combine the first order conditions with respect to BH,t+1 and B∗H,t+1 or B
∗
F,t+1 and BF,t+1
to get the international risk sharing condition:
εtP∗t (C∗t )
σ
Pt (Ct)
σ =
βtEt
[
1
Pt+1(Ct+1)
σ
]
β∗t Et
[
1
εt+1P∗t+1(C∗t+1)
σ
] = βtEt
[
εt+1
Pt+1(Ct+1)
σ
]
β∗t Et
[
1
P∗t+1(C∗t+1)
σ
]
1.A.2 Solve the producer’s problem with quadratic investment adjustment costs
max
{P∗ι (hd),k∗ι+1(hd)}∞ι=t
Et
∞
∑
ι=t
Qt,t+ι
 [εtP
∗
t (hd)− (1+ τ)MCH,t]D∗t (hd)
−
[
i∗ι (hd) +
γ(i∗ι (hd)−i)
2
2k∗ι (hd)
]
ε ιP∗N,ι

subject to
k∗t+1 (hd) = i
∗
t (hd) + (1− δ)k∗t (hd)− χ2 (k∗t (hd))D∗t (hd)
(
Qt,t+ιεtP∗N,ιλ
∗
1,t (hd)
)
D∗t (hd) =
(
k∗t (hd)
K∗H,t
) 1
θK
(
P∗t (hd)
P∗H,t
)−θH
C∗H,t
(
Qt,t+ιεtP∗N,ιλ
∗
2,t (hd)
)
MCH,t =
Wt
ZH,t
,
where the Lagrangian multiplier for the corresponding constraint is represented in the
bracket. The optimal pricing function and its corresponding retail capacity are derived by
taking first order conditions with respect to the following variables:
P∗t (hd) :
εtP∗t (hd) = θhdεtP
∗
N,tλ
∗
2,t (hd)
D∗t (hd) :
[εtP∗t (hd)− (1+ τ)MCH,t] = −P∗N,tεtλ∗1,t (hd)χ2 (k∗t (hd))− λ∗2,t (hd) εtP∗N,t
i∗ι (hd) :
1+
γ
(
i∗t (hd)− i
)
kt (hd)
= −λ∗1,t (hd)
where −λ∗1,t (hd) measures the marginal cost of adjusting capacity.
k∗t+1 (hd) :
−εtP∗N,tλ∗1,t (hd) = EtQt,t+1
 εt+1P∗N,t+1
γ(i∗t+1(hd)−i)
2
2k∗t+1(hd)
2 − εt+1P
∗
t+1(hd)
θH
D∗t+1(hd)
θKk∗t+1(hd)
−P∗N,t+1εt+1λ∗1,t+1 (hd)
[
(1− δ)− χ′2
(
k∗t+1 (hd)
)
D∗t+1(hd)
]

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Combine the first order conditions with respect to P∗t (hd) and D∗t (hd) to get the optimal
price:
P∗t (hd) =
θH
θH − 1
[
MCH,t
εt
− λ∗1,t (hd)χ2(k∗t (hd))P∗N,t
]
1.A.3 Solve the local retailer’s problem with quadratic investment adjustment
costs
max Et
∞
∑
ι=t
Qt,t+ι

∫ 1
x
[
P∗ι (hr,r)− P∗im,ι (hr,r)
]
D∗ι (hr,r)dhr+∫ 1
x
[
P∗ι ( fr,r)− P∗local,ι ( fr,r)
]
D∗ι ( fr,r)d fr
−
[
i∗ι (r) +
γ(i∗ι (r)−i)
2
2kι(r)
]
P∗N,ι

subject to
k∗t+1 (r) = i
∗
t (r) + (1− δ)k∗t (r)
− χ2 (k∗t (r))
∫ 1
x
D∗ι (hr,r)dhr − χ (k∗t (r))
∫ 1
x
D∗ι ( fr,r)d fr
(
Qt,t+ιP∗N,ιλ
∗
1,t (r)
)
D∗t (hr,r) =
(
k∗t (r)
K∗H,t
) 1
θK
(
P∗ι (hr,r)
P∗H,t
)−θH
C∗H,t
(
Qt,t+ιP∗N,ιλ
∗
2,t (hr,r)
)
D∗t ( fr,r) =
(
k∗t (r)
K∗F,t
) 1
θK
(
P∗ι ( fr,r)
P∗F,t
)−θH
C∗F,t
(
Qt,t+ιP∗N,ιλ
∗
2,t ( fr,r)
)
,
where the Lagrangian multiplier for the corresponding constraint is represented in the
bracket. The optimal pricing function and its corresponding retail capacity are derived by
taking first order conditions with respect to the following variables:
P∗t (hr,r) :
P∗t (hr,r) = θHP∗N,ιλ
∗
2,t (hr,r)
P∗t ( fr,r) :
P∗t ( fr,r) = θHεtP∗N,tλ
∗
2,t ( fr,r)
D∗t (hr,r) :[
P∗t (hr,r)− P∗im,t(hr,r)
]
= −P∗N,tλ∗1,t(r)χ2 (k∗t (hr,r))− λ∗2,t(hr,r)P∗N,t
D∗t ( fr,r) :[
P∗t ( fr,r)− P∗local,t ( fr,r)
]
= −P∗N,tλ∗1,t (r)χ (k∗t ( fr,r))− λ∗2,t ( fr,r)P∗N,t
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i∗ι (r) :
1+
γ
(
i∗t (r)− i
)
kt (r)
= −λ∗1,t (r)
k∗t+1 (r) :
−P∗N,tλ∗1,t (r) = EtQt,t+1

P∗N,t+1
γ(i∗t+1(r)−i)
2
2k∗t+1(r)
2 −
∫ 1
x
P∗t+1(hr ,r)
θH
D∗t+1(hr ,r)
θKk∗t+1(r)
dhr
−∫ 1x P∗t+1( fr ,r)θH D∗t+1( fr ,r)θKk∗t+1(r) d fr − P∗N,t+1λ∗1,t+1 (r) (1− δ)
P∗N,t+1λ
∗
1,t+1 (r)
[
χ′2
(
k∗t+1 (r)
)∫ 1
x D
∗
t+1(hr,r)dhr
+χ′
(
k∗t+1 (r)
)∫ 1
x D
∗
t+1( fr,r)d fr
]

Combine the first order conditions with respect to P∗t (h) and D∗t (h) to get the optimal
price:
P∗t (hr,r) =
θH
θH − 1
[
Pim,t(hr,r)− λ∗1,t (r)χ2(k∗t (hr,r))P∗N,t
]
1.A.4 Aggregations and resource constraints
Aggregate consumptions, retail capacity and prices are aggregated in the same way as in the
basic model. The only difference is that we need to take into account the proportion of two
groups of firms.
CH,t ≡
[∫ x
0
(
kt (hd)
KH,t
) 1
θH θK
Ct (hd)
θH−1
θH dhd +
∫ 1
x
(
kt (hr)
KH,t
) 1
θH θK
Ct (hr)
θH−1
θH dhr
] θH
θH−1
CF,t ≡
[∫ x
0
(
kt ( fd)
KF,t
) 1
θH θK
Ct ( fd)
θH−1
θH d fd +
∫ 1
x
(
kt ( fr)
KF,t
) 1
θH θK
Ct ( fr)
θH−1
θH d fr
] θH
θH−1
KH,t ≡
[∫ x
0
kt (hd)
1
θK dhd +
∫ 1
x
kt (hr)
1
θK dhr
]θK
,
KF,t ≡
[∫ x
0
kt ( fd)
1
θK d fd +
∫ 1
x
kt ( fr)
1
θK d fr
]θK
PH,t =
[∫ x
0
(
kt (hd)
KH,t
) 1
θK
pt (hd)
1−θH dhd +
∫ 1
x
(
kt (hr)
KH,t
) 1
θK
pt (hr)
1−θH dhr
] 1
1−θH
,
PF,t =
[∫ x
0
(
kt ( fd)
KF,t
) 1
θK
pt ( fd)
1−θH d fd +
∫ 1
x
(
kt ( fr)
KF,t
) 1
θK
pt ( fr)
1−θH d fr
] 1
1−θH
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At the aggregate level the investment of the retail capacity for home tradables IDH,t,
home retailers IR,t and foreign tradables IDF,t are given by:
IDH,t =
∫ x
0
[kt+1 (hd) + χ(kt (hd))Ct (hd)− (1− δ)kt (hd)]dhd
IDF,t =
∫ x
0
[kt+1 ( fd) + χ2(kt ( fd))Ct ( fd)− (1− δ)kt ( fd)]d fd
IR,t = KR,t+1 + χ2(KR,t)CFR,t + χ(KR,t)CHR,t − (1− δ)KR,t
The demand for nontradable goods is consumer demand for the nontradables plus the
sum of the investment of retail capacity for home tradables and foreign tradables.
Dt (n) =
(
pt (n)
PN,t
)−θN
[CN,t + IDF,t + IDH,t + IR,t]
The optimal price is given by
pt (n) = PN,t =
θN
θN − 1 MCN,t
From the aggregate resource constraint, the aggregate labour used is equal to the per
unit labour cost times the total quantity produced.
Lt =
YN,t
ZN,t
+
YH,t
ZH,t
=
IDH,t + IDF,t + IR,t + CN,t
ZN,t
+
CH,t + C∗H,t
ZH,t
1.A.5 The current account
The stochastic discount factor Qt,t+1 is defined such that the expectation of this discount
factor is just the inverse of the nominal interest rate29.
Qt,t+1 ≡ βt PtC
σ
t
Pt+1Cσt+1
, EQt,t+1 =
1
1+ it+1
, E
[
Qt,t+1
εt+1
εt
]
=
1
1+ i∗t+1
The following three equations describe the equilibrium conditions of the international
bond holding and balance of the current account.
BH,t = −B∗H,t, BF,t = −B∗F,t
At ≡ At+1 − Mt = BH,t + εtBF,t =− B∗H,t − εtB∗F,t = −εt
(B∗H,t
εt
+ B∗F,t
)
= −εt A∗t
29See the first order condition of the nominal bond holding for the consumer’s optimisation problem in the
appendix.
40 ERPT and Retail Capacity
When calculating the price of imports and exports, I subtract the distribution cost from
the consumer price for the price of direct exporters.
NXt = εt
(
P∗HD,t − χ2
(
K∗HD,t+1
)
P∗N,t
)
C∗HD,t + εtP
∗
IM,tC
∗
HR,t
− (PFD,t − χ2 (KFD,t+1)PN,t)CFD,t − PIM,tCFR,t
The balance of trade is simply adding the net export to the capacity account.
Et
{
Qt,t+1 At+1
}
= At + NXt
Appendix 1.B Summary of Equilibrium Conditions
The world equilibrium is characterised as follows. Given the strict inflation targeting
monetary policy, the stochastic process of the productivity shock, and the initial conditions of
bond holding and money holding, the equilibrium is given by the above set of endogenous
variables which satisfy (a) the consumer’s optimisation constraints such that home and
foreign representative households maximise their utility; (b) producers’ optimal price choice
and retailers’ optimal capacity choice such that producers and retailers in the home and
foreign country maximise their profit; (c) market clear constraints and (d) aggregate resource
constraints. The summary of equilibrium conditions of the home country is given as follows,
the corresponding foreign equilibrium conditions can be easily derived:
Table 1.B.1 Summary of equilibrium conditions
Endogenous discount
factor of consumer
preference:
βt ≡ log{ζ2 [1+ ζ1 (Ct + α (1− Lt))]}
Definition of the
stochastic discount
factor:
Qt,t+1 ≡ βt PtC
σ
t
Pt+1Cσt+1
Accounting identity for retail
capacity investment:
IHD,t = KHD,t+1 + χ(KHD,t)CHD,t − (1− δ)KHD,t
IFD,t = KFD,t+1 + χ2(KFD,t)CFD,t − (1− δ)KFD,t
IR,t = KR,t+1 + χ(KR,t)CHR,t + χ2(KR,t)CFR,t − (1− δ)KR,t
Aggregate resource
constraint: Lt =
YN,t
ZN,t
+
YH,t
ZH,t
=
IHD,t+IFD,t+IR,t+CN,t
ZN,t
+
CH,t+C∗H,t(1+τ)
ZH,t
Continued on next page...
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Table 1.B.1: Summary of equilibrium conditions – continued
Labour equilibrium: WtC−σt
Pt = α (1− Lt)
−ν
Retail capacity
aggregation:
KH,t ≡
[
xK
1
θK
HD,t + (1− x)K
1
θK
R,t
]θK
,
KF,t ≡
[
xK
1
θK
FD,t + (1− x)K
1
θK
R,t
]θK
Retail market share:
SH,t =
(KH,t)
1
θK
(KH,t)
1
θK +(KF,t)
1
θK
,SF,t =
(KF,t)
1
θK
(KH,t)
1
θK +(KF,t)
1
θK
SHD,t =
(
KHD,t
KH,t
) 1
θK ,SFD,t =
(
KFD,t
KF,t
) 1
θK
Consumer’s demand:
CN,t =
(
PN,t
Pt
)−ϕ
Ct,CT,t =
(
PT,t
Pt
)−ϕ
Ct
CH,t = SH,t
(
PH,t
PT,t
)−ρ
CT,t,CF,t = SF,t
(
PF,t
PT,t
)−ρ
CT,t
CHD,t = xSHD,t
(
PHD,t
PH,t
)−ρ
CH,t,CFD,t = xSFD,t
(
PFD,t
PF,t
)−ρ
CF,t
CHR,t = (1− x) (1− SHD,t)
(
PHR,t
PH,t
)−θH
CH,t,
CFR,t = (1− x) (1− SFD,t)
(
PFR,t
PF,t
)−θH
CF,t
Price aggregation: PT,t =
[
SH,tP
1−ρ
H,t + SF,tP
1−ρ
F,t
] 1
1−ρ , Pt =
[
P1−ϕT,t + P
1−ϕ
N,t
] 1
1−ϕ
PH,t =
[
xSHD,tP
1−θH
HD,t + (1− x) (1− SHD,t)P1−θHHR,t
] 1
1−θH
PF,t =
[
xSFD,tP
1−θH
FD,t + (1− x) (1− SFD,t)P1−θHFR,t
] 1
1−θH
Current account:
Et
{
Qt,t+1 At+1
}
= At + CAt
CAt = εt
(
P∗HD,t − χ2
(
K∗HD,t+1
))
C∗HD,t + εtP∗IM,tC∗HR,t −
(PFD,t − χ2 (KFD,t+1))CFD,t − PIM,tCFR,t
Continued on next page...
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Table 1.B.1: Summary of equilibrium conditions – continued
International risk
sharing condition:
εtP∗t (C∗t )
σ
Pt(Ct)
σ =
βtEt
[
1
Pt+1(Ct+1)
σ
]
β∗t Et
[
1
εt+1P
∗
t+1(C∗t+1)
σ
] = βtEt
[
εt+1
Pt+1(Ct+1)
σ
]
β∗t Et
[
1
P∗t+1(C∗t+1)
σ
]
Optimal retail capacity:
−PN,tλR1,t = EtQt,t+1

PN,t+1
γ(IR,t+1−i)
2
2KR,t+1
2 − PHR,t+1θH
DHR,t+1
θKKR,t+1
− PFR,t+1θH
DFR,t+1
θKKR,t+1
− PN,t+1λR1,t+1 (1− δ)
PN,t+1λ
R
1,t+1
 χ′ (KR,t+1)DHR,t+1
+χ′2
(
KR,t+1
)
DFR,t+1


− PN,tλ
FD
1,t
εt
=
EtQt,t+1

PN,ι+1
εt+1
γ(IFD,t+1−IFD)2
2(KFD.t+1)
2 − PFD,t+1εt+1θH
CFD,t+1
θKKFD,t+1
− PN,t+1λ
FD
1,t+1
εt+1
[(1− δ)− χ′2 (KFD,t+1)CFD,t+1]

−PN,tλHD1,t =
EtQt,t+1
 PN,ι+1
γ(IHD,t+1−IHD)2
2(KHD.t+1)
2 − PHD,t+1θH
CHD,t+1
θKKHD,t+1
−PN,t+1λHD1,t+1 [(1− δ)− χ′ (KHD,t+1)CHD,t+1]

1+
γ(IFD,t−IFD)
KFD,t
= −λFD1,t
1+
γ(IHD,t−IHD)
KHD,t
= −λHD1,t
1+
γ(IR,t−IR)
KR,t
= −λR1,t
Optimal price setting:
PFD,t =
θH
θH−1
[
εt MCF,t (1+ τ)− λFD1,t χ2(KFD,t)PN,t
]
PHD,t =
θH
θH−1
[
MCH,t − λHD1,t χ(KHD,t)PN,t
]
PHR,t =
θH
θH−1
[
PL,t − λR1,tχ(KR,t)PN,t
]
PFR,t =
θH
θH−1
[
PIM,t − λR1,tχ2(KR,t)PN,t
]
PL,t =
θH
θH−1
[
MCH,t − 1θH λR1,tχ(KR,t)PN,t
]
Continued on next page...
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Table 1.B.1: Summary of equilibrium conditions – continued
PIM,t =
θH
θH−1
[
εt MCF,t (1+ τ)− 1θH λR1,tχ2(KR,t)PN,t
]
PN,t =
θN
θN−1 MCN,t
Marginal costs: MCN,t =
Wt
ZN,t
, MCH,t =
Wt
ZH,t
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Table 1.B.2 List of aggregate variables
Variables Description SimulationForm
εt Nominal exchange rate q
Pt CPI p
PT,t Price index of tradable goods pt
PF,t Consumer price index of imports pf
PH,t Consumer price index of home produced goods ph
PN,t Price index of nontradable goods pn
PHD,t
Consumer price of goods produced by home retailing manufacturers
(Subscript D means distributing by itself) phd
PHR,t
Consumer price of goods produced by home non-retailing
manufacturers (Subscript R means selling to local retailer) phr
PFD,t
Consumer price of goods imported from foreign retailing
manufacturers (Subscript D means distributing by itself) pfd
PFR,t
Consumer price of goods imported from foreign non-retailing
manufacturers (Subscript R means selling to local retailer) pfr
PL,t Wholesale price of goods produced by home retailing manufacturers pl
PIM,t
Wholesale price of goods produced by home non-retailing
manufacturers pim
Ct Aggregate consumption c
CT,t Consumptions of tradable goods ct
CH,t Consumptions of home produced goods ch
CF,t Consumptions of imports cf
CN,t Consumptions of nontradable goods cn
CHD,t Consumptions of goods produced by home retailing manufacturers chd
CHR,t
Consumptions of goods produced by home non-retailing
manufacturers chr
CFD,t
Consumptions of goods imported from foreign retailing
manufacturers cfd
CFR,t
Consumptions of goods imported from foreign non-retailing
manufacturers cfr
MCN,t Marginal cost of nontradable good producers mcn
MCH,t Marginal cost of domestic tradable good producers mch
KHD,t retail capacity of home retailing manufacturers kdh
KFD,t retail capacity of foreign retailing manufacturers kdf
KR,t retail capacity of retailers kr
IHD,t Investment made by home retailing manufacturers idh
IFD,t Investment made by foreign retailing manufacturers idf
IR,t Investment made by retailers ir
Lt Equilibrium employment l
Wt Nominal wage w
Qt,t+1 Stochastic discount factor dis
At Net international bond holding a
REXt Real exchange rate ≡ εtP∗tPt rex
TOTt Terms of trade ≡ PF,tεtP∗H,t tot
Note: This list presents the simulation form of home variables. The simulation forms of relative prices are measure by the
foreign variable over the home variable. Simulation forms of foreign variables are denoted with a suffix “s”.
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Table 1.B.3 Calibration
Parame-
ters Description
Bench-
mark
Calibra-
tion for
the basic
model
β Discount factor 0.99 0.99
δ Depreciation rate on retail capacity 0.025 0.025
ν Disutility of labour 2 2
σ Risk aversion 2 2
ρ
Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
tradable goods 2 2
ϕ
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and
nontradable goods 0.74 0.74
θH Elasticity of substitution within home tradable goods 15.3 15.3
θN Elasticity of substitution within nontradable goods 7.7 7.7
θK Elasticity of retail aggregation factor 1.4 1.4
φH
Effectiveness of retail capacity on distributing home
products 0.3 0.3
φF
Effectiveness of retail capacity on distributing foreign
products 0.33 0.3
ϑ Fixed distribution cost per unit 0.5 0
Ξ Proportion of retailing manufacturers 0.2 –
τ Iceberg trade cost 0.03 –
γ Frictions on retail capacity adjustment 0.00 10
ζ1 Parameter 1 of the endogenous discount factor -0.005 –
ζ2 Parameter 2 of the endogenous discount factor 3 –
Note: “Benchmark + Retail Capacity Adjustment Friction” in the paper defers to the benchmark calibration with
frictions on retail capacity adjustment γ = 10.
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Appendix 1.C Statistics and Graphs
Table 1.C.1 Key statistics
Statistics U.S. data Benchmark
Benchmark +
Retail
Capacity
Adjustment
Friction
BKK
Business Cycle Correlations
rGDP, Consumption 0.91 0.97 1.00 0.79
rGDP, Employment 0.85 0.89 0.99 0.94
rGDP, Investment 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.27
rGDP, Net exports -0.69 -0.26 -0.21 -0.02
TOT, Net exports -0.17 0.07 -0.06 -0.84
C/C∗, REX -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.98
Volatility (standard deviation)
relative to rGDP
Consumption 0.85 0.97 1.07 0.79
Employment 0.75 0.45 0.59 0.47
Investment 3.10 – – 10.94
(a) ID,H – 2.79 0.49 –
(b) ID,F – 4.92 0.92 –
(c) IR – 3.20 0.76 –
Net exports 0.29 0.11 0.86 2.90
International Correlations
ZH,t, ZF,t 0.42 0.47 0.30
ZN,t, Z∗N,t -0.08 -0.05 –
Real GDP 0.68 0.34 0.58 -0.18
Consumption 0.46 0.29 0.65 0.88
labour 0.42 0.13 0.64 0.47
Pimport, Pexport 0.89 0.36 0.00 -1.00
Pimport, REX 0.57 0.38 -0.34 -1.00
Pexport, REX 0.58 0.33 0.85 1.00
TOT, REX 0.47 0.48 0.99 1.00
Avg. Distribtuion Margin
Home retailing manufacturers 0.36 0.36
Foreign retailing manufacturers
at Home
0.47 0.47
Home local retailer selling
home product
0.38 0.38
Home local retailer selling
foreign product
0.38 0.38
Note: Statistics are calculated based on logged & HP-filtered quarterly time series. The “U.S. data” column presents statistics
calculated during the period 1995:1-2012:12. Data sources can be found in table 1.C.4.
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Table 1.C.3 Estimated ERPT from simu-
lated data
Prices Benchmark
Short Run Long Run
P∗HD 0.3794 0.4746
(0.0062)
P∗HR 0.4594 0.5178
(0.0047)
P∗IM 0.9406 0.9471
(0.0005)
P∗H 0.4532 0.5153
(0.0048)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Fig. 1.C.1 Plot of the endogenous discount factor
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1.C.1 Empirical distribution margin, ERPT and international business cycle es-
timates
Table 1.C.4 Data sources
Series Frequency Periods Source
Export, Import Prices
of the United States
Quarterly
1990:1-
2013:2
Export/import price index all
commodities, the U.S. Bureau
of Labour Statistics
Real Effective
Exchange Rate;
Bilateral Nominal
Exchange Rate
Quarterly;
Monthly
1990:1-
2013:2
International Financial
Statistics, IMF
Terms of Trade Quarterly
1990:1-
2013:2
Datastream
Business Cycle Series:
Consumption,
Investment, Total
Hours Worked, Net
Exports
Quarterly
1995:1-
2013:2
OECD Main Economic
Indicators; OECD Economic
Outlook
Distribution Margins Annual 1995-2010
Supply Table at current prices
of the National Accounts,
Eurostat Database
Sectoral Retail Price
Margins
Monthly
2009:3-
2013:8
The U.S. Bureau of Labour
Statistics
Bilateral
Import/Export Unit
Value Indices
Monthly
1995:1-
2001:12
COMEXT (Eurostat) Database
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Table 1.C.5 Variances of retail price margins in the United States
Industries Variance (%)
Food and alcohol retailing 0.0353
Health and beauty care retailing, including optical goods 0.1098
Apparel, jewellery, footwear, and accessories retailing 0.1400
Computer hardware, software, and supplies retailing 1.0974
TV, video, and photographic equipment and supplies retailing 1.0658
Automobiles and automobile parts retailing 0.0539
Manufactured (mobile) homes retailing 0.0813
RVs, trailers, and campers retailing 0.0592
Sporting goods, including boats, retailing 0.0422
Lawn, garden, and farm equipment and supplies retailing 0.0525
Furniture retailing 0.1889
Flooring and floor coverings retailing 0.1820
Hardware and building materials and supplies retailing 0.2181
Major household appliance retailing 1.6423
Fuels and lubricants retailing 1.4924
Cleaning supplies and paper products retailing 0.1188
Book retailing 0.0451
Other merchandise retailing (partial) 0.0307
All products 0.0199
Note: Statistics are calculated based on Retail Producer Price Indexes of the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics from 2009:3 to
2013:8.
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Chapter 2
Decomposing Exchange Rate Pass
Through – Evidence from Chinese
Exporters
We develop a new approach to estimating demand-side exchange rate pass
through, also known as pricing-to-market, for multi-product multi-destination
exporting firms. We then examine the pass through of nominal exchange rate fluc-
tuations and local CPI fluctuations into export prices of Chinese firms’ products.
A sequential fixed effects estimator is employed to examine the extent to which
Chinese firms adjust their markups in different foreign markets in response to
bilateral and global exchange rate movements. We assess how markups vary
over time by firm structure and by product features. Finally, we develop a simple
model to disentangle the importance of bilateral (renminbi to local currency)
versus multilateral exchange rate fluctuations to firms’ pricing behavior.
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2.1 Introduction
In this paper1, we use highly-disaggregated data on the universe of Chinese exports to
examine exchange rate pass through (ERPT), the export price responsiveness to changes in
the bilateral, nominal value of the renminbi (rmb) vis-a-vis the currencies of 161 importing
countries over 2000-2011. We develop a new approach to identifying and estimating a
specific component of ERPT, the price markup elasticity of exported goods (in exporter’s
currency) with respect to bilateral exchange rate movements. Our analysis makes three
empirical contributions. First, using this new estimator on Chinese data, we find a markup
elasticity for Chinese exporters of 5.6-6.6% over 2000-2011. This implies that, after accounting
for marginal cost changes, 93-95% of bilateral exchange rate movements are passed through
to import prices (in importer’s currency). Second, we identify considerable heterogeneity
across Chinese firms in the extent to which they engage in pricing to market across destina-
tions, with some types of firms adjusting markups by more than 10%. Finally, we confirm
that the Chinese export price to a destination (importing) country responds not only to
the bilateral (rmb to importer currency) exchange rate movements but also to multilateral
currency movements that are orthogonal to movements in the bilateral (rmb to importer)
exchange rate. More importantly, although both bilateral and orthogonal multilateral move-
ments contribute to export price changes, only the bilateral exchange rate impacts on the
destination-specific markup elasticity.
Our analysis begins with the observation that the price of an imported good can be
decomposed into three parts: (a) the good’s production costs in the origin (exporting)
country including any parts or components that were imported into that origin country, (b)
a markup, i.e., an increase in the price charged over and above production costs that reflects
how much market power an exporting firm has in a destination (importing) country, and (c)
the costs associated with marketing and distributing a good to consumers in the destination
(importing) country. At least since Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and Corsetti, Dedola and
Leduc (2008), it has been well understood that movements in the exchange rate would
impact on each of these components differently, depending not only on structural factors,
such as the intensity of market competition in the destination (importing) country, but also
on the the source of the shocks that caused the movement in the exchange rate. Empirical
models that fail to recognise the need to distinguish the differential effect of exchange rates
on each component of prices and ignore the underlying source of the shocks to the exchange
rate yield estimates of ERPT that are of limited usefulness in guiding policymakers.
The approach we take focuses on micro, firm-level data. Among the leading firm-level
studies to date are Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) and Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings
(2014), both of which find evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions of Corsetti
1This chapter is sourced from my working paper with Dr. Meredith Crowley at University of Cambridge and
Associate Professor Huasheng Song at Zhejiang University.
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and Dedola (2005).2 Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012) find that larger, more productive
French firms adjust their markups more than smaller, less productive firms in response to
exchange rate changes (pass through is lower); Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) use data
on Belgian firms to show that firms with higher shares of imported components tend to
adjust their export prices more than firms with less reliance on imported parts. While both
papers break important new ground, both need to rely on imperfect controls for changes in
production costs of individual producers, without which it is not possible to obtain accurate
estimates of the mark-up elasticity. In this paper, we develop and implement a methodology
to improve the empirical accuracy of this essential parameter.
The novel methodology consists of a sequential fixed effects estimator applied to a large,
high-dimensional unbalanced panel dataset, covering the universe of firm and product level
trade transactions for a country. Motivated by the observation that 71% of Chinese exporters
export their products to more than one destination, we develop and employ a Gagnon
and Knetter (1995) type identification strategy which exploits export price information
from multi-destination firms. Because the same product of an exporter which is exported to
multiple destinations should have the same marginal cost, we could exploit price differentials
across destinations in response to an exchange rate shock to estimate the markup elasticity.
However, we show that simply applying a conventional method of adding destination
fixed effects to highly disaggregated firm-level data would produce biases in estimates of
the markup elasticity due to endogenous changes in a firm’s product-level trade pattern.
We demonstrate that when the purpose of the study is to estimate markup elasticities by
controlling for the effect of unobserved marginal cost, the sequence in which fixed effects are
introduced matters. We construct a sequential fixed effects estimator at the firm-product level
to eliminate the time-varying marginal cost component from prices in order to recover the
destination specific markup and estimate its responsiveness to exchange rate movements.3
The estimator is designed to deliver a more accurate estimate of the responsiveness of
the markup component arising from country-specific changes in import demand. We argue
that this estimator is better at controlling for time-varying marginal cost at the firm-product
level than alternative controls like time-varying firm-level TFP. Moreover, because our
methodology has a low data requirement (i.e., it does not require the detailed firm-level data
used in the computation of TFP), there is a distinct practical advantage to our estimator.4
In practice, the estimator’s low data requirement facilitates the estimation of the markup
elasticity for groups of firms for which national manufacturing censuses do not collect data.
In providing guidance to policy, we argue that this methodology is superior to other, more
2An alternative approach to this question has aimed to capture the differential impact of exchange rate shocks
on components of prices with macro time series models (Forbes, et. al., 2015) and disaggregated analysis by
sectors that attempt to reconcile sectoral and aggregate estimates (Lewis, 2016).
3Our estimator is robust to Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010) style of S-period differences and enables
us to estimate the markup elasticity conditional on price changes.
4For example, our estimator can be applied to customs transactions data which is available for many countries.
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conventional approaches, which average out the effect of different shocks, and/or may rely
on information which is aggregated and imprecise as regards production costs.
Economic theory suggests that there are cost-side and demand-side factors which con-
tribute to incomplete ERPT. On the cost side, an appreciation of rmb against other currencies
would be expected to reduce Chinese export prices because Chinese firms that use imported
inputs in production would experience a decrease in their marginal production costs. On
the demand side, profit-maximizing firms which face less elastic demand and command
more market power in destination (importing) countries would be expected to reduce their
markups in the face of an rmb appreciation. Together, these two effects could generate
reductions in export prices (in exporter’s currency) and incomplete ERPT.
First, using a conventional estimator of ERPT (Gopinath and Rigobon (2008)), we find the
ERPT of China’s exporters is high. Conditional on a price change, the rmb price of Chinese
exports responds to nominal bilateral exchange rate shocks by 20%; this means that 80% is
passed through to the price denominated in the local destination currency. Although our
estimated ERPT is higher than those estimates obtained from sector or industry-level price
indices5, our finding is consistent with recent studies on exporters using firm-level data (e.g.
Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014)).
Second, with our estimator, we isolate the markup adjustments of Chinese firms and
find that, conditional on price changes, markup adjustments account for one-third to one-
half of the total ERPT for China’s exporters over 2000-2011. There is substantial markup
responsiveness to exchange rate movements by all Chinese exporters of 5.6-6.6% over 2000-
2011. This finding is important because a traditional estimator of ERPT (e.g. Gopinath,
Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010)) finds evidence of substantially incomplete pass through;
that is, firms adjust export prices to dampen the transmission of exchange rate shocks to
consumers. However, this traditional estimator cannot inform us as to whether export price
adjustment occurs via the passing through of a firm’s gain/loss on the cost side versus an
adjustment of its markup.6
Third, we document heterogeneity in the markup responsiveness to bilateral exchange
rate changes. For example, over 2005-2011, 25% of Chinese export value was exported by
“trading firms.”7 We estimate the markup elasticity of these firms as ranging from 7.4-13.5%
(2000-2011), roughly 2-4 times higher than other Chinese exporters. Further, we estimate
higher markup responsiveness for firms exporting to a set of seven high-income countries
5Knetter (1989), Knetter (1993), Goldberg and Campa (2006).
6Fitzgerald and Haller (2014) take a different methodological approach to estimating markup adjustments
and find that Irish firms adjust prices to maintain markups in local currency.
7See the appendix for a definition of trading firms. Chinese trading firms, which are somewhat unique in
terms of their history and structure, might directly manufacture goods, but they also serve as trade intermediaries.
Our approach enables estimation of the markup elasticity for firms of this type for which the construction of
timing varying production costs is not feasible.
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that use freely floating major currencies other than the US dollar of 8.0% (all firms, 2000-2011)
and 13.5% (trading firms, 2000-2011).
Fourth, we evaluate the effect of the switch of the exchange rate regime in China in
2005 from a peg to a managed peg/float and find evidence for a unique role of the dollar
as an international currency [Gopinath (2015)]. We first estimate how export prices (in-
clusive of production costs) change in response to bilateral exchange rate movements and
the orthogonal component of the importing country’s multilateral exchange rate against
currencies other than the rmb. This approach verifies that, after controlling for the bilateral
rmb-importer currency, the orthogonal component of the importer’s multilateral exchange
rate has a significant effect on exporters’ prices. In other words, as suggested by Dornbusch
(1987) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and empirically verified by Auer and Schoenle
(2016), competitive pressure from other exporters in a destination influences Chinese prices.
More importantly, with our estimator, we are able to distinguish the contribution of the
orthogonal multilateral exchange rate movement to the Chinese export price (inclusive of
costs and global demand factors) versus the destination markup. Our results suggest that
the competition effect on the destination markup arising from idiosyncratic exchange rate
shocks between the trading partner and its trading partners is small.
Our final contribution is to integrate a canonical partial equilibrium model of firm-level
export prices with shocks from macro data series to study the sensitivity of estimated ERPT
to the explanatory variables that our reduced form estimates suggest are important. Specifi-
cally, we study three possible causes of incomplete ERPT apart from nominal rigidities. The
first category explains incomplete ERPT by considering oligopolistic markets in which the
optimal adjustment of the markup depends on the curvature of demand and the market
structure.8 The second group emphasizes the importance of the local component of the con-
sumer price, e.g., the importance of local distribution costs9. The third group is represented
by the recent work of Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) which focuses on the impact
of the exchange rate on marginal cost through imported inputs. Our model confirms the
importance of the firm’s import share, the pass-through of exchange rates into the prices of
imported inputs and the role of local distribution cost in ERPT estimation. We also reaffirm
our estimator is robust to various specifications of firm-specific cost factors. Finally, our
simulation results suggest that firm-specific factors account for around half of the general
equilibrium effect of price adjustments due to exchange rate movements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a brief review of
recent contributions. Section 2.3 presents the general pricing equation for a firm exporting
to multiple destinations. Section 2.4 discusses our empirical identification strategy. Section
2.5 summarizes the database and presents statistics on Chinese exporters. Section 2.6 and
2.7 present our empirical results on bilateral and multilateral ERPT respectively. Section 2.8
8Dornbusch (1987), Atkeson and Burstein (2007), Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
9Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003), Corsetti and Dedola (2005)
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builds a numerical model to understand how changing key parameters of the firm’s pricing
equation affects the estimates of ERPT. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
A consistent finding of the exchange rate pass through (ERPT) literature is that export prices
denominated in local currency do not react one-to-one to bilateral exchange rate movements.
The literature suggests that the lack of pass through is mainly driven by three channels:
(a) nominal rigidities, where the export price is rigid in local currency; (b) a marginal cost
channel, where marginal cost of a product could be correlated with exchange rate movements
through direct channels such as imported inputs or indirect channels through change of the
production scale as in Marston (1990); (c) a pricing to market channel, where an exporter
optimally chooses to stabilize its export price denominated in local currency due to an
oligopolistic market structure and the existence of a local distribution cost.
As discussed in Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008a),
controlling for the marginal cost is of particular importance for understanding how exporters
pass through exchange rate shocks to their prices. At the aggregate level, the literature has
used various proxies to control for the marginal cost. The most commonly used two are
the nominal wage index10 and the PPI of the exporting country11. Although industrial cost
measures might be good proxies for the average cost, they fail to capture the true marginal
cost.
A number of recent studies of ERPT12 have used firm-level data and emphasized the role
of markup adjustments as an impediment to the transmission of exchange rate shocks into
international prices. Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), for example, have improved the ap-
proximation accuracy of the marginal cost by taking into account the estimated productivity
of the exporter and the cost of its total imported inputs. Their method gives the most precise
proxy of the firm’s marginal cost so far. However, the productivity estimation often involves
complicated matching process across datasets. Due to the frequency limitations of annual
industrial survey, only annual productivity estimation can be used. Another limitation
is that an exporter may simultaneously export many products. It may be problematic to
just assume all products share the same marginal cost, while dropping multi-product firms
10e.g. Goldberg and Campa (2005)
11e.g. Marazzi, Sheets, Vigfusson, Faust, Gagnon, Marquez, Martin, Reeve, and Rogers (2005)
12Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) find that French exporters raise export prices in response to a depreciation
of their currency against a destination currency. Moreover, this markup adjustment is larger for more productive
firms, implying that PTM by the most productive and largest exporters contributes to low pass-through into
import prices. Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) examine the role of markup adjustment and imported inputs
in pass through for Belgian firms. They find that firms with greater shares of imported inputs and larger export
sales have lower pass through.
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involves a significant drop in data points and loss of information13. In addition, it is often
not clear which imported input is used to produce the exported product.
The most relevant paper in terms of the methodology is Fitzgerald and Haller (2014)
which studies the markup adjustments of Irish exporters and uses their domestic sale price
as the reference to control for unobserved cost shifts. They find strong evidence of pricing to
market by Irish firms (i.e., stable prices in consumer currency implying full pass through
of markup adjustments to producer currency conditional on price changes). Interestingly,
this is qualitatively different from what we observe for Chinese firms. While Fitzgerald and
Haller (2014) find that conditional on a price change, Irish firms adjust markups in exporter
currency by almost 100%, we find that Chinese firms adjust their markups in exporter
currency by 5-10%. This implies that although the price of the good in consumer’s currency
is rising with an rmb appreciation, this price increase is dampened by only a small reduction
in markup charged in the currency of the consumer. One possible explanation for these
observed differences between Irish and Chinese firms might be due to the firm’s choice of
an invoicing currency. The Irish firms studied by Fitzgerald and Haller (2014) invoiced their
export transactions in the destination market currency - sterling.
2.3 A General Pricing Equation
We consider the problem of a firm f located in China that can sell its output i domestically
or in N foreign countries which are denoted d1,d2, ...,dN . For destination market d1, the
Chinese firm’s problem is to set a price in rmb given the bilateral exchange rate rate between
the rmb and the destination country d1’s currency, the economic environment in China,
including macroeconomic conditions and firm and product-specific variables Xi f t, the eco-
nomic environment in destination d1, Xi f d1t, including preferences for firm f ’s product i, the
bilateral exchange rates of all other countries whose firms compete with Chinese firms in
market d1, e d2
d1
,t
, ..., e dN
d1
,t
, and features of the economic environments in countries d2 through
dN that impact on the costs of firms that compete against Chinese firms in destination d1,
Xd2t, ..., XdN t.
Prmbi f d1t = f
(
e CHN
d1
,t, e d2
d1
,t
, ..., e dN
d1
,t
, Xi f t, Xi f d1t, Xd2t, , ..., XdN ,t, ε f hd1t
)
(2.1)
Pd1i f d1t =
Prmbi f d1t
e CHN
d1
,t
(2.2)
where Prmbi f d1t stands for the rmb price of the product i sold by firm f to destination d1 at time
t and Pd1i f d1t is the price of that same good in country d1’s currency; CHN stands for China.
13Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) report 95% of Belgian firms are multi-product exporters.
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Without loss of generality, we can separate the effect of changing exchange rates and
economic fundamentals into supply and demand components associated with China and
destination d1 (Si f d1t and Di f d1t) and with destination d1 and its trading partners, d2, ...,dN ,
(S−d1t and D−d1t) respectively.
Si f d1t ≡ gS ,d1(e CHNd1 ,t, Xi f t) (2.3)
Di f d1t ≡ gD,d1(e CHNd1 ,t, Xi f d1t) (2.4)
S−d1t ≡ gS ,−d1(e d2
d1
,t
, ..., e dN
d1
,t
, Xd2,t, ..., XdN ,t) (2.5)
D−d1t ≡ gD,−d1(e d2
d1
,t
, ..., e dN
d1
,t
, Xd2,t, ..., XdN ,t) (2.6)
Therefore, the pricing equation can be simplified to
Prmbi f d1t = ftrans f ormed
(Si f d1t,Di f d1t,S−d1t,D−d1t, ε i f d1t) (2.7)
We assume that the pricing equation (3.25) is log linear in its components14 and rewrite
it as:
log(Prmbi f d1t) = β0,d1 + β1,d1 log(Si f d1t) + β2,d1 log(Di f d1t) (2.8)
+ β3,d1 log(S−d1t) + β4,d1 log(D−d1t) + log(ε i f d1t)
Traditional approaches to estimating ERPT regress the exporter’s price in exporter’s
currency on the bilateral exchange rate between the origin and destination. From equation
(2.8), it is clear that any bilateral exchange rate movements (rmb/d1) can operate either
through destination-specific demand-side factors (Di f d1t) or origin and firm-specific supply
side factors (Si f d1t). Our primary objective is to develop an estimator that can identify
and decompose the impact of bilateral exchange rate movements on price changes into
components operating through idiosyncratic demand factors in each destination and firm-
product specific cost. A secondary objective of our analysis is to examine what role, if any,
currency movements of other countries play in the firm’s pricing decision. Third country
currency movements could affect the costs of a Chinese firm via an imported input channel
or they could affect the intensity of competition the firm faces in a destination country.15
We develop an estimator that can identify the responsiveness of the export price markup
and the demand-side component of prices to bilateral and multilateral exchange rate move-
ments. To simplify the exposition of our problem, we begin by presenting the identification
problem under the assumption that supply and demand factors associated with countries
d2, ...,dN do not influence the pricing decision of the firm in country d1. We then present
14As shown in section 2.4, our empirical strategy also works under the existence of possible interactive effects.
15Dornbusch (1987), Atkeson and Burstein (2007), Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
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results associated with the bilateral estimator. We will relax this assumption in section 2.7
and report the more general results on the impact of bilateral and multilateral exchange rate
movements on prices.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
To illustrate how identification works with our estimator, we present (2.8) as a parsimonious
pricing equation and discuss existing approaches for estimating ERPT, the biases that can
arise under these approaches, and the advantages of our estimator. We write the price of a
Chinese exporting firm f selling a good i in destination d in year t as a function of these four
factors - firm, product, destination and year - and interactions between these factors.16
p f hdt = Fi +F f +Fd +Ft
+Fi f +Fid +Fit +F f d +F f t +Fdt
+F f dt +Fidt +Fi f t +Fi f d
+Fi f dt + ε i f dt
(2.9)
where the coefficients in front of factors are omitted for clarity. Some of the factors governing
pricing, for example, Fd and Fid are best understood as demand-side factors, like destination
specific tastes for all goods and for good i, respectively. Other factors, F f and F f t are
firm-level supply factors. The term Fi f d captures a time-invariant match of supply and
demand, i.e., destination d’s idiosyncratic preference for the product i manufactured by
firm f . Time-varying factors common to all Chinese firms (Chinese GDP growth, Chinese
inflation) are captured by Ft.
The most challenging component for econometricians interested in ERPT is the time-
varying unobserved marginal cost of the product i produced within the firm, Fi f t . Impor-
tantly, this factor is not only unobserved by the econometrician, but it is also potentially
unobservable to the agents in a multi-product firm because the allocation of some firm-level
costs across products is not conceptually well-defined. The key object of interest, the bilateral
exchange rate between China and country d is captured by the factor Fdt which also includes
macro variables for country d like CPI and GDP growth.
We emphasize two additional time-varying factors that reflect important heterogeneity
in ERPT across firms. The term F f dt embodies any variation across firms in the extent of
ERPT associated with variables like a firm’s market share in a destination which, in turn,
reflects the firm’s market power in a destination. Similarly, Fi f dt captures any interactions
between the bilateral exchange rate between China and destination d that impact on the
firm’s marginal cost in producing good i. From Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012), who
16We will return to a richer specification that includes multilateral competition later.
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find that larger, more productive French firms have lower pass-through than smaller, less
productive firms, and Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), who find similar differences in
ERPT between large and small firms in Belgium, we know that these interaction terms are
quantitatively significant in ERPT.
From (2.9), it is straightforward to see a high-dimensional (product-firm-destination)
fixed effect achieves a similar result as an S-period difference in terms of eliminating unob-
served confounding factors. After including product-firm-destination (i f d) fixed effects, the
equation simplifies to:
p˜i f dt = F f +Fi +Fd+F˜t
+Fi f +Fid +F f d + F˜it + F˜ f t + F˜dt
+ F˜ f dt + F˜idt + F˜i f t+Fi f d
+ F˜i f dt + ε˜ i f dt
(2.10)
in which the tilde sign above a variable indicates that it is the deviation in the underlying
variable from the i f d fixed effect, i.e., x˜j ≡ xj −∑j xj/nJ ∀j ∈ {t, it, f t,dt, f dt, idt, i f t, i f dt}
Alternatively, taking an S-period difference over time yields:
∆s p f hdt = Fi +F f +Fd+∆sFt
+Fi f +Fid +F f d + ∆sFit + ∆sF f t + ∆sFdt
+ ∆sF f dt + ∆sFidt + ∆sFi f t+Fi f d
+ ∆sFi f dt + ∆sε i f dt
(2.11)
where ∆sxj,t ≡ xj,t − xj,t−s ∀j ∈ { f , i, f ,d, f d, id, i f , i f d}.
The problem with estimating either (2.10) or (2.11) directly, is that neither approach
controls for the product specific marginal cost within the firm, Fi f t, which is unobserved
and correlated with the key variable of interest, the bilateral exchange rate, Fdt. In an effort
to control for the missing unobserved variable, a typical ERPT estimator is constructed by
taking first differences of (2.9) and adding firm-product-year dummies. This yields as an
estimating equation
∆˜pi f dt = ∆˜Fdt
+ ∆˜F f dt + ∆˜Fidt + ∆˜Fi f dt + ∆˜ε i f dt
(2.12)
in which ∆˜xj ≡ xj −∑j∆xj/nJ ∀j ∈ {dt, f dt, idt, i f dt}.
We make two comments here. First, the conventional method of ERPT estimation is
essentially a sequential partition process applying two sets of high-dimensional fixed effects.
That is, (2.12) is equivalent to sequentially adding i f d dummies and i f t dummies to (2.9). In
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a balanced panel, if the covariances between the bilateral exchange rate and the terms in the
second line of (2.12) are zero, then this procedure recovers an unbiased estimate of ERPT.
However, more generally, when bilateral ERPT varies systematically with firm-level
variables, like firm-level TFP, covariances between the exchange rate and terms in the second
line of (2.12) are non-zero (e.g., cov(∆˜Fdt, ∆˜Fi f dt) ̸= 0).17 Further, datasets of firm-product
export prices to destinations are unbalanced because the set of destinations served by a
firm changes endogenously with exchange rate movements. As we show below, these
two features of data on firm-product prices combine to generate biases in ERPT under the
approach described by (2.12).
2.4.1 Identification from orthogonal dimensions with an interaction term
We propose an estimator of the markup adjustment in export prices to bilateral exchange rate
movements which allows for interactions between unobserved firm-product-time specific
factors and bilateral exchange rates in an unbalanced panel. The estimator is free of the
bias inherent in the standard approach in the literature. We argue that the presence of an
interaction term between the rmb-destination exchange rate and firm-product unobserved
variables in the firm’s pricing equation implies that the order of partition in a sequential fixed
effects procedure matters. If controlling for unobserved firm-product marginal costs, Fi f t, is
the primary concern, destination fixed effects (rather than firm-product-year dummies or
S-period differences) need to be applied first.
The estimation procedure is as follows:
1. For each set of firm-product-year observations, demean all variables by destination.
2. For each firm-product-year triplet, formulate a string that records the triplet’s associ-
ated trade pattern, i.e., the set of destinations for that triplet, e.g., VN-KR-JP.
3. Run a regression of the destination demeaned variables with the trade pattern fixed
effect.
p˜i f dt = κ0 + κ1,t e˜dt ++X˜′dtκ2 + TPi f t + u˜i f dt
where edt is the bilateral exchange rate (rmb/d1), Xdt is a vector of destination-specific macro
variables including local CPI and real GDP, x˜jt ≡ xjt − ∑j xjt/nJ ∀j ∈ {d, i f d}, and TPi f t
is a string variable of the set of destinations to which firm f exports product i in year t.
Intuitively, the trading pattern strings facilitate apples-to-apples comparisons across sets of
firm-product prices in different periods and prevent the introduction of bias associated with
endogenously changing trade patterns.
17As noted earlier, Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) document variation in ERPT as a function of firm-level
productivity for French firms.
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In the next sections and appendix 2.B.3, we show that even if there are interactions
between the exchange rate and unobservable marginal cost, the estimate of κ1,t is the price
responsiveness to the exchange rate evaluated at the mean of exporters’ marginal costs, in
other words, the price markup elasticity.
Consistency of the estimator in a balanced panel
The essence of our estimation procedure is to take advantage of multi-dimensional panel
data and utilize orthogonal dimensions between variables to exactly identify the parameter
of interest. To illustrate how the estimator works, we present some simple stylized examples.
First consider a simple pricing equation in which price varies cross-sectionally by firm
and by destination and an interaction between these components is included, but in which
there is no common time factor driving the cross-sectional variables, the destination-specific
bilateral exchange rate (ed) and the firm’s marginal cost (mc f ).
p f d = β0 + β1ed + β2mc f + β3ed ∗mc f + u f d (2.13)
If we regress p f d on ed,
p f d = γ0 + γ1ed + u f d
the optimal γ̂1 is given by
γ̂1 =
∑ f ∑d(ed − e)(β1ed + β2mc f + β3ed ∗mc f )
∑ f ∑d(ed − e)2
= β1 +
β3∑ f
[
mc f ∑d(ed − e)2
]
∑ f ∑d(ed − e)2
= β1 + β3mc
γ̂1 gives the price markup elasticity, i.e., ERPT when marginal cost is evaluated at its
mean value across all firms. The estimator controls for the first order effect of cross-sectional
variation in mc f and incorporates the second order interaction effect. The estimated γ̂1 is
ERPT evaluated at the mean of the exporters’ marginal costs. Our estimator captures the
true markup adjustment regardless of whether or not the true underlying pricing equation
includes an interaction term. However, if there is an interaction term and conventional
methods are applied, the estimate of ERPT will be biased.
Next, we present a more realistic example in which firm and destination variables share
a common time-varying factor. This example illustrates that our estimator can cope with the
cross-destination comparison problem, i.e., cross-destination comparisons of macro variables
including nominal exchange rates and CPI are meaningless. Essentially, we want to use cross
destination variation in prices to control for time-varying unobserved marginal costs, but
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still exploit the intertemporal variation in nominal exchange rate and CPI series to identify
the price markup elasticity.
Consider a more realistic pricing equation in which the unobserved variable mc f t shares
a common dimension t with the policy variable of interest edt.
p f dt = β0 + β1edt + β2mc f t + β3edt ∗mc f t + u f dt
Partitioning out firm-time fixed effects, i.e., demeaning variables along the destination
dimension, yields
p˜ f dt = β0 + β1e˜dt + β3e˜dt ∗mc f t + u˜ f dt.
Taking a second partition for destination fixed effects, i.e., demeaning variables along
the firm-time dimension, yields
p˜SFEf dt = β0 + β1e˜
SFE
dt + β3(e˜dt ∗mc f t)SFE + u˜SFEf dt
At this stage, it is important to possess the capability to separate the term (e˜dt ∗mc f t)SFE
into two components, the variation of our observed variable e˜dt and that of the unobserved
variable mc f t. As we will show in the next subsection, an incorrect partition order will make
the term (e˜dt ∗mc f t)SFE non-separable in an unbalanced panel. We have:
(e˜dt ∗mc f t)SFE = 1nFnTnD
[
nFnT(nDedt −∑
d
edt)mc f t −∑
t
∑
i
(nDedt −∑
d
edt)mc f t
]
=
1
nTnD
[
nT(nDedt −∑
d
edt)mc f t −∑
t
(nDedt −∑
d
edt)mct
]
∑
f
(e˜dt ∗mc f t)SFE = nFnTnD
[
nT(nDedt −∑
d
edt)mct −∑
t
(nDedt −∑
d
edt)mct
]
=
nF
nTnD
[
nT(nDedt −∑
d
edt)−∑
t
(nDedt −∑
d
edt)
]
mct
If we run the regression p˜SFEf dt = γ0 + γ1,t e˜
SFE
dt + u˜
SFE
f dt , then we are able to estimate the
price markup elasticity evaluated at the mean of the unobserved variable, marginal cost,
for each time period γ1,t = β1 + β3mct18. For example, we can run a regression with time
interaction factors or run regressions separately for each time period to obtain the desired
estimator.
We next highlight another important property of our estimator. Under our proposed
partition order, simply regressing p˜SFEf dt on e˜
SFE
dt will yield a consistent estimator of γ =
18The level effect has been differenced out and the interaction effect is evaluated at the average value of the
unobserved variable for each time period.
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β1 + β3mc as long as the volatility of the time component of edt is not correlated with the
time component of the unobserved variable mc f t.
Suppose we run the following regression in which the parameter of interest is assumed
to be time invariant, p˜SFEf dt = γ0 + γ1e˜
SFE
dt + u˜
SFE
f dt . Then the optimal γ̂1 is given by
γ̂1 =
∑i∑d∑t
{
(e˜SFEdt − e˜SFE)
[
β1e˜SFEdt + β3(e˜dt ∗mc f t)SFE
]}
∑i∑d∑t(e˜SFEdt − e˜SFE)2
= β1 + β3
∑i∑d∑t
{
(e˜SFEdt − e˜SFE)(e˜dt ∗mc f t)SFE
}
∑i∑d∑t(e˜SFEdt − e˜SFE)2
= β1 + β3
∑d∑t
{
(e˜SFEdt − e˜SFE)2mct
}
∑d∑t(e˜SFEdt − e˜SFE)2
.
Note that the process edt can be approximated as edt = vt + vd + vt ∗ vd. Under this
approximation, we could rewrite γ̂1 as19
γ̂1 = β1 + β3
∑d∑t
{
[(vt − ∑t vtnT )(vd −
∑d vd
nD
)]2mct
}
∑d∑t[(vt − ∑t vtnT )(vd −
∑d vd
nD
)]2
= β1 + β3
∑t(vt − ∑t vtnT )2mct
∑t(vt − ∑t vtnT )2
Note that
E[(vt − ∑t vtnT )
2]E[mct] = E[(vt − ∑t vtnT )
2mct]− cov[(vt − ∑t vtnT )
2,mct] (2.14)
If cov[(vt − ∑t vtnT )2,mct] = 0, we can obtain the estimator evaluated at the mean of the
unobserved variable E[γ̂1] = β1 + β3E[mc]. In the context of our problem, this condition is
generally satisfied because the volatility of the exchange rate is not systematically correlated
with the level change in firms’ marginal costs. We estimate specifications with and without
time interaction dummies. Empirically, the difference between these two specifications is
small.
19
where e˜SFEdt − e˜SFE =
1
nFnTnD
[
nFnTnDedt − nFnT∑
d
edt − nD∑
t
∑
i
edt +∑
i
∑
t
∑
d
edt
]
=
1
nTnD
[
nD(nTedt −∑
t
edt)−∑
d
(nTedt −∑
t
edt)
]
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Consistency in an unbalanced panel
Having discussed how our proposed procedure works in a balanced panel, we construct
numerical examples to show how and explain why the order of partition matters in an
unbalanced panel with interactive unobserved variables.
We construct a three-dimensional numerical example in which the price p f dt is deter-
mined by three unobserved factors, v1, f ,v1,d,v1,t, each varying along a particular dimension
( f , d, and t), the bilateral nominal exchange rate, edt, and the unobserved marginal cost, mc f t.
We further allow for interactions between the unobserved marginal cost and the exchange
rates. I is an indicator variable that takes values of 0 or 1. The data generating process for
export prices is given below:
p f dt = I1v1, f + I2v1,d + I3v1,t + β1edt + mc f t + I4β2edt ∗mc f t + u f dt (2.15)
edt = v1,d + v1,t + v2,d + v2,t + v3,d ∗ v3,t + v4,d ∗ v4,t
mc f t = v1, f + v1,t + v2, f + v2,t + v5, f ∗ v5,t + v4, f ∗ v4,t
vj,k ∼ N(0,1) ∀j ∈ {1,2,3,4,5},k ∈ { f ,d, t, f dt}
In this example, bilateral exchange rates, edt, and firm specific marginal costs, mc f t,
co-move for three reasons. The first macro shock, v1,t, directly affects all variables, p f dt, edt,
and mc f t. The second macro shock, v2,t, affects exchange rates and firm marginal costs
directly; this shock only influences prices through the exchange rate and the marginal cost.20
The destination-specific shock, v4,d, has a cross-sectional impact on exchange rates and
marginal costs. Interactions between factors, such as v4,d ∗ v4,t and v4, f ∗ v4,t, ensure that
variables p f dt, edt, and mc f t are correlated with each other in all possible dimensions. Finally,
the bilateral exchange rate and the firm-level marginal cost each contains an idiosyncratic
interaction, v3,d ∗ v3,t and v5, f ∗ v5,t, respectively.
The objective is to estimate ERPT given that marginal cost is unobserved; i.e., we want to
estimate β1 + β2mct where mct ≡ ∑ f mc f t/nF when we do not observe vj,k, nor do we know
the data generating process of edt and mc f t.
We simulate data for 200 firms, 10 destinations and 10 time periods to compare the
results obtained from our estimator and those from the conventional methods, as can be
seen from table 2.1. Estimates from the conventional method used in Gopinath and Rigobon
(2008), referred to hereafter as the GR methodology, are calculated by first taking S-period
differences at the firm-destination level and then adding year fixed effects. We also compare
our results (denoted as CHS) to the high-dimensional fixed effects estimator proposed
by Correia (2016) which, as shown below, addresses the biases in an unbalanced balance
associated with the variation along a single dimension, but cannot correct for the bias
associated with the presence of interactions between dimensions. These are reported under
20For example, an aggregate origin-country productivity shock.
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the column “reghdfe". For the unbalanced panel experiment, we construct a missing data
pattern similar to what we observe in the Chinese customs database. In particular, for each
firm-year combination, we randomly generate 3 missing values (out of 10) for price p f dt.
We repeat this process for firm-destination combinations, and generating 3 missing values
among the remaining observations21.
Table 2.1 Comparison of estimators on simulated data
Balanced Panel Unbalanced Panel Theoretical
I1 I2 I3 I4 GR reghdfe CHS GR reghdfe CHS
0 0 0 0 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.28*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
1 1 1 0 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.34*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
0 0 0 1 0.93*** 0.88*** 0.96*** 1.37*** 0.88*** 0.96*** 0.96
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11)
1 1 1 1 1.05*** 1.07*** 1.03*** 1.44*** 1.06*** 1.03*** 1.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
Note: Estimated coefficients are calculated from the average of 100 simulations. Theoretical
estimates are calculated by β1 + β2mc. Results of reghdfe are estimated using the command
“reghdfe p e, absorb(firm_year destination)”. S equals 1 in the balanced panel case.
In table 2.1, the far left column indicates which sources of variation in the data generating
process are active in our price equation (2.15). For example, in the first row, by setting all
indicator variables to zero, the price is determined by the shocks that drive the exchange rate
and the marginal cost. In the second row, firm, destination and time-varying shocks directly
impact on prices. Both rows (1) and (2) show that for a balanced panel, the three estimators
return the correct estimate of the true ERPT parameter (listed in the last column). However,
the conventional method of estimating ERPT, referred to as GR, shows a strong upward
bias in an unbalanced panel. In row (3), we simulate the price series with a destination-firm
time-varying interacted factor. Finally, row (4) turns on each dimension of the variation and
their interactions. In the last row, only the CHS procedure is capable of returning the correct
theoretical parameter from the data-generating process. Our simulation shows that one
needs to be careful in applying multiple fixed effects in an unbalanced panel with interacted
unobserved variables. The order of applying fixed effect matters. If there exists orthogonal
dimensions between the observed explanatory variable and the unobserved variable(s), a
unique sequence of fixed effects can obtain the true parameter.
We compare analytical decompositions of our method and the conventional method. We
evaluate by first employing the conventional approach where the S-period time difference is
21The advantage of using two separate processes compared to a random drop at the firm level is that the
former allows the structure of missing values to differ at the time and the destination dimension.
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taken and then some additional fixed effects are added.
∆ f ds p f dt = I3∆ f ds v1,t + β1∆ f ds edt + ∆ f ds mc f t + I4β2∆ f ds (edt ∗mc f t) + ∆ f ds u f dt (2.16)
where
∆ f ds v1,t = v1,t − v1,t−s
∆ f ds edt = v1,t − v1,t−s + v2,t − v2,t−s + v3,d ∗ (v3,t − v3,t−s) + v4,d ∗ (v4,t − v4,t−s)
∆ f ds mc f t = v1,t − v1,t−s + v2,t − v2,t−s + v5, f ∗ (v5,t − v5,t−s) + v4, f ∗ (v4,t − v4,t−s)
∆ f ds (mc f t ∗ edt) = (v1,d + v1,t + v2,d + v2,t + v3,d ∗ v3,t + v4,d ∗ v4,t)
∗ (v1, f + v1,t + v2, f + v2,t + v5, f ∗ v5,t + v4, f ∗ v4,t)
− (v1,d + v1,t−s + v2,d + v2,t−s + v3,d ∗ v3,t−s + v4,d ∗ v4,t−s)
∗ (v1, f + v1,t−s + v2, f + v2,t−s + v5, f ∗ v5,t−s + v4, f ∗ v4,t−s)
̸= ∆ f ds mc f t ∗ ∆ f ds edt
This illustrates that ∆ f ds edt is correlated with three unobserved regressors ∆
f d
s v1,t, ∆
f d
s mc f t
and ∆ f ds (mc f t ∗ edt). As mc f t is unobserved, it is important that the interaction term can be
decomposed into two terms22 such that we could exploit the relationship similar to (2.14).
The resulting estimator is in general biased and the direction of bias cannot be determined.23
This problem is not limited to S-period difference related estimations but occurs in all cases
where multiple fixed effects are needed in an unbalanced multidimensional panel with
missing factors interacting with observed explanatory variables. As we have discussed
above, taking first differences achieves the same result in terms of eliminating unobserved
components as a high level fixed effect. We show in the appendix that fixed effects partitioned
in an incorrect order will lead to the same problem.
Reversing the order of these two partitions helps to identify the correct EPRT estimator
given the existence of orthogonal dimensions between the unobserved variable mc f t and the
22The two terms are in the form of an observed ∆ f ds edt interacted with an unknown term varying along firm
and time dimensions.
23While we could control for two unobserved regressors ∆ f ds v1,t and ∆
f d
s mc f t by adding firm-time specific
fixed effects, we cannot add further interactive fixed effects to control for ∆ f ds (mc f t ∗ edt) as the S-period lag is
firm destination specific.
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variable of interest edt. If we first demean at the destination dimension, we will get
p˜ f dt
f t = I2v˜1,d f t + e˜dt f t + I4 ˜(edt ∗mc f t)
f t
+ u˜ f dt
f t (2.17)
v˜1,d
f t = v1,d − ∑d∈τ f t v1,d
n f tD
e˜dt
f t = edt − ∑d∈τ f t edt
n f tD
= v˜1,d
f t + v˜2,d
f t + v˜3,d
f t ∗ v3,t + v˜4,d f t ∗ v4,t
˜edt ∗mc f t f t = (edt − ∑d∈τ f t edt
n f tD
) ∗mc f t = e˜dt f t ∗mc f t
= e˜dt
f t(v1, f + v1,t + v2, f + v2,t + v5, f ∗ v5,t + v4, f ∗ v4,t)
This operation will lead to exchange rates e˜dt
f d, indexed by f d. However, as a nature
of macro variables, edt cannot vary along the firm dimension. Therefore, we can separate
destination varying components of the exchange rate edt from the missing factor mc f t. The
essence of this idea is that most macro variables do not vary at all dimensions, which can be
exploited in a micro dataset to construct an estimator of a particular interest.
At this point, it may seem impossible to estimate (2.17) as we have a missing factor v˜1,d
f t
varying at all three dimensions. However, v˜1,d
f t is special as its variation is limited and
depends on the total number of destinations. For example, in the case of 10 destinations,
there will be maximum 10× 10 = 100 variations of v˜1,d f t. If the number of firms is larger
than the number of destinations24, which is generally true in a disaggregated trade dataset,
the model (2.17) will still be identifiable.
We propose a trade pattern dummy to control for v˜1,d
f t. The procedure involves three
steps. First, for each firm and time combination, record a list of exported destination names
(or indices). Second, join each list as a string in a alphabetic (or numerical) order. Third, for
each firm and time combination, prefix the destination name (or number) to the combined
string in step two for each destination within this combination. This string indicator can be
used to create dummies or execute the second partition.
Notably, in the context of exchange rate pass through estimation, we do not interpret
the conventional method as a biased estimator. Especially, directly estimating regression
specification (2.16) will capture how price generally reacts to exchange rate shocks. As
the first three factors simultaneously change other variables in the pricing equation, the
coefficient on S-period exchange rate will be a combination of effects of exchange rates and
other variables related to factors that also affect exchange rates. Our estimator separates the
destination specific shock component and evaluates the ERPT at the mean value of the firm
specific factor.
24Another practical reason is that we do not observe firms randomly change the set of countries they exported
to. The theoretical maximum number is unlikely to be reached in an empirical dataset.
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2.4.2 Mapping to the general pricing equation
In the following two subsections, we compare the conventional estimation method with our
estimation method under the general pricing equation framework proposed in section 2.3.
Bilateral ERPT
From the general pricing equation (2.8), we have25
∆log(PrmbCHN,dt) = β1,d∆log(SCHN,dt) + β2,d∆log(SCHN,−dt)
+ β3,d∆log(DCHN,dt) + β4,d∆log(DCHN,−dt) + ∆log(εCHN,dt)
The conventional method controls for observed economic fundamentals Xdt using destina-
tion CPI, real GDP and import-to-GDP ratio and runs the following regression pooling all
destinations.
∆log(PrmbCHN,dt) = γ0 + γ1∆log(e CHNd ,t) + γ2∆log(Xdt) + υdt (2.18)
The obtained γ1 can be interpreted as the general effect of bilateral exchange rate movements.
γ1 = ∑
d ̸=CHN
1
nD
[
β1,d
∂log(SCHN,dt)
∂log(XCHN,t)
∂log(XCHN,t)
∂log(e CHN
d ,t
)
+ β3,d
∂log(DCHN,dt)
∂log(e CHN
d ,t
)
]
+ Bias (2.19)
Without any cost shocks and demand shocks, the export price denominated in the
producer’s currency should not move with changes of nominal bilateral exchange rates.26
The bias component reflects the fact that we cannot perfectly control for all demand factors
in the destination for two reasons: (a) we do not observe price changes of local competitors;
(b) we do not observe price changes of competitors of exporters from other countries.
Demand-side bilateral ERPT
Similarly, we can derive the destination demeaned version of equation (2.8) as
˜log(PrmbCHN,dt) = β˜0,d + β1,d ˜log(SCHN,dt) + β2,d ˜log(SCHN,−dt)
+ β3,d ˜log(DCHN,dt) + β4,d ˜log(DCHN,−dt) + ˜log(εCHN,dt) (2.20)
25We drop the subscript i f for clarity. CHN indicates the exporting country is China.
26After controlling for demand shocks, there is no incentive for pricing-to-market.
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where
˜log(SCHN,dt) ≡ log(SCHN,dt)− 1N ∑d ̸=CHN
β1,d
β1,d
log(SCHN,dt) (2.21)
˜log(SCHN,−d1t) ≡ log(SCHN,−d1t)−
1
N ∑d ̸=CHN
β2,d
β2,d1
log(SCHN,−dt) (2.22)
The key relationship our estimator exploits is
β1,dlog(SCHN,dt) + β2,dlog(SCHN,−dt) = β1,dlog(SCHN,dt) + β2,dlog(SCHN,−dt) ∀d ̸= CHN
(2.23)
That is, the weight of each bilateral supply effect may differ but the total supply effect must
be the same for the same product. For our empirical analysis, we assumed that at firm-
product-custom-level, the quality of the good sold to different countries is not systematically
different.
Equation (2.23) implies that the term β1,d ˜log(SCHN,dt) + β2,d ˜log(SCHN,−dt) must be zero.
Therefore, we controlled for both bilateral and multilateral supply shocks.
We now introduce our estimator that exploits the cross destination variations.
˜log(PrmbCHN,dt) = γ0 + γ1 ˜log(e CHNd ,t) + γ2
˜log(Xdt) + FEd + υdt (2.24)
where
˜log(e CHN
d ,t
) ≡ log(e CHN
d ,t
)− 1
N ∑d ̸=CHN
log(e CHN
d ,t
) (2.25)
To see what our estimator captures, consider the case of a general appreciation of the currency
k against all other currencies, such that dlog(e d
k ,t
) = dlog(e CHN
k ,t
) = dlog(e j
k ,t
) ∀j ̸= k.
∂ ˜log(e CHN
d ,t
)
∂log(e CHN
k ,t
)
=
{
− 1N i f d ̸= k
1 i f d = k
(2.26)
d ˜log(PrmbCHN,dt)
dlog(e CHN
k ,t
)
= β3,d
∂ ˜log(DCHN,dt)
∂log(e CHN
k ,t
)
+ β4,d
d ˜log(DCHN,−dt)
dlog(e CHN
k ,t
)
(2.27)
=

− 1N β3,k
∂log
[
gD,k(e CHN
k ,t
,Xdk ,t)
]
∂log(e CHN
k ,t
)
+ β4,d
d ˜log(DCHN,−dt)
dlog(e CHN
k ,t
)
i f d ̸= k
β3,k
∂log
[
gD,k(e CHN
k ,t
,Xk,t)
]
∂log(e CHN
k ,t
)
+ β4,d
d ˜log(DCHN,−dt)
dlog(e CHN
k ,t
)
i f d = k
(2.28)
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The derivation of the last step is given in the appendix by equation (2.47). If we ignore
the second term, our estimator will capture exactly the demand effect of bilateral exchange
rate movements, i.e., γ1,k = β3,k
∂log
[
gD,k(e CHN
k ,t
,Xk,t)
]
∂log(e CHN
k ,t
)
.
In general, our estimator γ1 will be an observation weighted average of country specific
pass through γ1,d plus a bias due to the fact that we cannot perfectly control for price changes
of competitors from other countries. We will discuss this bias in more detail in section 2.7.
γ1 = ∑
d ̸=CHN
1
nD
β3,d ∂log
[
gD,d(e CHN
d ,t
, Xd,t)
]
∂log(e CHN
d ,t
)
+ Bias (2.29)
2.5 Data
To construct the dataset in this paper, we merge the Chinese customs database, the universe
of import and export transactions for China from 2000 to 2011, with macroeconomic data
from the World Bank and variables derived from the BIS’s nominal effective exchange rate
series.
The Chinese custom database covers all entries of China’s exports and imports at the
firm and harmonized system (HS08) 8-digit product level annually from 2000 to 2011.27 The
data reported include the export value and quantity, reported by the Chinese authorities
in US dollars and Chinese-language quantity classifiers, respectively. We convert annual
export values in US dollars to rmb. Because the dataset does not report the transaction-level
price, the analysis of ERPT uses the unit value in rmb by firm-product-destination as the
export price.28 In addition, the database contains information on the firm’s name, a unique
numerical identifier for each firm, the location of production, the mode of shipment (cargo
ship, air, etc.), and a Chinese government production classification. The database also reports
information on the classification of Chinese firms by capital formation.29
Products in the dataset are indexed using HS08 codes with around 7,000 identifiers each
year. The total number of active exporters had increased dramatically over the period from
62,770 in 2000 to 253,893 in 2011. We track the total number of actively traded products by
counting unique product-exporter pairs and find this measure increases roughly at the same
pace as the number of exporters from roughly 904 thousand in 2000 to 4.128 million in 2011.
The total exported value measured in dollars had increased tenfold from 2000 to 2011, while
the total quantity traded had grown at a slightly slower rate implying a gradual increase in
27The database consists of monthly transactions by firm-product-destination for 2000-2006 but only reports
annual data for 2007-2011. We aggregate the monthly data for 2000-2006 to the annual frequency in this study.
28We discuss the quantity classifiers used to construct unit values in detail in appendix 2.C.1.
29Categorical information on capital formation includes private firms, state-owned firms, Chinese-foreign
joint ventures, foreign-invested enterprises, etc. Unfortunately, this detailed information is only provided up
until 2006.
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the average unit value of goods exported from China. See table 2.C.2 in appendix 2.C for
additional details.
The key to identifying price responses to exchange rate movements for our estimator re-
lies on cross-destination market variation in prices. Following Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano
(2014), we document in table 2.1 that a “happy few” exporters are responsible for most of
China’s exports. The top panel provides a breakdown of the number of export transactions
by the count of products and destinations served by a Chinese exporting firm. The bottom
panel presents the respective shares of export value by firms that differ by the count of
exported products and foreign markets reached. Overall, we see that multi-destination
exporters account for two-thirds of export transactions (row 5 of the top panel of table 2.1,
33.19 +13.61+ 20.27%) and are responsible for 92% of export value (row 5 of the bottom panel
of table 2.1, 13.54+10.86+67.72%).30 These statistics highlight two important facts: (1) the
identification scheme based on multi-destination exporters uses observations from those
firms that are most important to China’s trade and (2) the vast majority of firms are not
single-product exporters.31 The shares of export transactions and export value by the count
of products and destination markets are relatively stable across years in our sample period.
As our identification strategy relies on multiple destinations, we drop all observations on
products that were exported to only one destination by a firm. Further, we drop observations
for products exported to the United States and to Hong Kong because China’s rmb was
pegged to the US dollar (and by extension to the HK dollar) from 2000 until 2005.
An advantage of using Chinese customs data to study price changes is that the use
of information-conveying count and mass classifiers to record quantity is a feature of the
Chinese language. Relative to previous studies which construct price as a unit value (export
value/export quantity) from data in which quantity is measured by weight (Berman, Martin,
and Mayer (2012)) or in a combination of weight and units (Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings
(2014)), the Chinese customs authority reports 30 distinct types of quantity classifiers that
exist in the Chinese language. In practice, this implies that the calculated unit value is the
price per unit for 42 percent of transactions in our dataset. Furthermore, for the remaining
58 percent of transactions that use value per kilogram or value per liter, etc. as the price, the
detailed information on Chinese quantity classifiers helps to ensure a better proxy for prices
30Conversely, we see that transactions by single-destination firms account for a small share of total Chinese
export value. In the top left cell of the top panel of table 2.1, we observe that 17.32% of observations on exports
in the Chinese customs dataset were articles exported to a single destination by a single product firm. However,
these transactions comprised only 1.51% of Chinese export value in 2003. The bottom row of the top panel
shows that one-third of export transactions in 2003 were products exported by a firm to a single destination.
However, the last row of the bottom panel indicates that the value of these transactions by single-destination
exporters was only 7.88% of total Chinese exports.
31 This implies that the calculation of firm-level productivity that relies on input shares from single-product
firms is using information from the type of firms that is relatively rare empirically and is not representative of
the typical exporting firm.
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Table 2.1 Multi-product, multi-destination exporters (2003)
Number of Countries
No. of Products 1 2-5 6-10 10+ Total
by Share of Exporters
1 17.32 7.75 1.88 1.3 28.25
2-5 11.02 17.28 5.88 5 39.18
6-10 2.33 4.73 2.83 3.48 13.37
10+ 2.26 3.42 3.01 10.5 19.19
Total 32.94 33.19 13.61 20.27 100
by Share of Exports
1 1.51 1.75 1.31 1.49 6.06
2-5 2.57 5.19 4.25 8.42 20.43
6-10 1.47 2.85 2.11 8.06 14.49
10+ 2.34 3.75 3.19 49.75 59.01
Total 7.88 13.54 10.86 67.72 100
Note: Each cell in the top panel shows the percentage of observations in the Chinese
customs data in 2003 that fall under the relevant description. The bottom panel presents
the corresponding value of exports.
using unit values. See appendix 2.C.1 for details of the Chinese quantity measures in our
data.
We calculate the price change (unit value change) at the firm-product-destination level
between t and t + 1 and summarize the relevant statistics across industries in table 2.2. First,
the mean price change across industries is slightly above one percent per year, indicating
a gradual increase in Chinese export prices over the sample period. However, the median
price change is zero, which is consistent with the observation of a high level of price stability
of internationally traded goods from other datasets. There is substantial heterogeneity in
the distribution of price changes across industries. More sophisticated products, such as
machinery appliances, and luxury products, such as precious stones and leather articles,
have a greater dispersion of price changes compared to commodities and raw materials.
More information on the frequency of price changes and the magnitude of price changes at
different frequencies can be found in appendix 2.C. We drop observations with changes of
prices denominated in rmb less than ±5%.
Macroeconomic variables on real GDP in constant 2005 US dollars, the import to GDP
ratio, and CPI in all destination countries and in China (normalized so that CPI=100 in
2010 for all series) come from the World Bank. We construct the bilateral nominal exchange
rate in rmb per unit of destination currency from China’s official exchange rate (rmb per
US$) and each destination country’s official exchange rate in local currency units per US$
(all series are the yearly average). Similarly, the bilateral real exchange rate in rmb per
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local currency unit comes from the World Bank. These variables are available for the
161 destination countries in our sample. When we examine the impact of multilateral
exchange rate movements, we incorporate a variable derived from the broad nominal
effective exchange rate (NEER) series provided by the BIS. These series are geometric
weighted averages of bilateral exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices. As this
measure is only available for 42 destinations in our dataset during our sampling period, the
analysis of multilateral exchange rate movements is restricted to these destinations.
In our empirical analysis, we use the bilateral nominal exchange rate, the local destination
CPI and a variable derived from the nominal effective exchange rate as the main variables
of interest. This approach is motivated by our desire to decompose price changes into
factors that are largely destination market-specific (i.e., CPI) versus those that respond
to fundamental shocks originating in two or more locations (i.e., nominal bilateral and
multilateral exchange rates). A concern with estimating ERPT across countries is that
nominal series, such as nominal bilateral exchange rates and CPI indices, provide meaningful
information about changes within a country over time, but cannot be directly compared
across countries. The typical ERPT regression which uses the real bilateral exchange rate
implicitly imposes a linear relationship between each nominal bilateral exchange rate (origin
currency/destination currency) and the ratio of CPI indices between destination and origin
with a coefficient equal to one.32 An alternative approach to estimating ERPT using the real
exchange rate involves taking a first or S-period time difference; as discussed in section 2.4.1,
this procedure introduces potential biases in an unbalanced multi-dimensional panel. Our
proposed estimator is robust to this type of mis-specification error and allows us to recover
the unbiased impact of nominal exchange rates and CPI movements on export prices.33
32Real exchange rate series which embed this restriction are highly correlated with nominal exchange rates.
Because nominal exchange rate series are significantly more volatile over time than the ratio of CPI indices, this
means that movements in the real exchange rate are primarily driven by fluctuations in nominal exchange rates.
It is not clear if restricting these two variables with significantly different volatilities to have a one-to-one linear
relationship when estimating ERPT is a good assumption.
33The compatibility problem in data series across destinations (i.e., the cross-destination comparability of
series) is addressed in our approach by assuming that each bilateral exchange rate series can be written as a
compatible series which consists of the observed bilateral series and an unobserved component that varies only
along the destination dimension, i.e., ecompatibledt = e
nominal
dt − µd. Under our approach, the destination specific
component µd, which makes the different bilateral series compatible across markets, is absorbed into the trade
pattern dummies.
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Table 2.2 Price changes across sectors (percentage)
Category HS code N mean s.d. p25 p50 p75
Live animals; animal products 01-05 84,863 1.1 87.7 -22.9 0.0 25.1
Vegetable products 06-14 302,530 1.3 65.9 -23.9 0.0 26.6
Animal/vegetable fats, oils 15 6,736 1.2 53.7 -19.9 0.0 23.4
Prepared foodstuffs 16-24 245,712 0.9 57.0 -17.0 0.0 18.8
Mineral products 25-27 79,844 1.3 67.2 -22.3 0.0 25.0
Chemical products 28-38 1,256,653 0.9 85.7 -22.8 0.0 24.6
Plastics/rubber articles 39-40 1,673,590 1.0 103.2 -32.9 0.0 35.2
Rawhides/leather articles, etc. 41-43 721,354 2.6 123.3 -52.2 0.3 57.5
Wood and articles of wood 44-46 372,609 0.8 72.6 -26.5 0.0 28.2
Pulp of wood/other fibrous
cellulosic material
47-49 510,673 1.0 101.5 -35.3 0.0 37.5
Textile and textile articles 50-63 4,662,971 1.2 75.3 -29.1 0.0 31.5
Footwear, headgear, etc. 64-67 775,858 1.9 87.6 -31.9 0.0 35.5
Misc. manufactured articles 68-70 902,709 -0.3 102.1 -34.2 0.0 35.2
Precious or semi-precious stones 71 91,301 1.6 140.8 -52.3 0.0 55.5
Base metals and articles of base
metals
72-83 2,583,361 1.2 85.6 -29.6 0.1 31.9
Machinery and mechanical
appliances, etc.
84-85 4,603,775 0.9 110.5 -34.0 0.0 35.7
Vehicles, aircraft, etc. 86-89 601,186 1.0 81.6 -26.0 0.1 27.7
Optical, photographic, etc. 90-92 842,866 0.8 123.4 -35.6 0.0 37.3
Arms and ammunition 93 2,237 1.3 89.1 -34.6 0.8 36.0
Articles of stone, plaster, etc. 94-96 2,439,015 1.5 105.8 -37.5 0.0 40.2
Others 97+ 13852 0.0 156.8 -58.3 0.0 58.3
Total 2.28E+07 1.1 96.4 -31.5 0.0 33.7
2.6 Results on Bilateral Exchange Rate Movements
In this section, we present our estimates of price adjustments in response to bilateral ex-
change rate movements. We begin by presenting results conditional on price changes
between periods t and t + s that exceed ±5% in order to focus on pass-through in the ab-
sence of nominal rigidities. This approach closely follows Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and
facilitates a comparison across methodologies. We then proceed by presenting estimates
of the markup elasticity of export prices to exchange rate movements and decompose the
effects of exchange rate shocks by comparing the estimates under different methodologies.
Table 2.1 presents estimates of ERPT conditional on price changes, which we refer to as
the Gopinath-Rigobon (GR) method. These estimates represent the average export price
adjustment in response to a bilateral exchange rate shock given that Chinese exporters have
changed their prices.34 Beginning with column (1), we find a 100% depreciation of the rmb
34Both Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and Fitzgerald and Haller (2014) emphasize the role of nominal rigidities
in price stability in response to exchange rate movements. To provide a comparable analysis to their work, we
begin by applying a data filter to the unbalanced panel of Chinese export data. For each product-firm-destination
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against China’s trading partner will increase the price denominated in rmb by 14.5%, which
implies a pass through of 86.5% into the local destination currency price. While this estimate
is substantially lower than the estimates using aggregate and disaggregated price indices35,
these estimates are consistent with recent findings using firm level data [e.g., Berman, Martin,
and Mayer (2012) Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014)]. The coefficients on real GDP and
the import share of GDP represent the destination market-specific demand effect and have
the expected positive signs. Finally, Chinese firms raise their destination market prices in
response to local price growth. A one percent increase in destination market CPI is passed
through as a 0.2 percent increase in the export price.
The second column estimates the impact of a bilateral real exchange rate movement on
prices. Surprisingly, the pass through of the bilateral real exchange rate is negative, -1.2%,
in contrast to the small positive estimates in Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012), Chatterjee,
Dix-Carneiro, and Vichyanond (2013), Chen and Juvenal (2016).
Turning to columns (3) and (4), we split our data sample into two time periods, 2000-
2005 and 2006-2011. These periods correspond to the period in which the rmb was pegged
to the US dollar and the period in which the rmb was a managed float. The estimated
response of export prices to bilateral nominal exchange rate movements is around 0.2 in
both periods. This implies exchange rate pass through in both periods is around 80 percent.
More interestingly, we observe a different coefficient on destination CPI before and after
the rmb is unpegged from the US dollar. The smaller coefficient on destination CPI before
the release of the peg of a 0.07 percent increase in export prices in response to a 1 percent
increase in destination CPI relative to the substantial 0.25 percent increase in export prices
after the release of the peg suggests that exporting firms switched their pricing behavior
away from a uniform price based on the rmb/dollar rate toward a pricing strategy based on
destination market conditions.
combination, we filter out absolute price changes <5%. This implies that pass-through estimates will be based
on S-period differences in prices and the corresponding cumulated change in the exchange rate and other macro
variables over the same period. The length of the S-period difference can vary within a firm-product-destination
triplet and across these triplets. That is, for a single firm-product-destination triplet, we might observe S-period
differences of 2 years, 4 years and 3 years within the 12 year panel. Our application of both the GR methodology
and the CHS estimator will use all of these differences to estimate price responsiveness. As noted previously, a
strength of the CHS estimator is that it works well in highly-unbalanced panels.
35Knetter (1989), Knetter (1993), Goldberg and Campa (2006)
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Table 2.1 Estimating pass through conditional on price changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Year
Full Sample Full Sample ≤ 2005 > 2005
Bilateral nominal exchange rate 0.145*** 0.185*** 0.201***
(0.00398) (0.00703) (0.00521)
Destination CPI 0.191*** 0.0742*** 0.258***
(0.00726) (0.0124) (0.00907)
Destination real GDP 0.0588*** 0.194*** 0.309*** 0.00566
(0.00764) (0.00711) (0.0194) (0.00861)
Import-to-GDP ratio 0.205*** 0.190*** 0.201*** 0.211***
(0.00300) (0.00304) (0.00811) (0.00327)
Bilateral real exchange rate -0.0123***
(0.00401)
Observations 4,722,665 4,722,665 1,075,599 3,647,066
S Period Difference Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conditional on Price Change Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable and all regressors are the S-difference of the logged level.
The bilateral exchange rate is defined as rmb per unit of foreign (destination) currency. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the product-firm-destination level reported in parentheses. Sta-
tistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level indicated by ***, **, and *. The significance
of results is robust to different levels of clustering.
More generally, we interpret our estimates in table 2.1, based on the GR methodology
with S-period price differences, as the impact on exporter prices of exchange rate movements
coming through both demand and cost channels. A bilateral shock between the Chinese rmb
and China’s trading partner’s currency will have two direct impacts, through demand and
through costs, on the profitability of exporters. On the demand side, if the exporter held its
price in rmb fixed under an appreciation of the rmb, then this choice to engage in complete
pass-through would transmit the exchange rate shock to foreign consumers as an increase in
the foreign currency price in the foreign market. In turn, this foreign currency price increase
would reduce the quantity demanded and the firm’s profit. Thus, the choice of how much to
adjust the export price is a firm response to destination market demand conditions. On the
cost side, the impact of an rmb appreciation directly reduces the cost of imported inputs if
foreign exporters of these products pass through the exchange rate shock.
At the same time, there are general equilibrium effects which depend upon the composi-
tion of the bilateral exchange rate shocks and the origin of the shock. In order to understand
the general equilibrium effects, we need to decompose the types of shocks that drive the
exchange rate change. For example, in column (1) the coefficient on the destination market
inflation measure has the same sign and a similar magnitude as the coefficient of the nominal
bilateral exchange rate. That is, holding real output, the import share, and the bilateral
exchange rate unchanged, a change in foreign market inflation would have a similar effect on
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export prices from China as a change in the exchange rate. One could think of two scenarios
in a standard two-country open economy model in which the above condition is satisfied.
First, suppose the foreign country suffers from a temporary negative productivity shock
and its central bank chooses to stabilize the output gap. The foreign central bank takes an
expansionary monetary policy which boosts inflation and demand. As a result, domestic
firms in the country and Chinese exporters choose to increase their prices. Alternatively,
suppose Chinese exporters suffer from an exogenous increase in marginal costs. Ceteris
paribus, Chinese exporters could choose to pass through their cost shocks into export prices
for goods sold in foreign markets. The difficulty for understanding exchange ERPT is that
neither CPI nor bilateral exchange rate is necessarily an exogenous variable as recently
highlighted by Forbes, Hjortsoe, and Nenova (2015).
Moreover, the exporters’ pass through will depend on how other competitors in the
destination market react. For example, the ERPT of US import prices will depend on the
movement of bilateral exchange rates with other countries and the market share of the
firm as estimated in Auer and Schoenle (2016). Therefore, the composition of the bilateral
exchange rate between the destination country and its trading partners other than China
should matter for Chinese export prices. We return to this problem in section 2.7.
Table 2.2 offers a comparison of the results based on the GR methodology and our
estimator (denoted CHS). Our estimator exploits cross destination country variation in
prices and differences out those factors that are common to all destinations. Under the
assumption that the HS08 product exported by a firm to different destinations has the
same marginal production cost, then our estimator eliminates the direct and indirect effect
of supply-side shocks as well as any demand shock that is common to all of the firm’s
destination markets.36 That is, our estimator presents the effect of exchange rate changes on
export prices that operates through time variation in destination-specific demand. Columns
(1) and (2) of 2.2 are identical to columns (1) and (2) of table 2.1 and are included for
comparison purpose. Column (3) reports the markup elasticity of the exporter price of 5.6%
in response to a destination currency appreciation relative to the rmb. This is about 40%
of the total exchange rate pass through estimated with the GR method. Conditional on a
price change in rmb, exchange rate shocks driven by the trading partner-specific demand
imply a change in the export price markup of only 5.6% implying that 94% of the currency
movement passes through to local currency prices. Interestingly, we also estimate a small
adjustment of the export price to local CPI growth; a one percent increase in local CPI implies
only a 0.05 percent increase in the price to the destination. The difference in the estimated
coefficients on CPI in columns (1) versus (3) arises because the CHS estimator removes the
global trend in the exporter’s price associated with global CPI movements and isolates the
36More precisely, as long as any marginal cost difference for an HS08 product exported by a firm to different
destination markets is not systematically correlated with movements in exchange rates, then our estimator is
consistent.
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local component. Turning to column (4), we see that the price markup response to the real
exchange rate of 5% is as one would expect given the elasticities of export price markups to
the nominal exchange rate and to local CPI are 5% in column (3).
Table 2.2 Total ERPT compared with demand-driven ERPT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GR GR CHS CHS
Bilateral nominal exchange rates 0.145*** 0.0559***
(0.00398) (0.00824)
Destination CPI 0.191*** 0.0516***
(0.00726) (0.00972)
Destination real GDP 0.0588*** 0.194*** 0.0257** 0.0235**
(0.00764) (0.00711) (0.0110) (0.0105)
Import-to-GDP ratio 0.205*** 0.190*** 0.00447 0.00446
(0.00300) (0.00304) (0.00667) (0.00667)
Bilateral real exchange rates -0.0123*** 0.0548***
(0.00401) 0.0548***
Observations 4,722,665 4,722,665 10,348,597 10,348,597
S Period Difference Yes Yes No No
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conditional on Price Change Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sequential FE Yes Yes
Notes: For GR, the dependent variable and all regressors are the S-difference of the
logged level. For CHS, the dependent variable and all regressors are in logs. Applica-
tion of the same 5% price change filter implies the two datasets contain identical informa-
tion, with the GR estimation dataset comprised of observations of t to t + s differences
while the CHS method records twice as many observations because both t and t + s ob-
servations appear in the logged level. The bilateral exchange rate is defined as rmb per
unit of foreign (destination) currency. Standard errors are clustered at the product-firm-
destination level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
level indicated by ***, **, and *. The significance of results is robust to different levels of
clustering.
2.6.1 Heterogeneity in price markup elasticities
In this section, we present results from the CHS estimator to document heterogeneity in the
price markup elasticity to bilateral exchange rate movements (also referred to as demand-side
ERPT) for different types of firms and products.
We begin by examining the heterogeneity across Chinese exporting firms according
to a method of classification that is somewhat unique to China.37 Unlike the naming
conventions for businesses in English speaking countries, firm names in Chinese include
Chinese characters that directly provide information about the types of business activities in
which the firms engage. For example, firms which conduct specialized import and export
37See appendix 2.C.2 for a detailed description of the classification method. Previous work using this
classification includes Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011), Crowley, Song, and Meng (2016), and Lu, Tao, and
Zhang (2013)
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activities and serve as intermediaries for smaller manufacturing firms often distinguish
themselves by including the characters for import and export in their names. We filter these
firms using a keyword list described in appendix 2.C.2 and label these firms as “trading”
firms and label the rest as “non-trading” firms. Although we use the term “trading firms” to
describe those firms that engage in trading and intermediary activities, some of these firms
are manufacturers who export their own output. The term “non-trading” refers to firms that
manufacture their own products for export. Many of these firms can be directly linked to
their production data in the Chinese Industrial Survey, but smaller manufacturing firms,
which are not surveyed every year, are also included in the group of “non-trading firms.”
As noted previously, an advantage of the CHS estimator is that it can be used to estimate
price adjustments to exchange rate movements for trading firms that do not produce their
own output and for smaller firms that do not report production data to the government.
Table 2.3 reports that the export prices of trading firms are more responsive to exchange
rate movements than those of non-trading firms. The results suggest that trading firms—
specialized exporters that reach a larger number of foreign destinations than non-trading
firms—appear to use their extensive information on local market conditions to optimally
set prices. The extent of pass through into import prices in destination currency is more
incomplete (lower) compared to non-trading firms. Column (1) reproduces the results from
table 2.2 column (3) for comparability. In column (2), we report that for trading firms, the
export price in rmb falls 0.7 percent in response to a 10 percent appreciation of the rmb.
This is slightly more than twice the magnitude of the price responsiveness of non-trading
manufacturing firms reported in column (3). In addition to reducing markups more in
response to an appreciation of the rmb, trading firms raise their export prices more in
response to local CPI growth. In column (2), we report that a one percent CPI growth is
associated with an increase in the export price of 0.08 percent. This response to destination
market conditions is considerably larger than the elasticity of 0.025 for non-trading firms
reported in column (3).
Columns (4) - (7) document two important facts about the price responsiveness of Chinese
firms. First, price markups were largely unresponsive to bilateral exchange rate movements
when China maintained a fixed exchange rate against the dollar. Second, the difference in
the elasticity of price markups for trading versus non-trading firms is even larger post-2005
when China began to allow the rmb to float against the US dollar. Columns (4) and (6)
report estimates for trading and non-trading firms, respectively, over the dollar-peg regime
of 2000-2005. For both groups of firms, the estimated markup elasticity is close to zero and
not statistically different from zero. We emphasize that all estimation samples excluded
exports to the U.S. and Hong Kong. Thus, even during the fixed exchange rate regime period,
there is substantial variation in the bilateral rmb-euro, rmb-yen, rmb-sterling, etc. rates.
Interestingly, these exchange rate changes do not materialize into price markup adjustments
that vary across destinations. One possible explanation for this lack of price variation across
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destinations might be that Chinese firms invoiced their transactions to all destinations in US
dollars.38 Because of the peg with the US dollar, prior to 2005 Chinese exporters practiced
an extreme form of pure producer currency pricing.
Interestingly, a pricing strategy of destination-specific markup adjustments in response
to bilateral currency changes seems to have become important after 2005. Column (5) shows
that in response to a 100% rmb appreciation, trading firms cut their prices by 12.3%. The
idea that firms should optimally cut markups to maintain their market shares in the face of
a depreciation of the importing (destination) country’s currency has long been suggested,
but attempts to document it empirically have yielded mixed results. Finally, column (7)
indicates that this increased price responsiveness is not limited to trading firms; the export
price of non-trading manufacturers also became more responsive to bilateral exchange rate
movements after 2005. Their prices remained less responsive than those of trading firms,
consistent with the idea that they might have less destination-specific information available
to them for developing their pricing rules.39
Table 2.3 Heterogeneity in price markup elasticities by firm organizational structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full
Sample
Trading
Non-
trading
Trading Trading
Non-
trading
Non-
trading
≤ 2005 > 2005 ≤ 2005 > 2005
Bilateral nominal
exchange rates
0.0559*** 0.0744*** 0.0357*** 0.0135 0.123*** 0.0203 0.0697***
(0.00824) (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0245) (0.0205) (0.0258) (0.0200)
Destination CPI 0.0516*** 0.0799*** 0.0254* 0.0356 0.0344 0.0258 0.0502
(0.00972) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0318) (0.0312)
Destination real GDP 0.0257** 0.0229 0.0282* -0.000984 0.0128 0.0923* -0.0116
(0.0110) (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0567) (0.0275) (0.0510) (0.0291)
Import-to-GDP ratio 0.00447 0.0122 -0.00162 -0.00591 0.0427*** 0.00883 0.0309*
(0.00667) (0.0101) (0.00983) (0.0285) (0.0164) (0.0271) (0.0171)
Observations 10,348,597 4,487,372 5,861,225 1,314,394 3,172,978 1,576,958 4,284,267
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conditional on Price
Change
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sequential FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The bilateral exchange rate is defined as rmb per unit of foreign (destination) currency. Standard errors
reported in parentheses are clustered at the product-firm-destination level. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent level is indicated by ***, **, and *. The significance of results is robust to different levels of clustering.
38Unfortunately, no information on the currency of invoicing is reported in the Chinese customs dataset so we
cannot infer if this is true.
39In appendix 2.A we present corresponding estimates for each column of table 2.3 using the GR method. As
expected, the estimates of ERPT are larger, implying that changes in the price of imported inputs have an impact
on the export price denominated in rmb.
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Table 2.4 provides a comparison of results from the GR methodology alongside those
from the CHS estimator broken down by (1) the type of contractual arrangement under
which the goods were produced in the top panel and (2) the product’s Rauch classification
in the bottom. These results document that the CHS estimator is effective at capturing the
price markup adjustment. In the top panel of table 2.4, specifications (1) - (6), present results
for subsamples by different official custom’s classifications of trade mode. These modes
refer to the type of contractual arrangement between input suppliers and manufacturers
that determine how imported inputs are taxed at the border. Among these classifications,
we use three: (i) general trade (GT), (ii) assembling supplied materials (ASM), and (iii)
processing imported materials (PIM). Together, these three modes account for over 90% of
transaction records in our sample over 2000-2006.40 An export transaction is classified as
GT if the producing firm receives no special tariff treatment for any imported inputs and
is free to sell its output domestically or abroad. In other words, production takes place
without any special contract over pricing. We expect GT export prices to respond optimally
to bilateral exchange rate movements. Export transactions classified as ASM imply the
manufacturing firm produces the output under a contract with a pre-determined price and
receives a fee from the components supplier for its services. Therefore, the price should be
insensitive to bilateral exchange rate shocks and changes in destination CPI. Finally, export
transactions under which firms process imported materials (PIM) involve an obligation for
the firm to export the merchandise produced from imported inputs that receive duty-free
tariff treatment. Because these firms purchase imported inputs, their costs can fluctuate with
exchange rate movements. However, because they are processing firms which provide little
value-added, they have little scope to engage in pricing to market or markup adjustments.
In columns (1) and (4), we present estimates of price responsiveness to bilateral exchange
rate movements under the GR and CHS methods. The finding that the CHS estimate of
0.075 is strictly smaller than the GR estimate of 0.099 is consistent with our claim that the GR
method incorporates movements due to input price fluctuations and markup adjustments
whereas the CHS method isolates the markup adjustment. More persuasively, we show in
columns (2) and (3) that, using the GR method, export prices of ASM and PIM producers fall
slightly as the rmb appreciates, consistent with what we would expect for producers reliant
on imported inputs. Interestingly, when we apply the CHS estimator that differences out
the product-level time-varying marginal cost of ASM and PIM producers, there is no price
adjustment. These results serve to validate that the CHS estimator is acting in the way we
expected—finding markup adjustments when they are feasible and not finding them for
contractual arrangements that make them implausible.
We further validate the CHS estimator by comparing it to the GR method for products
grouped under the Rauch classification. Under this classification, products traded on open
40These detailed trade modes are only reported for transactions until 2006.
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exchanges (OE) are generally regarded as commodities whose prices are expected to fluctuate
with global supply and demand. Reference price (RP) products are list price goods which
compete somewhat directly by offering goods for sale at a published price reported in an
industry trade publication. The producers of these goods are thought to have a very limited
ablility to exploit market power in pricing. Finally, differentiated goods are characterized by
non-public negotiated prices which indicate limited direct competition among firms and
greater scope for charging a markup.
Because only differentiated goods should exhibit a mark-up adjustment, we expect that
the CHS estimator would only yield a statistically significant elasticity for differentiated
goods. This is exactly what we observe in specifications (10) through (12). In contrast, the
GR specifications (7) - (9) indicate that export prices of all types of goods move in response
to bilateral exchange rate movements. Taken together, these results allow us to decompose
these price movements into markup adjustments and marginal cost movements. For OE and
RP products, all of the substantial changes in the export prices appear to be due to changes
in the cost of imported inputs. In contrast, for differentiated goods, almost 40% of the total
exchange rate pass through estimated by the GR method is due to price markup adjustments
that vary across destinations.
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Table 2.4 Heterogeneity in price markup elasticities by contractual arrangement and product
type
GR GR GR CHS CHS CHS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contractual Arrangement GT ASM PIM GT ASM PIM
Bilateral nominal exchange rate 0.0986*** 0.0547* 0.0731*** 0.0750*** -0.0439 0.0178
(0.00547) (0.0320) (0.0180) (0.00723) (0.0603) (0.0364)
Destination CPI 0.0853*** 0.0759 0.0314 0.0696*** -0.0206 -0.0672
(0.00857) (0.0490) (0.0262) (0.00893) (0.105) (0.0450)
Observations 2,811,221 76,684 134,084 6,377,126 159,403 311,490
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Rauch Classification Differentiated RP OE Differentiated RP OE
Bilateral nominal exchange rates 0.128*** 0.348*** 0.262*** 0.0482*** 0.0453 -0.0316
(0.00579) (0.0169) (0.0475) (0.0157) (0.0343) (0.109)
Destination CPI 0.118*** 0.422*** 0.419*** 0.0282 0.0573 0.00465
(0.0109) (0.0251) (0.0735) (0.0178) (0.0366) (0.133)
Observations 2,178,012 211,811 16,197 4,661,095 458,392 31,957
S-Period Difference Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conditional on Price Change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sequential FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: CPI, real GDP and M/GDP are included in each regression, but estimates are not reported. The bilateral
exchange rate is defined as rmb per unit of foreign (destination) currency. Standard errors are clustered at the product-
firm-destination level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level is indicated by
***, **, and *. The significance of results is robust to different levels of clustering.
Previous research (Manova and Zhang (2012)) has suggested that price differences across
destination markets can reflect differences in the quality of the product exported by a firm
to different destinations. Because our estimator is based on changes in destination-specific
markups that move with the exchange rate and not the time-invariant level of the markup
(which would reflect a quality differential), it should be robust to small differences in the
level of product quality across destinations. In table 2.5, we address the concern that our
estimator might simply be capturing the differences in quality by evaluate price markup
adjustments to bilateral exchange rates for a small set of high-income economies which
we expect have similar preferences for quality. Therefore, we believe it is reasonable to
assume that all destinations in this set receive goods of the same quality from individual
Chinese firms. Table 2.5 presents the markup elasticities for Chinese firms that export to
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In
this restricted sample of exports to a set of high-income countries with similar GDP per-
capita, we find slightly higher markup elasticities than our baseline results in table 2.2. We
take these results as confirming that our estimator captures the responsiveness of markups
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to bilateral exchange rate movements rather than time-invariant cross-sectional differences
in prices.
Table 2.5 Markup elasticities for exports to high-income countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year Year
Full Sample Trading Non-trading ≤ 2005 > 2005
Bilateral nominal exchange rates 0.0796*** 0.135*** 0.0363* -0.0731 0.0929***
(0.0165) (0.0255) (0.0215) (0.0609) (0.0339)
Destination CPI -0.00878 0.0323 -0.0470 0.234 -0.126
(0.0495) (0.0765) (0.0649) (0.189) (0.107)
Destination Real GDP 0.175*** 0.260*** 0.103 0.274** -0.0207
(0.0497) (0.0761) (0.0655) (0.121) (0.0819)
Import-to-GDP ratio 0.0610*** 0.109*** 0.0240 0.0513 0.114***
(0.0184) (0.0292) (0.0236) (0.0554) (0.0368)
Observations 470,798 210,827 259,971 156,468 314,330
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conditional on Price Change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sequential FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The bilateral exchange rate is defined as rmb per unit of foreign (destination) currency. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the product-firm-destination level reported in parentheses. Statistical sig-
nificance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level is indicated by ***, **, and *. The significance of results is robust
to different levels of clustering.
2.7 Evidence for the International Pricing System
Having shown that we can estimate a destination-specific price markup elasticity in re-
sponse to bilateral exchange rate movements and destination CPI growth, we turn to the
question: what effect do third country currency movements have on the prices set by Chi-
nese exporters? We construct two measures of multilateral exchange rate movements and
explore the effect of the exchange rate movements between third country trading partners
(d2,d3, ...,dN) and the destination country, d1. We expect that an appreciation of the destina-
tion d1 currency relative to its trading partners d2,d3, ...,dN raises the competitive pressure
on Chinese firms exporting to d1 and should lead them to reduce their prices. Our analysis
of multilateral currency movements uses the global currency invoicing matrix41 provided by
Gopinath (2015) and examines how the competition effect changes with the proportion of
dollar invoicing in a destination country.42 Our results provide evidence that multilateral
exchange rate movements affect prices from other exporters; further, variation in this effect
41A shortcoming is the absence of invoicing data for Chinese exporters. Our analysis provides a new perspec-
tive on how Chinese exporters vary their pricing according to the dollar-invoicing competitive environment.
42Gopinath (2015) proposed the idea of an international price system characterized by two features.“First,
the overwhelming share of world trade is invoiced in very few currencies, with the dollar being the dominant
currency. Second, international prices, in their currency of invoicing, are not very sensitive to exchange rate
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by the proportion of the transactions invoiced in dollars supports Gopinath’s hypothesis on
the existence of an international price system.
2.7.1 Construction of a multilateral exchange rate measure orthogonal to the
rmb
The nominal exchange rate between China and destination d1 is correlated with the bilateral
exchange rates between d1 and its trading partners d2,d3, ..., dN . Thus, to conduct an analysis
of bilateral (rmb/d1) and multilateral (d2/d1,d3/d1, ...,dn/d1) exchange rate movements,
we must first extract the component of third country exchange rate movements that are
orthogonal to the rmb/d1 rate. We start from the measure of the nominal effective exchange
rate (NEER) of country d1 which is constructed as43
log(neerd1t) = wrmb,tlog(e CHNd1 ,t
) + wd2,tlog(e d2
d1
,t
) + ...+ wdN ,tlog(e dN
d1
,t
) (2.30)
where wd2,t represents the trade weight of d2 in country d1. Firstly, we fit the following OLS
regression for each destination d and extract ûdt.
∆log(neerdt) = âd + b̂d∆[wd,rmb,tlog(e CHN
d ,t
)] + ûdt (2.31)
If changes in the bilateral exchange rate between the destination country vis-à-vis China
and the destination country vis-à-vis its other trading partners are orthogonal44, then the
residual from (2.31) is the trade-weighted average of third country exchange rates.
ûdt = ∆[wd,d2,tlog(e d2
d1
,t
)] + ...+ ∆[wd,dN ,tlog(e dN
d1
,t
)]
If the orthogonality condition does not hold, then the regression in (2.31) will separate out the
common components from ûdt. For example, if ∆[wd,d2,tlog(e d2
d1
,t
)] = ∆[wd,rmb,tlog(e CHN
d1
,t)],
ûdt = ∆[wd,d3,tlog(e d3
d1
,t
)] + ...+ ∆[wd,dN ,tlog(e dN
d1
,t
)].
fluctuations at horizons of up to two years." The existence of an international price system would imply a single
indicator, the invoicing currency statistics for a country, is a powerful predictor for ERPT into import prices.
43We take the nominal effective exchange rate index (board) from Bank for International Settlements as they
provide details on the trade weight matrix used to construct the NEER for each country.
44i.e., Cov
[
∆log(e CHN
d1
,t),∆log(e dk
d1
,t
)
]
= 0 ∀dk ̸= rmb
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We construct our main empirical measure of the orthogonal component of the destina-
tion’s multilateral exchange rate, the orthogonal NEER, as follows:
log(oneerd,2000) = log(100)
log(oneerdt) = log(oneerdt−1) + ûdt ∀t = 2001, ...,2011
= log(100) +
t
∑
τ=2001
ûdτ
oneerdt = oneerdt/oneerd,2010
The last step re-indexes all series to a base year of 2010. It can be easily verified that
∆log(oneerdt) = ûdt.
2.7.2 Results on bilateral and multilateral exchange rate movements
Having constructed an orthogonal multilateral exchange rate measure, we estimate an
extended GR ERPT regression:
∆log(PrmbCHN,dt) = γ0 + γ1∆log(e CHNd ,t) + γ2∆log(Xdt) + γ3∆log(oneerdt) + υdt (2.32)
where
γ3 = β2
∂log(SCHN,dt)
∂log(oneerdt)
+ β4
∂log(DCHN,dt)
∂log(oneerdt)
(2.33)
and γ3 captures the composition of supply and demand effects of bilateral exchange rate
movements that are orthogonal to the bilateral exchange rate between China and the desti-
nation country.
The sign in front of the supply effect β2 is expected to be zero or negative. Holding
the bilateral exchange rate between China and destination d fixed, an appreciation of oneer
implies a depreciation of (at least one of) the destination’s trade partner countries with
respect to China. The change in prices of imported inputs from those countries whose
currencies have depreciated against the rmb is less than or equal to zero, depending on the
degree of ERPT into imported input prices from that country. After receiving a negative cost
shock, Chinese exporters will optimally reduce their export prices denominated in rmb.
The sign in front of the demand effect β3 is also expected to be zero or negative. Ex-
porters from third countries whose currencies, like China’s, appreciated also receive cheaper
imported inputs and are likely to reduce their export prices in destination d. Note that the
local destination currency price of goods from those countries whose currencies depreciated
will fall if some of the bilateral exchange rate movements is passed through to import prices.
Therefore, all competitors in destination d optimally choose to charge a lower (or the same)
price. The competition effect implies downward pressure on prices and Chinese exporters
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are likely to react to this competition effect by cutting their prices. Therefore, a non-positive
demand effect and a non-positive supply effect together imply a zero or negative γ3.
Table 2.1 reports the contribution to export prices of both bilateral and the orthogonal
component of multilateral exchange rate movements. Notably, table 2.1 shows a significant
structural break of ERPT for multilateral exchange rate movements associated with the
change in China’s exchange rate regime from a peg to a managed float. In columns (3) and
(5), prior to 2006, we observe a significant negative coefficient on the orthogonal component
of the NEER, implying the existence of a local competition effect on Chinese export prices.
Post-2005, estimates in columns (4) and (6) show that this orthogonal component has no
statistically significant impact on prices. Our results contribute to the literature by providing
the first evidence on this competition effect from the perspective of exporting firms.45
Further, in columns (5) and (6), we document that the importance of the dollar invoicing
share in destination imports changed after the rmb abandoned its peg to the US dollar. The
coefficient on the interaction term between the orthogonal component of the multilateral
exchange rate and the share of the destination country’s trade invoiced in dollars is positive
and significantly different from zero. This is consistent with the findings of Gopinath,
Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010) and Gopinath (2015). A positive interaction term means the
competition effect is smaller as the proportion of dollar invoicing increases. Prior to 2006,
the fact that rmb was pegged to dollars gives us the unique opportunity to identify this
competition effect.46 Larger proportion of dollar invoicing implies a high proportion of
competitors’ prices is stable in dollars.
Interestingly, estimates show that the multilateral effect diminished after 2006 when rmb
was unpegged to dollar.
45Auer and Schoenle (2016) provide empirical evidence on this competition effect from the perspective of
importers.
46Before 2006, our oneer measures destination multilateral exchange rate shocks that are orthogonal to dollar
movements.
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Table 2.1 ERPT of bilateral and orthogonal multilateral exchange rate shocks (GR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full
Sample
Full
Sample
≤ 2005 > 2005 ≤ 2005 > 2005
Bilateral nominal exchange rates 0.125*** 0.118*** 0.215*** 0.192*** 0.211*** 0.263***
(0.00462) (0.00463) (0.00896) (0.00611) (0.0101) (0.00689)
Orthogonal Destination NEER 0.179*** -0.0652** -0.00362 -0.360*** 0.0426
(0.00859) (0.0277) (0.0102) (0.0716) (0.0444)
Dollar Invoicing Share 0.00553
-
0.0358***
(0.00346) (0.00188)
Orthogonal Destination NEER ∗ 0.599*** -0.0492
Dollar Invoicing Share (0.117) (0.0742)
Destination CPI 0.270*** 0.278*** 0.0752*** 0.443*** 0.108*** 0.757***
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0188) (0.0150) (0.0217) (0.0210)
Destination real GDP 0.0547*** 0.0500*** 0.318***
-
0.0623***
0.243*** -0.395***
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0285) (0.0133) (0.0404) (0.0195)
Import-to-GDP ratio 0.226*** 0.243*** 0.311*** 0.223*** 0.334*** 0.284***
(0.00388) (0.00396) (0.0134) (0.00421) (0.0145) (0.00514)
Observations 3,773,153 3,773,153 886,387 2,886,766 770,640 2,439,715
S Period Difference Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Con Price Change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: An increase in the orthogonal component of destination NEER means destination currency appreciation. The
bilateral exchange rate is defined as rmb per unit of foreign (destination) currency. Standard errors reported in paren-
theses are clustered at the product-firm-destination level. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level is
indicated by ***, **, and *. The significance of results is robust to different levels of clustering.
2.7.3 Demand-side multilateral controls
We now introduce the construction of the destination demeaned orthogonal NEER measure
for our method.
˜log(oneerdt) ≡ log(oneerdt)− 1N ∑j ̸=d,rmb
log(oneerjt) (2.34)
The destination demeaned measure can be written as47
˜log(oneerdt)− 1T∑t
˜log(oneerdt) = ϑdt − 1T
2011
∑
τ=2001
ϑdτ
47See subsection 2.B.2 for derivations.
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where
ϑdt ≡ ∑
j ̸=d,rmb
[(
N − 1
N
wd,j,t +
1
N
wj,d,t)log(e j
d ,t
)] +
1
N ∑k ̸=d,rmb
∑
j ̸=k
[wk,j,tlog(e k
j ,t
)] (2.35)
ϑdt can be decomposed into two elements. The first element represents changes of exchange
rates and trade weights that are relevant to the destination d. The second element represents
the bilateral exchange rate movements among countries excluding China and destination d.
The first element can be further decomposed into changes of trade weights and destina-
tion d currency movements. Consider the case of a general appreciation of destination d’s
currency against all of its trading partners. If trade weights wd,j are relatively stable, the first
part of ϑdt will be proportional to changes of bilateral exchange rates between China and the
destination country, i.e.
dϑdt = ∑
j ̸=d,rmb
[(
N − 1
N
wd,j +
1
N
wj,d)dlog(e j
d ,t
)]∝ dlog(e CHN
d ,t
) (2.36)
Conditional on the bilateral exchange rate movement e CHN
d ,t
, variations in ϑdt are mainly
driven by changes of trade weights and additional orthogonal exchange rate movements
among trading partners excluding China and destination d. Therefore, in the following
specification,
˜log(PrmbCHN,dt) = γ0 + γ1 ˜log(e CHNd ,t) + γ2
˜log(Xdt) + γ3 ˜log(oneerdt) + vt + υdt (2.37)
We interpret γ1 as the demand effect of destination country exchange rate movements
and γ3 as the demand effect due to changes of trade weights and additional orthogonal
exchange rate movements among trading partners excluding China and destination d.
Estimation results are shown in table 2.2. The main conclusion here is that adding
additional multilateral controls does not affect our bilateral estimates. This additional
measure and its associated interaction with dollar invoicing share are not significantly
different from zero in all specifications.
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Table 2.2 Markup responsiveness to bilateral and orthogonal multilateral shocks (CHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full
Sample
Full
Sample
≤ 2005 > 2005 ≤ 2005 > 2005
Bilateral nominal exchange rates 0.0645*** 0.0658*** 0.0128 0.104*** 0.0156 0.117***
(0.00879) (0.00907) (0.0246) (0.0152) (0.0282) (0.0170)
Orthogonal Destination NEER -0.0122 0.0624 0.00135 0.0868 0.0115
(0.0188) (0.0597) (0.0261) (0.0993) (0.0599)
Orthogonal Destination NEER ∗
Dollar Invoicing Share
-0.0360 -0.00809
(0.161) (0.106)
Destination CPI 0.0581*** 0.0589*** 0.0413* 0.0474* 0.0458 0.0561*
(0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0248) (0.0269) (0.0279) (0.0333)
Destination real GDP 0.0218* 0.0220* 0.107** -0.0203 0.122*** -0.0238
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0419) (0.0236) (0.0464) (0.0287)
Import-to-GDP ratio 0.00420 0.00412 0.00997 0.0348*** 0.0229 0.0459***
(0.00761) (0.00761) (0.0230) (0.0132) (0.0260) (0.0164)
Observations 8,048,660 8,048,660 2,298,021 5,750,639 1,968,364 4,735,842
S Period Difference No No No No No No
Sequential FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Con Price Change Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: An increase in the orthogonal component of destination NEER means destination currency appreciation. The
bilateral exchange rate is defined as rmb per unit of foreign (destination) currency. Standard errors reported in paren-
theses are clustered at the product-firm-destination level. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level is
indicated by ***, **, and *. The significance of results is robust to different levels of clustering.
2.8 A Canonical Pricing Model: Numerical Simulations of ERPT
In this section, we investigate how changing key parameters of firm’s pricing strategy affects
the estimated ERPT.
First, we simulate firms based on the productivity distributions estimated from China
Industrial Survey Data (1999-2007). Next, we merge the simulated firms with real data of
macro series and construct prices of the simulated firms using a pricing equation which
incorporates three key ingredients of real rigidities, i.e., markup adjustment due to local
competition, the wedge effect of local distribution cost, and the imported input channel48.
We then apply GR and our own proposed method and record the estimated values and
standard errors. We test a wide range of combinations of parameter values and regress the
obtained coefficients on parameter values to get the sensitivity measure.
48As our estimates are conditional on prices changes, we focus on real rigidities rather than nominal rigidities.
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The exporter’s optimal price Prmbf dt can be derived as follows:
Prmbf dt =
θ f dt
θ f dt − 1
[
mcCHNf t +
ηP∗dt
θ f dt
edt
]
(2.38)
mcCHNf t =
Zt + γ f Mt/(eCHNt )
ψ
Ω f t
(2.39)
where θ f dt is the firm-destination specific demand elasticity; mcCHNf t is the firm specific
marginal cost denominated in producer’s currency rmb; η is the local distribution margin as
in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005); P∗dt is the destination price level; edt is the bilateral nominal
exchange rate between China and its trading partner, an increase in it means an rmb appreci-
ation; Zt and Mt stand for the price of local and imported input respectively; γ f is the ERPT
to imported inputs49,50; eCHNt is the nominal effective exchange rate of rmb
51, an increase of
which means an rmb appreciation; ψ is the pass through for imported inputs; Ω f t is the firm
specific productivity shock.
To keep our analysis as tractable as possible, we make the following two simplifications.
(a) the logarithm of the elasticity of demand is a linear process; (b) the firm’s productivity
follows an AR(1) process.
log(θ f dt − θ0) = θd − βmclog(mcCHNf t )− βelog(edt)− βoneerlog(oneerdt)− βplog(P∗dt) + υ f dt
(2.40)
where θ0 gives the average demand elasticity across all firms, destinations and time periods;
θd represents heterogeneous competition environments in the destination markets; βmc
represents the effect of productivity on the competitiveness of a firm subject to a certain
market structure.52 ; βe represents the direct impact of bilateral exchange rate movements;
βoneer represents the impact of orthogonal components of nominal effective exchange rate
movements at destination d; βp represents the effect of changing local consumer price level.
Firms productivity shocks are assumed to take a form specified in equation (2.41). We
estimate parameters of equation (2.41) and the productivity distribution of Chinese firms
using annual data of China Industrial Survey (1999-2007) following the method of Olley and
Pakes (1996).
49We do not aim to separate the income effect and substitution effect here. γ f in our model is the composition
of these two effects.
50We do have the import data for each firm in our datasets. However, we cannot directly control for imported
inputs as we cannot identify for most firms if the imported inputs are used for domestic sales or for inputs to
produce exported products. Another related problem is that a typical firm both imports and exports multiple
products, we do not know which imported input is used in which exported product.
51Here we assume that the cost of imported inputs is only affected by general rmb movements but not country
specific exchange rate movement.
52A positive βmc means that a higher responsiveness of the demand elasticity to marginal cost increases the
estimated ERPT. In a Cournot competition framework, the demand elasticity is a function of firm’s market share
which is in turn a function of firm’s marginal cost.
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log(Ω f t) = ρΩlog(Ω f t−1) + ξΩf t + ζ
Ω
t (2.41)
In the last step, we want to generate missing observations that resemble the pattern
we have observed in our dataset. We use minimal demand-side settings to generate the
correct weight of trade flows to each country.53 Under this setup, the destination country
will accept the price and purchase the product if the price converted into local currency is
smaller than the cutoff value of a local CPI indexed relative price. The price can be dropped
from our dataset for two reasons: (a) the potential price charged by the exporter is higher
than the maximum price the destination market could accept; (b) the exporter is subject to a
certain type of nominal rigidity and cannot change their price. We do not try to distinguish
between these two effects. δdt is calibrated to match the observed trade weight (in terms of
the number of observations) in each time period.
Prmbf dt edt < δdt ∗ P∗dt (2.42)
We simulate our model to examine all possible combinations of parameter values in table
2.1. Our simulation procedure is as follows.
1. Start with productivity data of 500 sampled firms and build series of Ω f t from 2000
to 2011 by adding firm specific shocks ξΩf t randomly drawn from a standard normal
distribution and aggregate shocks ζΩt estimated from our macro series according to
equation (2.41).
2. Merge simulated firms with the dataset of macro series. Construct the demand elastic-
ity θ f dt using equation (2.40) with the local preference parameter θd randomly drawn
from a standard normal distribution. Construct marginal cost mcCHNf t with Z proxied
by the average nominal wage in China and M normalised to 100 using equation (2.39).
Construct the price Prmbf dt using equation (2.38).
3. For each time period, compute the percentile of the price Prmbf dt charged by firm f in
destination d and drop the price if equation (2.42) is not satisfied.
4. Collect the simulated data, apply and record the value and standard errors of estimates
using GR and our method.
5. Repeat 1-4 for all possible combinations of parameter calibrations in table 2.1.
6. For each variable of interest, regress values of the estimated coefficient on values of
calibrated parameters weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the estimator.
53Note that our main objective is to understand the pricing behaviour. We do not aim to precisely match the
extensive margin. The technical reason for our setup is to obtain a realistic weight of exchange rate shocks that
resembles the weight implied in our empirical estimation.
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Table 2.1 Calibration
Parameter Testing Range
βe 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
βoneer 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
βP∗ 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
ψ 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1
η 0, 0.2, 0.5
γ 0, 0.5, 1
θ0 2.5
Table 2.2 summarises our simulation results. Each row represents the sensitivity of
the estimated coefficients to the change of calibrated parameters holding other calibrated
parameters fixed, i.e.,
∂ estimated coefficient of variable x using method m
∂ calibration of parameter para
where x ∈ {Bilateral NER, ONEER, CPI}, m ∈ {GR, CHS}, para ∈ {βe,βoneer,βP∗ ,ψ,η,γ}.
The last row (“constant") of each method represents the estimates when all PTM param-
eters are set to zero. In this case, simulated firms will charge a constant markup and only
change their price denominated in rmb due to marginal cost shocks. The estimated EPRT of
the GR method is high and significant (0.169), reflecting the correlation between movements
of firms’ nominal marginal cost and exchanges rates. As we expected, the estimated coeffi-
cients of Bilateral NER, ONEER and CPI show strong responses to the change of calibrated
values of βe,βoneer,βP∗ respectively for the GR panel. The import share γ plays a non-trivial
role in ERPT and CPI coefficients using the GR method. A higher import share reduces
ERPT and a higher import pass through strengthens this effect. The change in the calibration
of import pass through ψ is quantitatively small.
After differencing out firm level cost shocks, the row “constant" suggests that estimates
from our method give the correct markup elasticity, i.e., the estimated coefficients are
not different from zero when all PTM parameters are set to zero. The responsiveness of
estimated coefficients of Bilateral NER, ONEER and CPI to diagonal demand side parameters
βe,βoneer,βP∗ is highly significant and similar to that obtained in the GR method.54 Changing
values of supply-side parameters γ,ψ has no effect on the estimated coefficients using our
method, confirming its capability of controlling for firm-specific cost-side confounding
factors.
54For some numerical reasons, the off-diagonal coefficients are also significantly different from zero. These
values are small in magnitude though.
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Table 2.2 Sensitivity tests
GR CHS
Bilateral NER Orthogonal NEER CPI Bilateral NER Orthogonal NEER CPI
βe 1.000*** -4.66e-06 2.93e-06 0.998*** -0.000979** -0.000883***
(4.79e-06) (5.62e-06) (7.63e-06) (0.000346) (0.000391) (0.000315)
βoneer -7.45e-07 1.000*** 1.92e-07 -0.000984*** 0.997*** -0.00106***
(4.16e-06) (6.17e-06) (7.70e-06) (0.000308) (0.000539) (0.000332)
βP∗ -1.63e-06 9.63e-06* 1.000*** -0.000832*** -0.000918** 0.998***
(4.12e-06) (5.62e-06) (8.14e-06) (0.000294) (0.000389) (0.000379)
η 1.943*** -3.045*** 2.363*** 2.004*** 0.00504*** 2.004***
(0.0573) (0.0512) (0.123) (0.000865) (0.00119) (0.000939)
γ -0.140*** 0.0553 -0.514*** 5.39e-05 5.14e-05 4.86e-05
(0.0374) (0.0359) (0.0671) (0.000239) (0.000349) (0.000258)
ψ 3.72e-05*** -7.14e-05*** 9.62e-05*** -2.56e-05 -5.63e-05 -7.84e-06
(4.38e-06) (6.32e-06) (8.24e-06) (0.000213) (0.000307) (0.000230)
Constant 0.169*** 1.467*** 0.332*** -0.000293 -0.000401 -0.000321
(0.0240) (0.0251) (0.0263) (0.000209) (0.000296) (0.000226)
We find a large quantitative effect of the change in distribution margins on pass through
estimates using both GR and our method. As pointed out by Corsetti and Dedola (2005), the
existence of local distribution margin drives a wedge between local consumer prices and
the dock price, resulting in an incomplete ERPT not only for the consumer price but also
the price at the dock. Our simulation results imply that a higher local distribution margin
increases the responsiveness of prices denominated in rmb and lowers the pass through to
prices denominated in the local currency.
Table 2.3 presents the results when estimations are run on two sub-samples, the pre and
post dollar peg period. From the upper panel, GR results show that estimated average ERPT
(the “constant” row) and the sensitivity of changing parameters ψ and η change significantly,
providing evidence for a structural break when rmb was unpegged from dollar. However,
our estimates suggest a stable demand side relationship over time.
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Table 2.3 Sensitivity tests (pre and post dollar peg era)
≤ 2005 > 2005
Bilateral NER Orthogonal NEER CPI Bilateral NER Orthogonal NEER CPI
GR
βe 1.000*** -1.16e-07 6.61e-06 1.000*** -3.42e-06 6.14e-07
(5.70e-06) (9.18e-06) (8.06e-06) (4.44e-06) (5.10e-06) (9.50e-06)
βoneer -5.81e-07 1.000*** -5.48e-07 -9.28e-07 1.000*** 7.02e-07
(4.96e-06) (9.73e-06) (8.14e-06) (4.01e-06) (5.47e-06) (9.60e-06)
βP∗ 4.67e-06 -1.70e-05* 1.000*** -2.33e-06 6.01e-06 1.000***
(4.90e-06) (9.10e-06) (8.79e-06) (3.98e-06) (5.08e-06) (9.82e-06)
η -2.684*** 10.96*** 5.197*** 2.343*** -1.750*** 3.780***
(0.0625) (0.0982) (0.0655) (0.0581) (0.0763) (0.169)
γ -0.154*** 0.342*** -0.173*** -0.157*** 0.273*** -0.741***
(0.0397) (0.0552) (0.0431) (0.0374) (0.0454) (0.0882)
ψ -3.59e-05*** 0.000117*** 0.000102*** 4.81e-05*** -6.84e-05*** 0.000142***
(6.66e-06) (1.41e-05) (9.09e-06) (3.82e-06) (4.85e-06) (9.14e-06)
Constant 2.496*** -5.822*** -1.425*** -0.0148 0.603*** -0.149***
(0.0245) (0.0252) (0.0280) (0.0236) (0.0246) (0.0257)
CHS
βe 0.998*** -0.00138** -0.00120** 0.998*** -0.00101*** -0.00101***
(0.000414) (0.000609) (0.000526) (0.000333) (0.000331) (0.000317)
βoneer -0.00119*** 0.996*** -0.00185*** -0.000961*** 0.998*** -0.001000***
(0.000373) (0.000846) (0.000582) (0.000291) (0.000415) (0.000318)
βP∗ -0.00106*** -0.00173*** 0.997*** -0.00101*** -0.00106*** 0.998***
(0.000360) (0.000635) (0.000674) (0.000295) (0.000336) (0.000385)
η 2.004*** 0.00783*** 2.007*** 2.004*** 0.00526*** 2.005***
(0.00102) (0.00183) (0.00156) (0.00104) (0.00124) (0.00117)
γ 7.51e-05 1.00e-04 0.000100 8.68e-05 9.65e-05 7.05e-05
(0.000237) (0.000460) (0.000379) (0.000493) (0.000597) (0.000553)
ψ -2.00e-05 -7.68e-05 -1.77e-05 -2.08e-05 -2.34e-05 -1.53e-05
(0.000224) (0.000431) (0.000356) (0.000292) (0.000349) (0.000326)
Constant -0.000303 -0.000544 -0.000479 -0.000610 -0.000733 -0.000674
(0.000216) (0.000403) (0.000343) (0.000399) (0.000480) (0.000440)
2.9 Conclusions 103
2.9 Conclusions
This paper studies how China’s exporters react to exchange rate shocks by employing
firm-level data from China’s custom office from 2000 to 2011. Using multi-destination
exporters, we carefully decompose the effect of exchange rate shocks into demand and
supply components.
We propose a sequential fixed effect estimator using orthogonal dimensions in a multi-
dimensional panel to control for unobserved firm specific supply shocks. We demonstrate
that if the dataset is unbalanced, the order for including various fixed effects matters. Differ-
ent orders of inclusion eliminate different potential interaction terms between unobserved
factors and observed explanatory variables. There may be a unique order that yields the
best estimate for the question of interest.
We document four empirical findings on ERPT concerning China’s exporters. First, we
find an unconditional general ERPT estimate of 0.2, which suggests that Chinese exporters
pass through 80% of exchange rate shocks to their trading partners. Second, adding time
fixed effects give an unconditional pass through of bilateral exchange rate shocks of 0.14.
Third, differencing out destination invariant factors leaves an estimate of country specific
demand driven ERPT of 0.06, meaning that about one-half of the total pass-through is due to
PTM or demand-side factors, which provides evidence for pricing-to-market. Fourth, the re-
sponsiveness to bilateral exchange rate changes is larger for trading firms vs. manufacturers;
the flexible exchange rate regime vs. pegged exchange rate regime; general trade firms vs.
processing and assembly firms; differentiated goods vs. reference price or open exchange
goods.
Chinese export prices exhibit responsiveness to bilateral as well as global (US dollar)
currency movements. We find a significant additional dollar effect on the pass-through of
exchange rate and local price shocks. The dollar effect is sensitive to the proportion of dollar
invoicing in the destination market, adding evidence for the existence of the international
price system.
We also simulate a numerical model integrating data of real macro series and experiment
on a wide range of combinations of parameters on the pricing equation of exporters. We
confirm the importance of firm’s imported input share, ERPT of imported inputs and the
local distribution margin in ERPT estimation and reaffirm that our estimator is robust to
changes in specifications of firm-specific cost factors.

Appendix
Appendix 2.A Additional Results on ERPT Heterogeneity
Table 2.A.1 presents estimates of ERPT for trading and non-trading (manufacturing) export
prices using the GR method. The estimated ERPT is higher for non-trading exporters
compared to trading exporters. Further, the effect of changing to a floating exchange rate
regime is more noticeable for non-trading exporters.
Table 2.A.1 Trading v.s. non-trading exporters (GR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trading Non-trading Trading Trading Non-trading Non-trading
≤ 2005 > 2005 ≤ 2005 > 2005
Bilateral nominal exchange rates 0.111*** 0.162*** 0.0836*** 0.120*** 0.0845*** 0.187***
(0.00799) (0.00699) (0.0148) (0.00953) (0.0127) (0.00847)
Destination CPI 0.105*** 0.0883*** 0.0114 0.152*** 0.0410** 0.104***
(0.0123) (0.0103) (0.0208) (0.0155) (0.0172) (0.0129)
Destination real GDP 0.158*** 0.0776*** 0.0555 0.151*** 0.146*** 0.0639***
(0.0138) (0.0111) (0.0370) (0.0152) (0.0291) (0.0122)
Import-to-GDP ratio 0.0555*** 0.114*** 0.0108 0.0652*** 0.0700*** 0.122***
(0.00627) (0.00516) (0.0142) (0.00706) (0.0121) (0.00574)
Constant 0.0400*** 0.0477*** 0.0127*** 0.0484*** 0.0198*** 0.0559***
(0.000767) (0.000622) (0.00197) (0.000888) (0.00156) (0.000726)
Observations 1,375,019 1,991,442 307,601 1,067,418 433,754 1,557,688
S Period Difference Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect Year Year Year Year Year Year
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conditional on a Price Change YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: The bilateral exchange rate is defined as rmb per unit of foreign (destination) currency. Standard errors reported
in parentheses are clustered at the product-firm-destination level. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level is
indicated by ***, **, and *. The significance of results is robust to different levels of clustering.
Table 2.A.2 presents a breakdown of ERPT estimates under the GR versus CHS method
by Rauch classification and product type. As expected, the CHS estimator documents
substantial adjustments to the export price markup in rmb for differentiated goods exported
by both trading and non-trading firms. Further, the markup adjustment is larger for trading
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firms. There is no markup adjustment for reference price goods using this estimator. The
GR estimates of total ERPT show larger export price adjustments for reference price goods
than for differentiated goods, indicating that export prices respond to changes in the cost of
imported inputs.
Table 2.A.2 Rauch classification for trading vs. non-trading exporters
Differentiated Products Reference Priced
Bilateral NER CPI Bilateral NER CPI
GR
Trading 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.38*** 0.42***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
Non-trading 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.36*** 0.46***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
CHS
Trading 0.08** 0.05 -0.00 0.10
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09)
Non-trading 0.05* 0.02 0.05 0.07
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Notes: The bilateral exchange rate is defined as rmb per unit of foreign
(destination) currency. Standard errors are clustered at the product-
firm-destination level reported in parentheses. Statistical significance
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level indicated by ***, **, and *. The signifi-
cance of results is robust to different levels of clustering.
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Appendix 2.B Analytical Derivations
2.B.1 Multilateral results of our estimator
˜log(DCHN,d1t) ≡ log(DCHN,d1t)−
1
N ∑d ̸=CHN
β3,d
β3,d1
log(DCHN,dt) (2.43)
˜log(DCHN,−d1t) ≡ log(DCHN,−d1t)−
1
N ∑d ̸=CHN
β4,d
β4,d1
log(DCHN,−dt) (2.44)
Unlike our results of the supply side, to see which part has been differenced out, we need to
make two additional simplification assumptions on the functional form of gD,−d1(.). First,
we assume that the demand effect is log-linearly separable by countries, i.e.,
log(DCHN,−d1t) = log
[
gD,−d1(e d2
d1
,t
, ..., e dN
d1
,t
, Xd2t, ..., XdN t)
]
= wd2,d1 log
[
hD,d2(e d2
d1
,t
, Xd2t)
]
+ ...+ wdN ,d1 log
[
hD,dN (e dN
d1
,t
, XdN t)
]
Second, we assume the functional form hD,d1(.) does not differ across countries, i.e., hD,d1(.) =
hD,d(.) ∀d ̸= CHN. That is, the competition effect on Chinese exporters from country j at
destination d only depends on changes of exchange rates e j
d ,t
, economics fundamentals Xj,t
and a destination specific weight wj,d.
log(DCHN,−d1t) = ∑
d ̸=CHN,d1
wd,d1 log
[
hD(e d
d1
,t, Xdt)
]
Equation (2.44) can be rewritten as
˜log(DCHN,−d1t) = ∑
d ̸=CHN,d1
wd,d1 log
[
hD(e d
d1
,t, Xdt)
]
− 1
N ∑d ̸=CHN,d1
∑
j ̸=CHN,d
β4,d
β4,d1
wj,dlog
[
hD(e j
d ,t
, Xjt)
]
= ∑
d ̸=CHN,d1
{
wd,d1 log
[
hD(e d
d1
,t, Xdt)
]
− 1
N
β4,d
β4,d1
∑
j ̸=CHN,d
wj,dlog
[
hD(e j
d ,t
, Xjt)
]}
(2.45)
d ˜log(DCHN,−d1t)
dlog(e dk
d1
,t
)
= wdk ,d1
dlog
[
hD(e dk
d1
,t
, Xd1t)
]
dlog(e dk
d1
,t
)
− 1
N
β4,dk
β4,d1
wd1,dk
dlog
[
hD(e d1
dk
,t
, Xdkt)
]
dlog(e d1
dk
t
)
(2.46)
d ˜log(DCHN,d1t)
dlog(e dk
d1
,t
)
= − 1
N
β3,dk
β3,d1
dlog
[
gD,dk(e CHNdk ,t
, Xdkt)
]
dlog(e CHN
dk
,t)
(2.47)
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2.B.2 Derivation of the empirical destination demeaned orthogonal NEER
Adding destination fixed effects gives
˜log(oneerdt)− 1T∑t
˜log(oneerdt) =
log(oneerdt)− 1T∑t
log(oneerdt)− 1N ∑j ̸=CHN
log(oneerjt)− 1NT ∑j ̸=CHN∑t
log(oneerjt)
log(oneerdt)− 1T∑t
log(oneerdt) =
t
∑
τ=2001
ûdτ − 1T
2011
∑
k=2001
k
∑
τ=2001
ûdτ
= ∑
j ̸=d,CHN
[wd,j,tlog(e j
d ,t
)]− 1
T
2011
∑
τ=2001
∑
j ̸=d,CHN
[wd,j,τ log(e j
d ,τ
)]
2.B.3 Consequences of different partition orders
A different order of partition integrates the time components of the exchange rate edt and
the unobserved variable M f t. However, in a balanced panel, the change of partition order
does not matter even if there exists interaction terms between unobserved variables and
the variable of interest. As the demeaned time components are the same for all firm and
destinations, simply adding the second firm-time fixed effect (demeaned at destination level)
will separate destination varying components and firm-time varying components.
p˜ f dt = I2v˜1,t + e˜dt + I4 ˜(edt ∗ M f t) + u˜ f dt
v˜1,t = v1,t − ∑t v1,tnT
e˜dt = edt − ∑t edtnT = v˜1,t + v˜2,t + v
3
d ∗ v˜3,t + v4d ∗ v˜4,t
˜edt ∗ M f t = (v1,d + v1,t + v2,d + v2,t + v3,d ∗ v3,t + v4,d ∗ v4,t)(v1, f + v1,t + v2, f + v2,t + v5, f ∗ v5,t + v4, f ∗ v4,t)
−∑
t
(v1,d + v1,t + v2,d + v2,t + v3,d ∗ v3,t + v4,d ∗ v4,t)(v1, f + v1,t + v2, f + v2,t + v5, f ∗ v5,t + v4, f ∗ v4,t)/nT
= (v1, f + v2, f )e˜dt + e˜dtv1,t + e˜dtv2,t + v5, f ∗ e˜dtv5,t + v4, f ∗ e˜dtv4,t
= (v1, f + v2, f )(v˜1,t + v˜2,t + v3d ∗ v˜3,t + v4d ∗ v˜4,t)
+ (v1,dv˜1,t + v˜1,tv1,t + v2,dv˜1,t + v˜2,tv1,t + v3,dv˜1,tv3,t + v4,dv˜1,tv4,t)
+ (v1,dv˜2,t + v˜1,tv2,t + v2,dv˜2,t + v˜2,tv2,t + v3,dv˜2,tv3,t + v4,dv˜2,tv4,t)
+ (v1,dv3,dv˜3,t + v1,tv3,dv˜3,t + v2,dv3,dv˜3,t + v˜2,tv3,tv3,d + v3,dv3,dv˜3,tv3,t + v3,dv4,dv˜3,tv4,t)
+ (v1,dv4, f v˜4,t + v4, f v˜1,tv4,t + v2,dv4, f v˜4,t + v4, f v˜2,tv4,t + v3,dv4, f v˜3,tv4,t + v4,dv4, f v˜4,tv4,t)
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If the dataset is unbalanced, the integrated term is firm and destination specific. Adding
the second fixed effect no longer separates destination varying components from firm-time
varying components. The estimator will in general be biased and the direction of bias is not
always clear.
p˜ f dt
f d = I2v˜1,t f d + e˜dt f d + I4 ˜(edt ∗ M f t)
f d
+ u˜ f dt
f d
v˜1,t
f d = v1,t − ∑t∈τ f d v1,t
n f dT
e˜dt
f d = edt − ∑t∈τ f d edt
n f dT
= v˜1,t
f d + v˜2,t
f d + v3d ∗ v˜3,t f d + v4d ∗ v˜4,t f d
˜edt ∗ M f t
f d
= (v1,d + v1,t + v2,d + v2,t + v3,d ∗ v3,t + v4,d ∗ v4,t)(v1, f + v1,t + v2, f + v2,t + v5, f ∗ v5,t + v4, f ∗ v4,t)
− ∑
t∈τ f d
(v1,d + v1,t + v2,d + v2,t + v3,d ∗ v3,t + v4,d ∗ v4,t)(v1, f + v1,t + v2, f + v2,t + v5, f ∗ v5,t + v4, f ∗ v4,t)/n f dT
= (v1, f + v2, f )e˜dt
f d + e˜dtv1,t
f d
+ e˜dtv2,t
f d
+ v5, f ∗ e˜dtv5,t f d + v4, f ∗ e˜dtv4,t f d
= (v1, f + v2, f )(v˜1,t
f d + v˜2,t
f d + v3d ∗ v˜3,t f d + v4d ∗ v˜4,t f d)
+ (v1,dv˜1,t
f d + v˜1,tv1,t
f d
+ v2,dv˜1,t
f d + v˜2,tv1,t
f d
+ v3,dv˜1,tv3,t
f d
+ v4,dv˜1,tv4,t
f d
)
+ (v1,dv˜2,t
f d + v˜1,tv2,t
f d
+ v2,dv˜2,t
f d + v˜2,tv2,t
f d
+ v3,dv˜2,tv3,t
f d
+ v4,dv˜2,tv4,t
f d
)
+ (v1,dv3,dv˜3,t
f d + v1,tv3,dv˜3,t
f d + v2,dv3,dv˜3,t
f d + v˜2,tv3,t
f d
v3,d + v3,dv3,dv˜3,tv3,t
f d
+ v3,dv4,dv˜3,tv4,t
f d
)
+ (v1,dv4, f v˜4,t
f d + v4, f v˜1,tv4,t
f d
+ v2,dv4, f v˜4,t
f d + v4, f v˜2,tv4,t
f d
+ v3,dv4, f v˜3,tv4,t
f d
+ v4,dv4, f v˜4,tv4,t
f d
)
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Appendix 2.C Descriptive Statistics for China’s Customs Dataset
Similar to recent contributions by Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) and Amiti, Itskhoki,
and Konings (2014), this paper uses annual data on unit values at the HS08 level as the
measure for export price. These papers differ in the time periods used for the analysis. See
table 2.C.1.
Table 2.C.1 Comparison of the data with other research
Crowley, Han and Song
Berman, Martin, and
Mayer (2012)
Amiti, Itskhoki, and
Konings (2014)
Home Country China France Belgium
Frequency annual annual annual
Periods 2000-2011 1995-2005 2000-2008
Price Measure unit value unit value unit value
Import/Export imports and exports exports imports and exports
Level of Disaggregation 8-digit code 8-digit code 8-digit code
China’s dramatic ten-fold increase in export value over 2000-2011 includes extensive margin
net entry on both the firm and firm-product dimensions. See table 2.C.2.
Table 2.C.2 Chinese exports: exporting firms, products and value, 2000-2011
Products Exporters
Product-Exporter
Pairs
Obs.
Quantity
(billions of
units)
Value (billions
US$)
2000 6,712 62,770 904,136 1,882,375 506 249
2001 6,722 68,487 991,015 2,121,515 585 291
2002 6,864 76,631 1,140,033 2,396,290 557 299
2003 6,989 93,582 1,429,506 3,051,436 692 421
2004 7,003 118,005 1,771,554 3,792,239 919 569
2005 7,112 140,834 2,182,173 4,689,924 802 717
2006 7,159 184,134 3,152,047 7,330,049 950 895
2007 7,166 193,133 3,285,334 7,311,976 1,164 1,219
2008 7,204 205,995 3,229,604 7,775,485 1,200 1,429
2009 7,316 215,647 3,344,899 8,043,300 1,037 1,199
2010 7,359 233,760 3,827,380 9,686,571 1,225 1,575
2011 7,399 253,893 4,128,888 10,577,429 1,268 2,554
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In figures 2.C.1 and 2.C.2 we present the distribution of price changes by the duration with
which the firm-destination-product survives and at different frequencies, respectively. For
each firm-product-destination triplet in the dataset, we count the number of repeated trade
records. k indicates that price observations on the firm-product-destination triplet appeared
k + 1 times in our annual dataset from 2000 to 2011. Hence, firm-product-destinations with
a higher number k indicate either the item is traded more frequently or the item survived for
more periods. Figure 2.C.1 shows that an item with more records is less spiked with smaller
price dispersion. That is, items with more records are less likely to either keep their price
fixed between t and t+ 1 or experience abnormally large price changes. In other words, they
are changing their prices steadily. In figure 2.C.2 we plot the distribution of price changes
conditional on observing a price change for a firm-product-destination period. For each
firm-product-destination, we calculate the number of periods, s, between price changes. We
then organize price changes into bins of s = 1, s = 2, ..., s = 8+. The five panels in figure
2.C.2 display the distribution of price changes given the number of periods between price
changes. This figures shows the magnitude of price changes are larger and more dispersed
if the number of years between the price changes is larger.
Fig. 2.C.1 Distribution of price changes for firm-product-destination triplets that survive for
1+ k periods, k = 1,2, ...
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
-200 -100 0 100 200
-200 -100 0 100 200 -200 -100 0 100 200
1 2 3
4 to 7 8 plus
Percentage Price Changes
 
112 Decomposing ERPT: Evidence from Chinese Exporters
Fig. 2.C.2 Distribution of price changes between t and t + s, s = 1,2, ...
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2.C.1 Chinese count and mass classifiers and the construction of unit values
We construct unit values at the firm-product-destination level as the value of exports divided
by the reported quantity of exports. The Chinese customs authority reports 30 distinct
quantity measures which we use in construction of unit values. In the Chinese language,
these quantity measures, or classifiers, are intrinsically informative about the nature of the
good being traded. Of the 30 quantity measures in our estimation dataset, 22 are count
classifiers and 8 are mass classifiers.55 In Chinese, count classifiers are used to measure
distinct items while mass classifiers are used to measure things that are naturally measured
by weight, volume, length, etc. In our dataset for 2007, 42 percent of transactions are of goods
recorded with count classifiers and 58 percent are of goods recorded with mass classifiers.
We argue that the use of classifiers as a reporting unit implies that unit values in Chinese
data are more closely aligned to transactions prices than they are in other national customs
datasets. Firstly, the high share of transactions which use count classifiers combined with
the wide variety of count classifiers used to measure similar products means that unit values
for these HS08 products are closely aligned with the true transactions price. Secondly, those
55According to Cheng and Sybesma (1999), p. 515, “...the distinction between the two types of classifiers
is made with explicit reference to two different types of nouns: nouns that come with a built-in semantic
partitioning and nouns that do not – that is, count nouns and mass nouns.”
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goods whose measurement is reported in mass classifier units are items whose intrinsic
nature implies that the most appropriate metric is the reported measure of kilograms, square
meters, etc. Again, this implies that unit values for these commodities will be close to true
transactions prices.
To illustrate the variety of count classifiers used for similar objects, note that “Women’s
or girls’ suits of synthetic fibres, knitted or crocheted” (HS61042300) and “Women’s or girls’
jackets & blazers, of synthetic fibres, knitted or crocheted” (HS61043300) are measured with
two distinct Chinese count classifiers, “套” and “件,” respectively. Further, table 2.C.3 docu-
ments the intrinsic information content of the measurement units for HS04 product groups
8211 and 8212. The Chinese language descriptions of all of these HS08 products convey the
similarity across products; each Chinese description contains the Chinese character ‘dao’
(刀), which means ‘knife’ and is a part of longer compound words including table knife and
razor. Interestingly, three different Chinese count classifiers, “套,” “把,” and “片,” are used
to count sets of knives (HS82111000), knives and razors (HS82119100 - HS82121000), and
razor blades (HS82122000), respectively.
Table 2.C.3 Examples of quantity classifiers in Chinese customs data
Quantity
Measure
HS08 Code English Description Chinese Description
套 82111000 Sets of assorted knives 成套的刀
把 82119100 Table knives having fixed blades 刃面固定的餐刀
把 82119200 Other knives having fixed blades 其他刃面固定的刀
把 82119300
Pocket & pen knives & other knives
with folding blades
可换刃面的刀
把 82121000 Razors 剃刀
片 82122000
Safety razor blades, incl razor blade
blanks in strips
安全刀片,包括未分开
的刀片条
The most frequently used mass classifier is kilograms (56 percent of transactions). Exam-
ples of other mass classifiers include meters for “Knitted or crocheted fabric of cotton, width
≤ 30cm” (HS60032000), square meters for “Carpets & floor coverings of man-made textile
fibres” (HS57019010), and liters for “Beer made from malt” (HS22030000).
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2.C.2 Classification of firms as non-trading (manufacturing) or trading firms
We identify trading firms by the inclusion of certain Chinese characters in the firm’s name, i.e.,
“jinchukou” (import-export), “maoyi” (trade), “shangmao” (business and trade), “jingmao”
(economic and trade), “cangchu”(warehouse), “wuliu”(logistics), and “huowu” (cargo). As
described by Lu et al. (2013), the tradition of using Chinese characters to identify a firm’s
activities in its self-revealing name has been a feature of China’s international engagement
since the reforms of 1978. This practice has continued to the present day. Ahn et al. (2011)
document the use of specific characters in a name correlates with differences in trading
volume, product categories, and export destinations. Figure 2.C.3 shows that the share of
Chinese export value directly conducted by non-trading (manufacturing) firms rose steadily
from 2000 to 2005 as the Chinese government liberalized export markets to allow more firms
to directly export. Interestingly, after 2005, firms designated as trading firms continued to
account for one-quarter of Chinese export value and dominate multi-destination trade.
Fig. 2.C.3 The share of Chinese exports by non-trading (manufacturing) firms
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Chapter 3
Firm Level Exchange Rate Pass
Through – A Machine Learning
Approach
Understanding how exporters react to exchange rate shocks is important for
evaluating international shock transmissions and setting optimal international
monetary policy. Empirical studies have documented substantial heterogeneity
in the degree to which different firms and products respond to exchange rate
shocks. In addition, estimates of exchange rate pass through (ERPT) are time
varying and depend on observed and unobserved variables in a nonlinear way.
This paper proposes a machine learning algorithm that systematically detects
the determinants of ERPT and estimates ERPT at the firm level in a large-scale
custom dataset. The accuracy of the algorithm is tested on simulated data from
an extended multi-country version of Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Applying the
algorithm to China’s custom data from 2000-2006, this paper estimates the ERPT
of China’s exporters and documents new evidence on the nonlinear relationships
among market structures, unit value volatility and ERPT.
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3.1 Introduction
In the last decade, the increasing availability of large scale firm level datasets has greatly
enlarged the ability to understand firm level heterogeneity and its implications at the
aggregate level. Especially in the literature of ERPT, understanding why firms have different
pricing behaviour in response to a common exchange rate shock has important implications
in setting the optimal monetary policy1.
Unlike micro studies in other fields, international trade firm-level datasets recently made
available contain a significant proportion of firms in an economy and almost all custom
transactions at firm product (8-digit) level in a given period. As the richness and the scale
of micro dataset available to researchers develop rapidly, conventional methods applied
extensively by empirical researchers, fixed effects related methods for example, are either
less flexible in their functional assumptions or not very effective in gathering all possible
aspects of heterogeneity2 in a large scale dataset. Therefore, these methods may not be
the best option to understand firm-level heterogeneities. Conventional ERPT estimation
methods generate large standard errors when applied at sector/firm level due to unobserved
variables, e.g. marginal cost, heterogeneity in product characteristics and market structures.
Empirically, researchers trade off controlling for unobserved variables against the flexibility
of functional forms3.
On the other hand, recent researches in machine learning focus especially on large
datasets and heterogeneities. It seems to be the natural alternative for trade problems. In
spite of successful applications of these algorithms in various subjects, economists often
stay alarmed with the usage of these algorithms for two reasons. First, a machine learning
algorithm often involves extracting maximum amount of information in a certain dataset
and thus the results are often data driven and may not necessarily reflect the true relationship
between variables being studied. Second, a machine learning algorithm may be good in
making predictions but does not identify causal relationships, nor does it enhance our
economic understanding.
For causality, the mainstream empirical papers working with firm-level data take a
restrictive approach. Methods include restricting the dataset so that the subgroup being
studied is no longer subject to omitted variable bias or adding multiple fixed effects such
that “irrelevant" and possible confounding variations can be partitioned out. However,
adding restrictions and layers means dropping observations and losing information4. These
1Seminal contributions include Dornbusch (1987), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Corsetti and Dedola (2005),
Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2007), Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008a), Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008b),
Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
2The ability to search for all possible aspects of heterogeneities is important for predicting the firm-level
response to policy shocks.
3For example, by dividing data into several bins according to destinations, quantiles of market shares, etc.
4Not a problem if obtaining one (aggregate) coefficient is the main concern but costly in understanding
firm-level heterogeneities.
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restrictions can help us build an “ideal" environment to study the hypothetical relationship
but also limit our vision to a particular hypothetical situation.
Thanks to persistent advocates of applying machine learning methods to Economics5,
pioneer works on adapting machine learning methods to make casual inferences and solve
policy problems have made a significant progress6. However, existing studies work under the
condition of unconfoundedness. This condition will not be satisfied for international trade
related problems. The marginal cost of the product being sold and the prices of competitors
are unobserved and endogenous to exchange rate movements. Estimates ignoring these
confounding variables will lead to biased point estimates of individual treatment effects.
This paper follows recent work on making casual inferences and proposes an algorithm
specifically designed to estimate firm-level heterogeneities in response to macro shocks in a
multi-dimensional panel. The proposed algorithm features in two aspects: (a) it uses the high
predicting power of the gradient boosting regression tree algorithm (GBRT)7 to construct
counterfactual environments; (b) it uses orthogonal variations across dimensions to control
for unobservables. The proposed algorithm contributes to the machine learning literature
in its awareness that the monotonic property of tree based algorithms can be used together
with orthogonal variations across dimensions to control for unobserved components8.
The central idea behind the proposed algorithm is that machine learning algorithms
making causal inferences should be assisted with structural information implied by economic
models. Most machine learning algorithms take an agnostic data driven approach. As
in most estimation techniques, adding correct structural assumptions will increase the
precision of estimation. However, how to add economic assumptions into a machine learning
algorithm is still not clear9. This proposed algorithm presents a novel approach to feed
5See Varian (2014) for an introduction of various machine learning algorithms and how they can be applied
to study economic questions.
6See Athey and Imbens (2015), Bajari, Nekipelov, Ryan, and Yang (2015), Chernozhukov, Hansen, and
Spindler (2015), Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan, and Obermeyer (2015). Pioneer works on adapting machine
learning methods to make casual inferences include Wager and Athey (2015), Chernozhukov, Chetverikov,
Demirer, Duflo, Hansen, et al. (2016), Athey and Imbens (2016), Athey, Tibshirani, and Wager (2016), Athey,
Imbens, Pham, and Wager (2017).
7 GBRT is featured in its power of out-of-sample prediction accuracy due to its ability to capture nonlinearities.
GBRT algorithm has been widely applied in frontier studies of a wide range of topics, e.g. global distribution
and the risk of dengue [Bhatt et al. (2013)], effect of climate change [Cox et al. (2013), Randall and Van Woesik
(2015)]. The algorithm is proved to be effective in solving practical classification and prediction problems and
has been actively implemented in international computing and machine learning challenges [For details, click
List of Winning Solutions]. An introduction to the GRBT algorithm can be found in the appendix.
8Most custom datasets have disaggregated and detailed firm level transaction records, but key elements such
as the marginal costs are not observed and are difficult to be estimated even when one can complement the
custom database with some industry surveys.
9In general, the range of structural assumptions is not limited to probabilistic assumptions and could include
information on how variables interact in a structural model. This paper only works on a limited case and shows
that adding the log-linearised version of the structural pricing equation will significantly improve firm level
ERPT estimates of the proposed algorithm.
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structural information into a tree based machine learning algorithm in a multi-dimensional
panel framework10.
The proposed algorithm is designed to work directly with large scale custom datasets
and identify the ERPT parameter for each exporter in an economy. The algorithm learns from
reading records of trade patterns. It not only predicts export prices and quantities at the firm
level conditioning on values of future environments of aggregate variables but also generates
the genetic rules governing the data generating process11. To assess the performance of the
proposed algorithm, I build the following multi-country trade model.
In order to understand how firms optimally price their products under a multi-sector
multi-country environment, I extend the two-country model of Atkeson and Burstein (2008)
to a multi-country framework and introduce heterogeneity in productivity distributions
across sectors and countries. The main features of the model are as follows. First, there are
N countries in the world and each country owns S sectors with heterogeneous productivity
distributions. Second, within each sector there are local firms as well as exporters from
other countries competing under Cournot competition with a demand elasticity structure
similar to Atkeson and Burstein (2008). The result of the competition is determined by the
productivity distribution of the participating firms as well as aggregate variables such as
bilateral exchange rate shocks. Due to the Cournot competition structure, there is no closed
form solution for the model12. I construct counterfactual environments to understand how
ERPT differs under different productivity distributions of local firms and foreign exporters
and different compositions of exchange rate shocks.
In terms of macroeconomic modeling, although such a framework may be helpful in
understanding the pricing behavior of an exporter facing competition from local competitors
and other exporters from other countries, the need to add extra levels of heterogeneity
seems to be less justified. The main drawback of a micro-founded multi-sector multi-country
trade model is the lack of ability to map into the real world due to its demanding require-
ment in calibration. In practice, estimating the productivity distribution for a particular
country/sector, provided the existence of good data, is already a challenge13.
However, such highly detailed micro-founded models may have much to offer in an
alternative modeling strategy. The procedure is given as follows. First, notice what data
are available in reality. Second, simulate the highly micro founded model with arbitrary
calibration. Third, subset the simulated data and construct a dataset similar to what is
observed in the reality. Fourth, write an algorithm or econometric method to estimate key
10As I will illustrate in the model section, adding structural information has a marginal effect on the predictive
power of the dependent variable but is critical in getting the correct causal inference.
11For example, how ERPT depends on observed firm level characteristics.
12A market of N firms would give N simultaneous equations.
13For this particular question of interest, one would need to estimate the productivity distributions for each
country in the world, which is difficult.
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parameters of interest14 for each individual/firm of interest in the constructed dataset. Fifth,
change the parameter value of the model, re-simulate and construct a new dataset. Test
the algorithm’s ability to estimate the key parameter of interest and revise the algorithm if
not. Sixth, apply the algorithm to observed data. If the model is believed to be correct, the
estimates from the algorithm are reliable.
The advantage of this approach is that we will have a structural model that enables
us to understand how the mechanism works and figure out the key variable of interest
in reality provided that the model is correctly specified15. This approach is useful in a
scenario where we do not have full information to estimate the whole model but may have
enough information to identify a subset of parameters implied by the structural model.
The proposed approach is similar to the indirect inference approach but differs in that my
proposed approach, particularly steps 4 and 5, puts emphasis on building an algorithm that
provides the correct estimates of interest for all possible calibrations of the micro-founded
model. The indirect inference approach emphasises on finding an auxiliary model such
that estimates from the true model or data are as close as possible to the estimates from the
auxiliary model.
The algorithm is proved to be successful in recovering the true ERPT parameter at firm
level in the simulated model and is applied to the custom database of China from 2000-2006.
Using this nonparametric approach, my finding confirms that ERPT is a nonlinear function
of firm-level characteristics depending on various measures of market structure. Consistent
with theoretical and empirical works, the relationship between ERPT and several market
share measures resembles a U shape16.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 formalises the empirical question.
Section 3 introduces the proposed algorithm and explains the mechanism behind it. Section
4 presents the theoretical model of ERPT and various exercises for recovering the true ERPT
estimates using the proposed algorithm. Section 5 presents empirical results on China’s
custom data. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Problem
This section gives a formal presentation of the empirical question that this paper tries to
address. In addition, I construct two-dimensional numerical examples to illustrate how
14Please note that these parameters are not necessarily the same as the parameters needed for calibration.
15If the model specification is in doubt, an additional loop between step 2 and 5 can be added to evaluate
possible alternatives in model specification. I am still working on the proper way to evaluate and compare
different model specifications under my proposed procedure.
16Krugman (1986), Dornbusch (1987), Atkeson and Burstein (2008), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Chen, Imbs,
and Scott (2009), Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012), Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), Auer and Schoenle
(2016)
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conventional fixed effects related methods may fail to capture the nonlinear features of ERPT
estimates.
The pricing equation of exporters can be presented as follows.
pI = g (eI1 , XI , MI2 ,ϵI )
where I = {i, f ,d, t} represents the dimensions along which a variable varies, with i, f ,d, t
standing for product, firm, destination and time respectively; the missing variables vary
along dimensions that satisfy I2 ⊂ I and I1 ̸= I2; g is an unknown function; p is a scalar
dependent variable representing the exporter’s price; e is the key variable of interest, the
bilateral nominal exchange rates; X is a vector of observed feature variables; M is a vector of
unobserved variables that correlate with e; ϵ is an error term that does not correlate with
e. The objective is to understand how changes in exchange rates affect the exporter’s price
conditioning on the set of observed firm level characteristics X, such as various market share
measures, and unobserved variables M that are not varying along all dimensions, such as
firm specific marginal costs.
∂g(.)
∂ed,t
3.2.1 Conventional approaches in the literature are not informative about the
underlying structure of ERPT
In this subsection, I construct examples to explain why conventional fixed effect methods
are not very informative. In my examples, I restrict my focus to the same exporter selling the
same product to different destinations d over a certain time period t . For simplicity, I assume
a linear process of export prices pd,t that depends on bilateral exchange rates ed,t, market
shares msd,t, and marginal cost of the product mct. βd,t represents the ERPT coefficient which
is assumed to be a nonlinear function of market shares and marginal costs.17
pd,t = µ+ βd,ted,t + msd,t + mct + ϵd,t
In constructing the rest of series, I assume simple linear relationships under which all
explanatory variables, ed,t,msd,t and mct, are correlated with each other. Specifically, market
shares are constructed to be linear in a destination time specific factor and nominal exchange
17A more realistic model is discussed in section 4.
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rates. Marginal cost is constructed similarly.
msd,t = ud,t + 0.1ed,t
mct = ut − 0.1et; et := ∑d ed,tnd
ed,t ∼N(0,1), ud,t ∼ uni f orm(0,1), ϵd,t ∼ N(0,0.01)
Next, I simulate the model for three different underlying ERPT functions βd,t and compare
results of applying the standard fixed effect estimator with destination and time fixed effects.
Spec1 : βd,t = (msd,t − 0.5)2 + mct; ut ∼ uni f orm(0,1)
Spec2 : βd,t = 2(msd,t − 0.5)2 ∗mct; ut ∼ uni f orm(0,1)
Spec3 : βd,t = 2(msd,t − 0.5)2 ∗mct; ut ∼ N(0,1)
The objective is to read simulated data records of d, t, pd,t, ed,t,msd,t and estimate the ERPT
βd,t. There are two difficulties in estimating ERPT in this simulated example: (a) the ERPT is
not a constant parameter but an unknown function of firm characteristics; (b) the marginal
cost mct is not observed.
Table (3.1) presents results with each specification being simulated for 2000 destinations18
and 40 time periods. Columns (1) - (5) resemble the empirical discovery process of the
relationship between ERPT and market shares. The estimated coefficients in column (1)
represent a general response of prices to exchange rates. Column (2) adds market share in
levels and finds significant coefficients for both variables. Columns (3) and (4) try different
interaction terms between exchange rates and market share but no significant result is
found. This reflects the main drawback of fully specified structural equations compared to
nonparametric approaches. The rejection of one specification is not informative about the
alternative right specification. If the researcher stops at regression (4), the discovery that
ERPT is U shaped in market share is likely to be delayed.
Even at the correct regression specification column (5)19, results are not very informative
about the underlying structure driving the heterogeneity of ERPT due to the existence of the
unobserved marginal cost. The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms from column
(2) - (5) are very similar to the results under specification 1. From regression results under
specification 1 and 2, it is difficult to make an inference on how βd,t depends on firm-level
18In my original experiment, I set this number to be significantly bigger than the number of time periods nT .
A more realistic example where nD = 200 can be found in the appendix.
19 Regression (5) is the specification closest to the true data generating process among these three specifications.
For example, specification 1 can be rewritten as follows: pd,t = 10 + ms2d,ted,t − msd,ted,t + (mct + 0.25)ed,t +
msd,t + mct + ϵd,t where mct =
∑t mct
nT = 0.5. Coefficient on msd,t is close to the theoretical value of 1. The
exchange rate interacting with market share has a significant coefficient close to -1 and the interaction term with
exchange rate squared has a coefficient close to 1. The coefficient on ed,t is slightly downward biased as the mean
of mct equals 0.5, which gives the theoretical value of 0.815.
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Table 3.1 Estimates from the fixed effect method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification 1: pd,t = µ+
[
(msd,t − 0.5)2 + mct
]
ed,t + msd,t + mct + ϵd,t
ed,t 0.757*** 0.635*** 0.759*** 0.638*** 0.796***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
msd,t 1.198*** 1.198*** 0.995***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
ed,t ∗msd,t -0.006 -0.006 -1.019***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.011)
ed,t ∗ms2d,t 1.016***
(0.011)
Adjusted R2 0.663 0.865 0.722 0.865 0.879
Specification 2: pd,t = µ+
[
2(msd,t − 0.5)2 ∗mct
]
ed,t + msd,t + mct + ϵd,t
ed,t 0.212*** 0.090*** 0.217*** 0.093*** 0.242***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
msd,t 1.197*** 1.196*** 1.002***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ed,t ∗msd,t -0.009** -0.005*** -0.962***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
ed,t ∗ms2d,t 0.957***
(0.004)
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.825 0.227 0.825 0.885
Specification 3: pd,t = µ+
[
2(msd,t − 0.5)2 ∗mct
]
ed,t + msd,t + mct + ϵd,t; ut ∼ N(0,1)
ed,t -0.177*** -0.275*** -0.180*** -0.279*** -0.088***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
msd,t 1.005*** 1.003*** 1.038***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
ed,t ∗msd,t 0.302*** 0.296*** 0.301***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
ed,t ∗ms2d,t -0.190***
(0.011)
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.049 0.006 0.053 0.056
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Individual FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000
Note: This table presents estimation results after applying the conventional fixed effect estimator to Monte-Carlo simu-
lated data from specification 1 to 3.
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characteristics such as market share msd,t and marginal cost mct. Specification 3 shows that
the estimated coefficients can be very sensitive to the distribution of the unobserved variable
mct where the random factor ut is assumed to be standard normally distributed rather than
uniformly distributed.
3.3 Algorithm
This section explains the proposed algorithm. The first part of this section introduces the
general property which the proposed algorithm relies on under the framework of statistical
learning theory. The second part explains how this property can be exploited to control for
unobserved variables in tree based algorithms.
3.3.1 The proposed idea under statistical learning theory
A standard statistical learning problem can be formulated as follows. Consider an input
space X and output space Y . (X,Y) ∈ X ×Y are random variables with an unknown joint
distribution P. We observe a sequence of n i.i.d. pairs of (Xi,yi) sampled according to P.
The goal of the learning problem is to construct a function g : X → Y such that this function
minimises the risk of all possible measurable functions:
R(g) :=
∫
h(g(X),Y)dP
where h(.) is a criterion function20. Empirically, the optimal g is given by
ĝn := argmin
g∈G
1
n
n
∑
i=1
h(g(Xi), pi)
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of PXY. G is a space of allowed
functions depending on the classification algorithm. ĝn stands for the estimated function
f from data. The main concern of the statistical learning theory is to establish bounds for
R(ĝn)− infg R(g) so that we know when empirical error R(ĝn) is a good representation of the
true risk measure infg R(g). This measure can be further decomposed into two components,
the estimation error and the approximation error.
R(ĝn)− inf
g
R(g) =
(
R(ĝn)− inf
g∈G
R(g)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Estimation Error
+
(
inf
g∈G
R(g)− inf
g
R(g)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Approximation Error
(3.1)
20Empirically, h(, ) may take the form of |y− g(X)| or (y− g(X))2 depending on the assumptions of P.
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Estimating the approximation error is usually hard since it requires knowledge about the
target.21 Important contribution on establishing the relationship between estimation error
bounds and entropy measures of classifiers/algorithms has been made by Vladimir N.
Vapnik22.
The method introduced in this paper takes a different appraoch. Instead of assuming
that the observed set of variables are given, I consider a parallel set of learning problems.
The dependent variable will be the same and take the same value. Most feature variables
will also be the same. But some feature variables may be different.
Suppose we have a set of parallel learning problems indexed by 1, ..., j. For each j, we
have an input space X ×M(j) and an output space Y . (X, M(j),Y) ∈ X ×M(j) × Y are
random variables with joint distribution P(j) unknown to us. We observe n i.i.d. pairs of
(Xi, M
(0)
i ,yi). We know that M
(j)
i is a function of M
(0)
i . For each j, we have the conventional
learning problem of constructing a function g(j) : X ×M(j) → Y such that this function
minimises the risk:
R(j)(g) :=
∫
h(g(X, M(j)),Y)dP(j)
ĝ(j)n := argmin
g∈G
1
n
n
∑
i=1
h(g(Xi, M
(j)
i ), pi)
Define the numerical measure of the partial derivative as
h2(g, x1, X−x1 , M
(j),ϵ) :=
g(x1 + ϵ, X−x1 , M(j))− g(x1 − ϵ, X−x1 , M(j))
2ϵ
Suppose we are originally interested in the case g(0) : X ×M(0)→Y , the question is to what
extent we can infer the answer of (0) from results from g(j) : X ×M(j)→Y . In this case, we
21Most statistical learning algorithms take an agnostic approach and avoid making specific assumptions about
the underlying distribution.
22See Vapnik (1999) for a literature review.
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can write the problem as an expression similar to equation (3.1):∫
h3[h2(ĝ
(j)
n , x1,X−x1 , M
(j),ϵ)− h2(arginfg R
(0)(g), x1, X−x1 , M
(0),ϵ)]dP(0) =
∫
h3

(
h2(ĝ
(j)
n , x1, X−x1 , M
(j),ϵ)− h2(arg inf
g∈G
R(j)(g), x1, X−x1 , M
(j),ϵ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Estimation Error
+
(
h2(arg inf
g∈G
R(j)(g), x1, X−x1 , M
(j),ϵ)− h2(arg inf
g∈G
R(0)(g), x1, X−x1 , M
(0),ϵ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Substitution Error
+
(
h2(arg inf
g∈G
R(0)(g), x1, X−x1 , M
(0),ϵ)− h2(arginfg R
(0)(g), x1, X−x1 , M
(0),ϵ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Approximation Error
dP(0)
The first term, the estimation error, is where most frontier machine learning algorithms
making casual inferences work on23. The third term is a conventional term but very difficult
to measure without prior assumptions.
The second term is new from this paper. It reflects the effect of substituting the learning
problem from (0) to (j). Note that this substitution error depends on three elements, i.e. the
group of allowed functions G, the relationship between the variable of interest x1 and M(0),
and the relationship between input spaces being substituted M(0) and M(j).
The interesting part is that the linkage between the size of the substitution error and
the set of allowed functional classes G, and the relationship between input spaces being
substituted M(0) and M(j) can be exploited to control for unobserved variables by adding
the third channel of optimisation.
Consider two cases. If two input spaces M(0) and M(j) are very different from each
other, the range of allowed functions G will have a considerable impact on the substitution
error through affecting ĝ(j)n and ĝ
(j)
n being selected. On the contrary, if two input spaces M(0)
and M(j) are identical, the set of functions G can be of any range and do not change the
substitution error.
Alternatively, for any given set of functions G, it is possible to figure out the maximum
"distance" between M(0) and M(j) such that the substitution error is zero.
23e.g. Wager and Athey (2015), Chernozhukov, Chetverikov, Demirer, Duflo, Hansen, et al. (2016), Athey and
Imbens (2016), Athey, Tibshirani, and Wager (2016), Athey, Imbens, Pham, and Wager (2017).
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3.3.2 Tree based algorithms
This paper exploits a special case where the set of functions G are tree based algorithms and
designs a procedure that can be applied to control for variables that do not vary along all
dimensions in a multi-dimensional panel.
The next two subsections explain how tree based algorithms can be exploited to control
for unobserved components and facilitate the identification of casual inferences. Subsection
3.3.2 starts with a simple example and outlines the condition (compared with the conven-
tional monotonic transformation) that needs to be satisfied for a variable to be a good proxy
for the unobserved variable. I will refer to this condition as weak monotonic transformation.
I also discuss additional simulation results for general cases. These simulation results sug-
gest that a more general form of the monotonic transformation condition exists. I will try my
best to describe this condition and refer to it as the conditional monotonic transformation
property.
In practice, even a conditional (weak) monotonic transformation of the unobserved
variable is difficult to find. Subsection 3.3.2 shows that, in a multi-dimensional panel,
parameters from structural estimations in a set of restricted dimensions can be used as a
proxy for the weak monotonic transformation of unobserved variables not varying along all
dimensions.
One-dimensional example
In this subsection, I temporarily abstract away from my ERPT question and discuss this one-
dimensional example that helps to understand and clarify the mechanism of the proposed
algorithm. Consider the case of identifying the individual treatment effect.24
yi = βiTi + Mi
βi(Mi) := Mi
Ti ∈ {0,1}, Mi ∈ {0,1}
where Ti is a treatment indicator randomly drawn from {0,1} with equal probability and βi
is the treatment effect for individual i. Mi is the unobserved variable. In this first example, I
assume βi(Mi) = Mi for simplicity. More general cases are discussed in later sections. The
objective is to find βi given data of individual outcomes yi and its treatment indicator Ti.
The data generating process (the functional form of each variable) is unknown to economists.
Mi is unobserved.
Suppose all explanatory variables are observed and the functional form is known, ob-
taining the causal inference is equivalent to estimating parameter values of the function
24You can also think of this setting in terms of the conventional framework characterising treatment effects:
yi = [y1i(Mi)− y0i(Mi)]Ti + y0i(Mi) with y1i(Mi) = 2Mi and y0i(Mi) = Mi.
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and taking the partial derivative. Similarly, if all explanatory variables are observed but the
functional form is unknown, one could fit a nonparametric function and then perform a
numerical partial differentiation with the estimated model. That is, suppose Mi is observed,
we can estimate the individual treatment effect βi using the following two-step procedure:
1. Use a nonparametric econometric method or a machine learning algorithm to recognise
the pattern of yi using Ti and Mi. Obtain
model1 : (Ti, Mi)→ pi
2. Use model1 to construct counterfactual predictions conditioning on the value of Mi
and calculate individual treatment effect25.
βEsti = model1(1, Mi)−model1(0, Mi)
In this procedure, the ability to make predictions conditioning on the value of Mi is
important. If the explanatory variable Mi is unobserved, the individual treatment effect βi
will not be identifiable in general.
In many cases, economists do not observe Mi. But it may be possible to have/create
a variable Mi that preserves some structural information in Mi. If we could construct
counterfactuals conditioning on the structural information provided byMi, we will be able
to recover βi using the above procedure. In general, the structural information contained in
the alternative variableMi could be highly nonlinear. I find that the tree based algorithms
have a unique advantage in addressing this type of problems.
Consider the following data generating process of 200 individuals:
Table 3.1 Values of yi
yi βi Mi Ti
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0
2 1 1 1
Table 3.2 Assignment of Mi
Mi i
0 1-100
1 101-200
In this constructed example, the assignment of Mi happens to be ordered and I want to
utilise the information provided by the index i to estimate the individual treatment effect βi.
To capture the highly nonlinear information contained in i, I will run a tree based algorithm
25In the case where Ti is continuous, a similar numerical derivation can be obtained by βEsti =
model1(Ti+c,i)−model1(Ti−c,i)
2c
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with the supervisor/dependent variable yi on explanatory variables Ti and i in step 1 and
construct counterfactuals based on the estimated tree structure model1(Ti, i) in step 2.
Data
i ≤ 100
0
i > 100
Ti = 0
1
Ti = 1
2
Fig. 3.1 Fitted model1(Ti, i)
The result of applying a decision tree is presented in figure 3.1. In producing model1(Ti, i),
the algorithm compares the resulted MPE26 between the best split of Ti and the best split of
i. Splitting the sample into Ti = 0 and Ti = 1 will result in MPE = 0.5, while splitting into
i ≤ 100 and i > 100 (the best split for i) will result in MPE = 0.25. Therefore, the algorithm
will choose to split i for its first split. After this split, the MPE for the subgroup i ≤ 100 is 0
and no further split is needed. The algorithm will try to find the best split for the subgroup
i > 100. In this case, the best split will be Ti = 0 and Ti = 1.
ŷi Evaluated at
i Ti = 1 Ti = 0 Estimated βi True βi
1-50 0 0 0 0
51-100 0 0 0 0
101-150 2 1 1 1
151-200 2 1 1 1
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
l
l
l
l
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 50 100 150 200
First 200 observations
 
l lTrue Beta Predicted Beta
The table on the left hand side illustrates the second step. The right hand side graph
compares the true βi with the estimated βi in an environment closer to reality. First, a random
noise is added to the data generating process, i.e. yi = βiTi + Mi + ϵi, where ϵi ∼ N(0,0.01).
Second, in estimating the model1(.), I add a random variable ζi ∼ N(0,1) as an additional
explanatory variable which is independently generated from the data generating process of
26I use h(.) = |yi −mc| as the error criteria.
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pi. The idea is that the algorithm should be able to distinguish informative variables from
uninformative ones by utilising additional structural information implied by the index i.
Figure 3.B.1 gives the estimated βi under three different settings27. Sub-figure (a) rep-
resents the result when I use ei and ζi as the explanatory variables. As the algorithm can
no longer make predictions of βi conditioning on useful information in Mi, the predicted βi
can be very different from the true βi. Sub-figure (c) represents the estimates after adding
N − 1 dummies of the index i. Sub-figure (d) represents the estimates when the true βi = Mi
is added as a feature variable.
In general, the assignment of Mi will not be ordered and adding index i will not provide
relevant information. Figure 3.B.2 presents estimates of βi where Mi is randomly drawn
from {0,1} with equal probability for each individual i.
To make the correct prediction of βd, one needs to find a transformation of the unobserved
variable Mi that satisfies a weak monotonic property ℸ defined below:
Definition 1. Let {an} be a sequence of real numbers. ℸ : {an} → {bn} ∈ RN is a weak
monotonic transformation if
aj > ai ⇒ bj > bi ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} or
aj > ai ⇒ bj < bi ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}
Proposition 1. Let {an} be a sequence of real numbers. Suppose that entering {an} as an ex-
planatory variable in a recursive binary splitting algorithm results in k < n unique splitting points
am1 , ..., amk with mi indicating the index for the i th split, then entering any weak monotonic transfor-
mation of {an} will result in the same splitting indices m1, ...,mk.
The proof of proposition 1 is given in appendix 3.B. Intuitively, since a binary splitting
algorithm only uses ordinal information of an explanatory variable in its splitting criteria,
any transformation that preserves the ordinal information of this explanatory variable should
result in the same splitting points. Compared to proposition 1, a more interesting and useful
property of tree based algorithms is the conditional monotonic transformation property as
stated below:
Proposition 2. Let Xn be a set of feature variables excluding an. If var(a|Xn) ̸= 0 for some values
of Xn and there is a large number of observations for these subsets of Xn, entering {an} as a feature
variable is equivalent to entering any ℸ({an}|Xn) in a recursive binary splitting algorithm.
I have not proved proposition 2 yet. I illustrate my idea using the following numerical
example. Consider the case where the treatment effect βi depends on another observable
explanatory variable Xi. To keep the story simple, I assume that Xi is independently drawn
27The additional variable ζi is included in all cases.
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from {0,1} with equal probability and βi is linear in Xi and Mi.
yi = βiTi + Mi
βi = Xi + Mi
Ti ∈ {0,1}, Mi ∈ {0,1}, Xi ∈ {0,1}
I experiment on the following two formulations of Mt:
M1d =
{
−|ϵi| i f Mi = 0
|ϵi| i f Mi = 1
; M2i =
{
−|ϵi|+ Xi i f Mi = 0
|ϵi|+ Xi i f Mi = 1
; where ϵi ∼ N(0,1)
These two formulations are (a) highly nonlinear but (b) satisfy the weak or conditional
weak monotonic transformations28. Estimation results are given in Figure 3.B.3 and 3.B.4.
Please note that the algorithm does not know the data generating process ofM1i andM
2
i and
thus cannot see the clear distinction between red and green points in sub-figures (a) and (b).
It classifies by recognising patterns between pi andM1i , Ti (orM
2
i , Ti, Xi in the second case).
To sum up, tree based algorithms only use the ordinal information in its classification
process. Any transformation that contains the same ordinal information of the unobserved
variable will produce the same tree structure. Therefore, if one can find a variable or a set
of variables that contain approximately the same ordinal information of the unobserved
variable, the casual inference can be made (approximately) as if we had observed the
unobserved variable.
Utilising orthogonal dimensions
In general, it is difficult to apply the conditional weak monotonic transformation property
in a one dimensional data framework. However, in a multi-dimensional panel, this prop-
erty can be exploited together with orthogonal variations across dimensions to control for
unobserved variables. The proposed approach exploits the fact that certain dimensions
are less influenced by certain types of errors. Conditioning on a particular dimension, the
structural estimates may be biased. However, as long as the bias is "well structured" in other
dimensions, the weak monotonic transformation property will apply and the individual
treatment effect is identifiable29. The idea of using all possible combinations of subsets
of dimensional-limited structural estimations to control for unobserved variables is first
proposed in this paper.
28Please note thatM1d andM
2
i do not satisfy the conventional monotonic transformation definition which
requires aj ≤ ai ⇔ bj ≤ bi ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}
29In the context of the ERPT problem, “well structured” means that the covariance between the volatility
(second moment) of bilateral exchange rates and the level (first moment) of marginal cost of the firm at the time
dimension does not vary across destinations. This point is explained by analytical examples in the appendix.
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In the context of the constructed two-dimensional examples in section 2, the procedure
of the proposed algorithm can be applied as follows. First, run simple OLS regressions using
the pricing equation implied by the structural model in all possible subsets of dimensions.
Second, gather these estimates from regressions and enter them as variables in a tree based
algorithm to predict the dependent variable30. In this process, only informative coefficients
on predicting the dependent variable from the first step will be selected. Third, use the
obtained non-parametric model to predict the dependent variable by changing the key
variable of interest and keeping other explanatory variables and the obtained coefficients
in step 1 fixed. Fourth, calculate the numerical partial derivative and perform a second
algorithm mapping this numerical partial derivative on observed explanatory variables and
estimated structural coefficients.
1. For t = 1...nt, run OLS, and collect coefficients b0t ,b
1
t
pd,t = b0t + b
1
t ed,t
For d = 1...nd, run OLS, and collect coefficients b0d,b
1
d
pd,t = b0d + b
1
ded,t
2. Approximating p. Run GBRT entering coefficients {b0t ,b1t ,b0d,b1d} as additional feature
variables. Obtain
model1 : (ed,t,msd,t,b0t ,b
1
t ,b
0
d,b
1
d)→ pd,t
3. Numerical differentiation. Use model1 to construct counterfactual predictions condi-
tioning on the values of msd,t,b0t ,b
1
t ,b
0
d,b
1
d and calculate
31:
pEst1d,t =model1(ed,t − ϵ,b0t ,b1t ,b0d,b1d)
pEst2d,t =model1(ed,t + ϵ,msd,t,b
0
t ,b
1
t ,b
0
d,b
1
d)
βEstd,t =
pEst2d,t − pEst1d,t
2ϵ
4. Approximating βEst. Run GBRT with the dependent variable βEstd,t on ed,t,msd,t,b
0
t ,b
1
t ,b
0
d,b
1
d,
and get
model2 : (ed,t,msd,t,b0t ,b
1
t ,b
0
d,b
1
d)→ βEstd,t
30Unlike the fixed effect related methods, instead of partitioning out information, the proposed approach adds
back these estimates to the main estimation question.
31Throughout my analysis, I choose ϵ to be half standard deviation of the policy variable, i.e. ϵ = 0.5std(ed)
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Table 3.3 presents the estimated ERPT from applying the proposed algorithm to three
examples constructed in the section 2.32
The algorithm is evaluated in two aspects, the ability to recover the key parameter
of interest, βd,t and the ability to discover the underlying structure βd,t. In contrast to
conventional regression methods, the algorithm estimates β for each d and t, which generates
80,000 estimates. I construct three measures to evaluate the algorithm’s ability to recover the
key parameter of interest, βd,t: (a) the usual absolute measure of distances defined as the
sum of squared residuals, SSR; (b) the measure of the number of outliers or extreme values
defined as the number of estimated βEst that lies outside one standard deviation of the true
β over total number of estimated βEst,33; (c) visualisation plotting the first 50 observations.
SSR :=∑
d
∑
t
(βEstd,t − βd,t)2
Error Rate :=
|{βEstd,t : |βEstd,t − βd,t| > σβ}|
|{βEstd,t }|
For evaluating the ability to recover the underlying structure of the ERPT function, I
construct the following three measures. Measure 1 and 2 will enable us to compare the true
relationship between ERPT and market share with the algorithm estimated relationship.
Measure 3 is helpful in understanding why the algorithm estimated relationship is different
from the true relationship under some circumstances.
1. The true relationship between ERPT and market share evaluated at different quantiles
of the marginal cost.
• Calculate mcq := quantile(mc,q) from data; q ∈ [0.3,0.5,0.7]34
• Plot f (ms) = (ms− 0.5)2 + mcq
2. The estimated relationship between ERPT and market share evaluated at different
quantiles of feature variables excluding market share ms, i.e. X−ms := ed,t,b0t ,b1t ,b0d,b1d.
• Calculate the q-th quantile of each variable in X−ms;
• Plot f (ms) =model2[ms, (X−ms)q] where (X−ms)q := (ed,t)q, (b0t )q, (b1t )q, (b0d)q, (b1d)q
3. The estimated relationship between ERPT and market share evaluated at the reverse
engineered quantiles of the marginal cost.
32In evaluating the algorithm, I construct two different datasets of the same size generated by the data
generating process specified in section 2. The algorithm is first trained in one dataset. The fitted model is then
tested in the second dataset.
33In my examples, the panel is balanced, |{βEstd,t }| = nDnT
34In my initial experiments, I arbitrarily chose these three quantiles 0.3,0.5,0.7. A more common choice may
be 0.25,0.5,0.75.
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Table 3.3 Estimates of the proposed algorithm
Specification 1:
ms
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
be
ta
Estimated 0.7q
Reverse Engineered
True
Estimated 0.3q
Estimated 0.5q
First 50 observations
0 10 20 30 40 50
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
be
ta
EstimatedTrue
SSR = 83.71, Error Rate = 0.54%
Specification 2:
ms
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
be
ta
Estimated 0.7q
Reverse Engineered
True
Estimated 0.3q
Estimated 0.5q
First 50 observations
0 10 20 30 40 50
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
be
ta
EstimatedTrue
SSR = 86.05, Error Rate = 13.40%
Specification 3:
ms
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
-10
-5
0
5
be
ta
Estimated 0.7q
Reverse Engineered
True
Estimated 0.3q
Estimated 0.5q
First 50 observations
0 10 20 30 40 50
-6
-4
-2
0
2
be
ta
EstimatedTrue
SSR = 96151.01, Error Rate = 2.64%
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Table 3.4 No additional information
Specification 1:
ms
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
be
ta
Estimated 0.7q
Reverse Engineered
True
Estimated 0.3q
Estimated 0.5q
First 50 observations
0 10 20 30 40 50
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
be
ta
EstimatedTrue
SSR = 5934.63, Error Rate = 73.47%
Specification 2:
ms
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
be
ta
Estimated 0.7q
Reverse Engineered
True
Estimated 0.3q
Estimated 0.5q
First 50 observations
0 10 20 30 40 50
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
be
ta
EstimatedTrue
SSR = 817.50, Error Rate = 44.41%
Specification 3:
ms
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
be
ta
Estimated 0.7q
Reverse Engineered
True
Estimated 0.3q
Estimated 0.5q
First 50 observations
0 10 20 30 40 50
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
be
ta
True
Estimated
SSR = 1425815.68, Error Rate = 25.84%
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Table 3.5 Adding dimensional index
Specification 1:
ms
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
be
ta
Estimated 0.7q
Reverse Engineered
True
Estimated 0.3q
Estimated 0.5q
First 50 observations
0 10 20 30 40 50
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
be
ta
EstimatedTrue
SSR = 282.40, Error Rate = 2.66%
Specification 2:
ms
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
be
ta
Estimated 0.7q
Reverse Engineered
True
Estimated 0.3q
Estimated 0.5q
First 50 observations
0 10 20 30 40 50
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
be
ta
EstimatedTrue
SSR = 160.56, Error Rate = 19.37%
Specification 3:
ms
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
be
ta
Estimated 0.7q
Reverse Engineered
True
Estimated 0.3q
Estimated 0.5q
First 50 observations
0 10 20 30 40 50
-10
-5
0
5
be
ta
EstimatedTrue
SSR = 334858.85, Error Rate = 4.08%
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• Estimate mcq implied by (X−ms)q; q ∈ [0.3,0.5,0.7]
(a) Run GBRT with mct as the dependent variable on X−ms and get modelmc
(b) Estimate mcq = modelmc[(X−ms)q]
• Plot f (ms) = (ms− 0.5)2 + mcq
I compare results for the proposed method with two alternative settings. Table 3.4
presents results when no additional information is added. model1 will be a function mapping
(ed,t,msd,t)→ pd,t and X−ms = ed,t. The estimation procedure includes step 2-4 only. Table
3.5 presents results using indices d and t as controls. model1 will be a function mapping
(ed,t,msd,t,d, t)→ pd,t with X−ms = (ed,t,d, t).
Comparing results of three tables, the proposed method is significantly better at esti-
mating βd,t and approximating the underlying structure of βd,t in all three specifications.
The method without adding any additional information generates large errors in the point
estimate of βd,t due to alignments of the unobserved variable mct. Given that, the graph
on the right hand side shows that the estimated relationship represents the ERPT function
evaluated at the median of the unobserved variable mct. Adding dimensional indices as ad-
ditional feature variables will improve the accuracy of point estimates (by a smaller amount
compared to the proposed approach) but does not provide additional information on the
quantile of the unobserved variable mct. As a result, the resulting underlying structure of
βd,t can be very different from the true structure.
The key to improve the estimates relies on feeding the correct additional structural
information about the functional forms to the machine learning algorithm. This type of
algorithm has not been explored by existing machine learning approaches because adding
such structural information is not possible for prediction problems35. A formal presentation
of the algorithm can be found in the appendix.
3.4 Model and Recovering ERPT from Simulated Exporters
The previous section tests the algorithm using simple numerical examples. This section tests
the performance of the algorithm in a workhorse international macroeconomic model with
heterogeneous firms.
3.4.1 Model
I take the seminal contribution of Atkeson and Burstein (2008) as the benchmark model.
The model is designed to understand how strategic competition due to different market
structures (productivity distributions) could reach different equilibria after an exchange rate
shock. There are N countries in the world trading with each other. Within each country,
35They require information of the dependent variable to estimate structural coefficients.
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there are a large but limited number of sectors S. As in Atkeson and Burstein (2008), these
sectors can be interpreted as “the lowest level of disaggregation of commodities used in
economic censuses and price index construction”. Within each sector, there are a limited
number of firms producing goods. Each firm produces a distinct product with the elasticity
of substitution within the sector being ρs.
To make the model tractable, I will stick to the following two simplifications made in the
original model. First, the model starts with an equilibrium and firms do not make entry and
exit decisions36. Second, firms only use labour in their production and no imported inputs
are needed.
To customise the model to fit the purpose of this paper, I extend the model in three
aspects. First, I allow asymmetries in industry structures. To achieve this, I assume a large
but limited number of sectors. Second, I extend the original two-country framework to
an N-country trading system. This modification allows the model to study the effect of
asymmetric exchange rate shocks on trade pattens. Third, to ensure a unique equilibrium in
this multi-country world, I assume that only the best domestic firm in each sector exports.37
This setting can be tough as there exists a hidden sector specific trading barrier such that only
the best firm in each sector finds it profitable to export. Technically, this simplification makes
this multi-firm multi-sector multi-country model stable and avoids multiple equilibria. In an
N-country framework, it generates a very nice market structure with productive N-1 firms
from trade partners and a bunch of domestic firms that may be less productive but large in
numbers [see figure 3.D.2].
Firm’s Problem
Variables in this model have five dimensions with f , s,o,d, t standing for firm, sector, origin,
destination, time respectively. The final consumption Dd,t in destination d is aggregated
across sectors using the CES production function with the elasticity of substitution across
sectors being equal to η. The price index for final consumption Pd,t can be derived as follows.
Dd,t ≡
[
∑
s
(Ds,d,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
, Pd,t ≡
[
∑
s
(ps,d,t)1−η
] 1
1−η
(3.2)
Within a sector, there are foreign firms in this sector 1s,o winning the exporting games
IE from each origin o and all domestic firms in this sector 1s,d competing together with the
within-sector elasticity of substitution ρs. The sectoral demand Ds,d,t and price Ps,d,t are given
by:
36The rationale is that firms’ decisions depend on long-run sum of expectations of all future profits. As this
model aims to study short-run effects of exchange rate fluctuations, this is a relatively safe condition.
37When the best firm is determined, it exports to all countries.
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Ds,d,t ≡
[
∑
o
∑
f∈1s,o∩1E
(q f ,s,o,d,t)
ρs−1
ρs + ∑
f∈1s,d
(q f ,s,o,d,t)
ρs−1
ρs
] ρs
ρs−1
Ps,d,t ≡
[
∑
o
∑
f∈1s,o∩1E
(p f ,s,o,d,t)1−ρs + ∑
f∈1s,d
(p f ,s,o,d,t)1−ρs
] 1
1−ρs
Firms compete in quantities q f ,s,o,d,t under Cournot competition within each sector s38:
max
q f ,s,o,d,t
q f ,s,o,d,t(p f ,s,o,d,teo,d,t −mc f ,s,o,t)
subject to
q f ,s,o,d,t =
(
p f ,s,o,d,t
Ps,d,t
)−ρs (Ps,d,t
Pd,t
)−η
Dd,t (3.3)
where mc f ,s,o,t is the marginal cost of firm f from sector s and origin o at time t.
Price, Market Share and Demand Elasticity
The optimal price p f ,s,o,d,t for an exporter from origin o to destination d can be expressed as a
function of price elasticity of demand ε f ,s,o,d,t, marginal cost ms f ,s,o,d,t and bilateral exchange
rate eo,d, which is defined as units of currency o per unit of currency d at time t.
p f ,s,o,d,t =
ε f ,s,o,d,t(ms f ,s,o,d,t)
ε f ,s,o,d,t(ms f ,s,o,d,t)− 1
mc f ,s,o,t
eo,d,t
(3.4)
The price elasticity of demand ε f ,s,o,d,t can be expressed as a function of the market share
and the elasticity of substitution. Specifically, under the assumption that ρ > η, the price
elasticity of demand is a strictly decreasing function of market share, i.e. bigger firms face a
less elastic demand and charge a higher markup.
ε f ,s,o,d,t =
1
1
ρ (1−ms f ,s,o,d,t) + 1ηms f ,s,o,d,t
(3.5)
where market share is defined as
ms f ,s,o,d,t =
p f ,s,o,d,tq f ,s,o,d,t
∑ f p f ,s,o,d,tq f ,s,o,d,t
=
p1−ρf ,s,o,d,t
∑ f (p f ,s,o,d,t)1−ρ
(3.6)
38In this nested CES structure, the main theoretical result is not sensitive to whether firms compete in prices
or quantities. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) show that similar expressions can be derived if firms are competing
in prices.
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Substituting (9) into (8), we can express elasticity of demand as relative prices. ERPT is less
than one as a decrease in ed,t leads to an increase in optimal price, which in turn leads to a
lower market share and increases the optimal markup. A log-linearised version of the above
description can be derived as follows:
Log-linearising equation (3.4), deviations of optimal price can be expressed as a function
of deviations of its own market share, its own marginal cost and the bilateral exchange rate
between the origin country and the destination country.
p̂k,s,o,d,t = κk,s,o,d,tm̂sk,s,o,d,t + m̂ck,s,o,t − êo,d,t (3.7)
where κ f ,s,o,d,t is the price elasticity with respect to a firm’s own market shares, which equals
the desired markup times a multiplier due to differences in elasticity of substitution across
sectors and within sectors.
κ f ,s,o,d,t ≡
(
ε f ,s,o,d,t
ε f ,s,o,d,t − 1
)(
− 1
ρs
+
1
η
)
(3.8)
Note that both m̂ck,s,o,t and êo,d,t are state variables and exogenous to firms. After a shock,
firms reach the new equilibrium through Cournot competition. The deviation of market
share m̂sk,s,o,d,t for firm k depends on ex ante market structure, i.e. market share distributions
{msk,s,o′,d,t}k∈1 f ,o′∈1o , marginal cost shocks {m̂ck,s,o′,t}k∈1 f ,o′∈1o , and the bilateral exchange rate
movements of all trade partners from country d, {êo′,d,t}o′∈1o .
m̂sk,s,o,d,t [1− (1−msk,s,o,d,t)(1− ρs)κk,s,o,d,t]
= (1−msk,s,o,d,t){(1− ρs) [m̂ck,s,o,t − êo,d,t]}
−∑
o′
∑
f ̸=k
ms f ,s,o′,d,t
{
(1− ρs)
[
m̂c f ,s,o′,t − êo′,d,t − κ f ,s,o′,d,tm̂s f ,s,o′,d,t
]}
(3.9)
It is worth stressing that even under a firm specific shock, the equilibrium effect of
changing market shares for other firms ∑o′∑ f ̸=k ms f ,s,o′,d,tκ f ,s,o′,d,tm̂s f ,s,o′,d,t will not be zero
in most cases39. The importance of competitors’ market share reactions is weighed by the
market share with its importance strictly increasing in the market share of the competitor40.
Substituting (3.9) into (3.7), we can obtain a general equation for price deviations in a
multi-country environment.
p̂k,s,o,d,t = λk,s,o,d,t
[
m̂ck,s,o,t − êo,d,t − κk,s,o,d,tĈEk,s,o,d,t
]
(3.10)
39In the presence of m̂s f ,s,o′ ,d,t, there is no simple analytical solution for the optimal market share change after
a shock even after log-linearisation. Given a set of realised shocks and prior market structure, market share
conditions (3.9) will formulate a system of f nonlinear equations and can be solved numerically. As I will show
in later simulations, reaction from other firms will make ERPT fail to present the U-shaped response in market
share.
40Note that the expression κ f ,s,o′ ,d,t is strictly increasing in market share ms f ,s,o′ ,d,t.
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where λk,s,o,d,t is the theoretical ERPT and it is U-shaped in market share as derived in most
ERPT literature,
λ f ,s,o,d,t =
1
1− (1−ms f ,s,o,d,t)(1− ρs)κ f ,s,o,d,t (3.11)
Fig. 3.1 Plot of λ f ,s,o,d,t
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and ĈEk,s,o,d,t is the total effect of competitors’ reactions.
ĈEk,s,o,d,t =∑
o′
∑
f ̸=k
ms f ,s,o′,d,t(1− ρs)
[
m̂c f ,s,o′,t − êo′,d,t − κ f ,s,o′,d,tm̂s f ,s,o′,d,t
]
(3.12)
In a multi-country setting, the optimal price response of an exporter is a function of
origin specific exchange rate shock minus bilateral exchange rate shocks of all other trade
partners weighted by a nonlinear function of corresponding competitor’s market share.
The household’s problem follows closely with Atkeson and Burstein (2008). There is a
representative household in each destination d maximising its expected utility by choosing
optimal final consumption Cd,t and optimal labour supply Ld,t. The representative consumer
can trade a complete set of international assets from all trade partners.
max
Cd,t,Ld,t
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtU(Cd,t, Ld,t)
subject to
Ud,t = log[C
µ
d,t(1− Ld,t)1−µ]
Pd,tCd,t +∑
o
[
∑
ν
pBo,t(ν)Bo,t(ν)− (1+ io,t−1)Bo,t−1
]
∗ eo,d,t = Wd,tLd,t +Πd,t
where holding Bo,t(ν) will earn Bo,t unit of currency o at t + 1 if state ν happens. pBo,t(ν) is
the price of bond from origin o with state ν. io,t−1 represents the interest paid in the unit of
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currency o from t− 1 to t. Πd,t is the lump-sum profit transfer from all domestic firms and
exporters in country d.
The optimal solution of household’s problem is given by
1− µ
µ
Cd,t
1− Ld,t =
Wd,t
Pd,t
(3.13)
Co,tPo,t
eo,d,tCd,tPd,t
=
Co,t+1(ν)Po,t+1(ν)
eo,d,t+1(ν)Cd,t+1(ν)Pd,t+1(ν)
(3.14)
where (3.13) represents the optimal division of consumption and labor and (3.14) stands for
the conventional international risk sharing condition.
Other equilibrium conditions
The production function is assumed to be linear in labour where the marginal cost mc f ,s,o,t of a
firm is calculated by dividing the nominal wage of the origin country Wo,t by its productivity
Ω f ,s,o,t. For each firm, the total quantity of products sold ∑d q f ,s,o,d,t equals the quantity
produced Ω f ,s,o,tl f ,s,o,t. The last equation is the labor market clearing condition.
mc f ,s,o,t =
Wo,t
Ω f ,s,o,t
Ω f ,s,o,tl f ,s,o,t =∑
d
q f ,s,o,d,t
∑
f ,s
l f ,s,o,t = Lo,t
I select the nominal wage Wo,t in each origin as the numeraire and set it equal to one. In
this model, the productivity distribution can be asymmetric across sectors and countries.
As a result, the bilateral nominal exchange rate is not necessarily equal to one. In my
simulation the steady state bilateral exchange rate is determined by the bilateral balance of
trade condition, i.e.
∑
f ,s
p f ,s,d,o,tq f ,s,d,o,t =∑
f ,s
p f ,s,o,d,tq f ,s,o,d,t ∗ eo,d,t f or o ̸= d
3.4.2 Recovering ERPT from simulated exporters
In the following subsection, I use the model to test the proposed algorithm. Specifically, I
simulate the model under different scenarios, calculate the model implied ERPT at firm level
by constructing counterfactual environments, run the proposed algorithm using simulated
data and compare estimated pass through with its theoretical value.
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Model Simulation
I use the same calibration for the elasticity of substitution across sectors η and within sectors
ρ as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008). In the benchmark case, I choose a model of three
countries. The number of sectors is chosen to be 25, consistent with the classification of
popular industry coding standards41. For a given prior productivity distribution, the number
of domestic firms in each county determines the degree of home bias in the sector. For a
model of three countries, I set the number of domestic firms to be 3. As a result, there will
be 5 firms in each sector, including two relatively more competitive foreign firms and three
domestic firms. This setting gives a reasonable median home market share around 50%
depending on the productivity distribution of the sector in other countries42. Firm level
productivity shocks are assumed to follow a simple AR(1) process with persistence equal to
0.95.
Countries S N ρ η Φ(Ω)
Benchmark 3 25 3+2 10 2 Uniform
Robustness 4,5 10-35
3 to 10 +
Countries - 1
10 2 Uniform
To ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium in each period, I consider a financial
autarky case and give exogenous exchange rate shocks to the model43. I further assume that
the no financial market exchange rate arbitrage condition holds, i.e.
e1,2,t =
e1,3,t
e2,3,t
which implies a maximum of 2 exchange rate shocks in this three country world44.
e1,2,t = ξ1,te1,2,ss, e3,2,t = ξ3,te3,2,ss, ξi,t ∼ uni f orm(0.8,1.2)
There are two sets of state variables influenced by two sets of shocks, i.e. the set of
productivity shocksΩ f ,s,o,t for each firm, each sector and each country and the set of bilateral
exchange rate shocks eo,d,t. In each period, productivity shocks and exchange rate shocks
are first realised and the corresponding values of state variables are then calculated. The
most productive domestic firm in each sector wins the exporting game and exports to all
41Increasing the number of countries and sectors will exponentially increase the number of nonlinear equations
needed to solve for each period.
42In this model, increasing the number of domestic firms will not always lead to a greater home bias as it will
also make foreign firms surviving from the exporting game more competitive. Home firms increase in numbers
but foreign competitors increase in quality. The equilibrium result depends on the assumption of productivity
distributions.
43The international risk sharing condition (3.14) no longer applies.
44The third bilateral exchange rate is determined by the no arbitrage condition.
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trade partners. Collecting all equilibrium conditions for all countries, solving the model is
equivalent to solving a large-scale constrained system of nonlinear equations45.
In the following exercise, I will take country 1 as the home country and try to recover
ERPT of country 1’s exporters. Counterfactual macro state is constructed as follows46
ec1,2,t = e1,2,t−1, e
c
3,2,t = ξ3,te3,2,ss, e
c
1,3,t =
ec1,2,t
ec3,2,t
Estimation procedure
After the model is simulated, an artificial dataset is constructed to resemble those observable
variables in China’s custom dataset and test the proposed algorithm. The objective of the
algorithm is to use only information from the constructed dataset to (a) learn from trade
patterns, (b) estimate price changes under a bilateral exchange rate shock at period t given
market conditions at t− 1 and (c) recover the model implied ERPT for estimated firms.
The estimation procedure is given as follows:
1. Simulate the model for 240 periods (20 years). Record variables that are accessible from
a common custom database including f , s,o,d, t, p f ,s,o,d,t,q f ,s,o,d,t, plus some observable
macroeconomic indices including Ds,d,t, Ps,d,t, ed,t, Pd,t, Ld,t,Cd,t.
2. Re-simulate the model to recover the model implied counterfactual ERPT. To calculate
the model implied theoretical ERPT, I load all variables including the productivity
shock from the simulated model. I then construct the counterfactual equilibrium using
the productivity distribution at period t-1 and bilateral exchange rate at period t. The
price difference between the counterfactual and the original equilibrium reflects the
equilibrium effect of a pure exchange rate shock.
3. Identify a simple regression relationship between the dependent variable and the
observable independent variables based on economic theory.
log(p f ,s,d,t) = a + b ∗ log(ed,t) + c ∗ log(p f ,s,d,t−1)
4. Identify dimensions to be fixed as {s, t,d, sd}. Run regressions and collect coefficients
as,bs, cs, at,bt, ct, ...
5. Create market share measure ms f sdt,sdt =
p f ,s,d,tq f ,s,d,t
Ps,d,tDs,d,t
45The setting that only the most productive firm in a sector exports avoids potential multiple equilibria and
returns a unique solution in most calibrations. The model is built using Julia JUMP module and solved using
Ipopt solver.
46The algorithm is tested on various settings of exchange rate shocks and a world with maximum 5 countries.
Related results are available upon request.
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6. Run GBRT with supervisor log(p f ,s,d,t) on the policy variable log(ed,t) and the feature
variables
X = log(ed,t−1), log(ed′,t), log(ed′,t−1), log(ms f sdt−1,sdt−1),
log(Ds,d,t−1), log(Ps,d,t−1), log(Pd,t−1), log(Ld,t−1), log(Cd,t−1),
as,bs, cs, at,bt, ct, ...
and obtain model1
7. Numerical differentiation using the predicted price at current exchange rate and the
predicted price if the exchange rate was the same as in the previous period47.
pEst1f ,s,d,t = model1(ed,t,X )
pEst2f ,s,d,t = model1(ed,t−1,X )
ERPTEstf ,s,d,t =
log(pEst1f ,s,d,t)− log(pEst2f ,s,d,t)
ed,t − ed,t−1
8. Run GBRT again with supervisor ERPTEstf ,s,d,t on log(ed,t), X and obtain model2.
Results
The performance of the algorithm is tested in two cases. Case 1 shuts down the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks of firms in all countries48, leaving only multilateral exchange rate shocks.
Case 2 represents the world with both the idiosyncratic productivity shocks and multilateral
exchange rate shocks.
In a multi-country world, multilateral rather than bilateral exchange rate movements
matter. As derived in (3.9) and (3.12), the multilateral exchange rate shocks transmit into
exporter’s prices through the competition channel. However, controlling for the effect of
multilateral exchange rate movements is not straightforward and most empirical works
estimating the ERPT from the exporters’ perspective only focus on bilateral movements.
47All other variables in X take their current value at time t.
48Firms are still different in their productivity drawn.
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Fig. 3.2 Naive ERPT estimates
Market Share
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
-10
-5
0
5
10
ER
PT
Naive
Note: The blue dots represent the model implied firm-level ERPT without
accounting for the exchange rate movements of other trade partners. The
model is simulated under case 1 where there is no productivity shock. If
there is no exchange rate shock, the price p f ,s,1,2,t will be the same across all
time periods.
Ignoring this competition effect will potentially lead to seemingly unacceptable ERPT
estimates. Figure 3.2 shows calculation of firm level ERPT for exporters in country 1 selling
in country 2 without controlling for the exchange rate movement between country 2 and 3.
In the simulated model, the price of exporters from country 1 at country 2, p f ,s,1,2,t, reacts to
both e1,2,t and e2,3,t. The bilateral exchange rate movements of other trade partners of the
destination country could potentially magnify or mitigate the effect of the bilateral exchange
rate movement from the origin country. If the ERPT is calculated without accounting for this
effect, calculated results can be significantly greater than 1 or smaller than 0.
Figure 3.3 shows the results of the time-averaged estimated ERPT49 from the proposed
algorithm. The proposed algorithm performs extremely well under case 1. All time-averaged
estimates lie within one standard deviation of the model implied estimate and are very close
to the mean value of the model implied estimates. The error rate on point estimates is only
2.53%. The right graph shows that the estimated relationship between ERPT and market
share is well aligned with the true relationship of the model implied estimates50.
For the second case, adding productivity shocks increases the error rate. However, out of
25 firms, only two firms’ time-average ERPT lie outside one standard deviation of the true
49i.e. 1nt ∑t β
Est
f ,s,1,2,t. As only the best firm exports, the 25 firms in the figure stand for 25 sectors in the model.
Graphs for detailed point estimates and the comparison with alternative methods can be found in the appendix.
50 Note that for a given market share, the same exchange rate shock may have different impacts on each sector
of an economy, which depends on two factors: (a) the underlying distribution of productivity for this particular
sector of exporters from all countries and (b) the general equilibrium effect due to the change in aggregate
environments of a local destination and countries exporting to this destination.
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Fig. 3.3 ERPT estimates of the proposed algorithm versus model implied counterfactuals
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Case 1: only exchange rate shocks
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Case 2: add productivity shocks
Note: The left graph represents the time-average of ERPT for exporters originating from country 1 exporting to country 2.
The x-axis of the left graph represents the index of exporters. The red dots represent estimates of the proposed algorithm.
The blue dots represent the time-average of model implied firm-level ERPT backed up through counterfactual analysis. The
blue bars reflect the time fluctuation of model implied ERPT for each firm. Error rate and SSR are calculated based on point
estimates of ERPT for each firm-time combination (i.e. not time-averages).
The right graph represents the estimated relationship between market share and ERPT. The blue dots plot the model implied
ERPT. The coloured lines provide the algorithm estimated relationship evaluated at different quantiles of the feature variables
excluding the market share, X−ms.
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value. The right figure is relatively weak in identifying the correct quantiles but still well
aligned with the true relationship implied by the model.
3.5 Empirical Results
This section presents three empirical contributions on understanding firms’ pricing be-
haviour. First, with the proposed algorithm, this paper presents estimates of ERPT for each
firm-product-destination combination of China’s exporters during the sampling period 2000-
2006.51 These estimates can be later used to construct effective exchange rate measures using
a bottom-up approach based on firm-level ERPT; to identify the most and the least influenced
commodity, industry and trade partner by exchange rate shocks; or to plot distributions of
ERPT for different types of firms, industries and destinations, etc.
Second, this paper takes an agnostic approach to study the relationship between ERPT
and various market share measures. With a four-dimensional panel (firm-product-destination-
time), 12 market share measures can be constructed. Among these 12 market share measures,
9 measures are economically meaningful. Although there has been increasing attention in the
trade and international literature on how different market share measures capture different
aspects of firms’ pricing decision and international shock transmissions, most studies work
on a subset of the market share framework presented in table 3.1. My estimates contribute to
the literature by assessing the relative statistical importance of market shares in explaining
variations of ERPT and the unit value volatility. In addition, this paper empirically doc-
uments the nonlinear relationship between various market share measures and confirms
various theoretical predictions.
51I use China Import and Export Custom Database funded by Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance.
Data are available at the monthly frequency from 2000 to 2006. I aggregate these monthly series into quarterly
frequency to accommodate the availability of macro series such as CPI index. Details of the database and its
related descriptive statistics can be found in the second chapter.
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Table 3.1 Dimensions of market shares
Measure Construction Abbreviation Notation
Classical Market Share
Vf di
∑ f Vf di
fdi_di Firm Share (DI)
Local Core Product Measure
Vf di
∑i Vf di
fdi_fd Product Share (FD)
Destination Importance at
Firm-product Level
Vf di
∑d Vf di
fdi_fi Destination Share (FI)
Global Firm Competitiveness
∑d Vf di
∑ f ∑d Vf di
fi_i Firm Share (I)
Global Core Product Measure
∑d Vf di
∑d∑i Vf di
fi_f Product Share (F)
Destination Importance at
Product Level
∑ f Vf di
∑ f ∑d Vf di
di_i Destination Share (I)
Local Firm Competitiveness
∑i Vf di
∑ f ∑d Vf di
fd_d Firm Share (D)
Local Taste Preference
∑ f Vf di
∑ f ∑i Vf di
di_d Product Share (D)
Destination Importance
within Firm
∑i Vf di
∑d∑i Vf di
fd_f Destination Share (F)
Third, this paper provides the first evidence that the underlying factors explaining unit
value volatility and ERPT may be different. The price volatility is strictly decreasing in all
market share measures, while the relationship between ERPT and the market structure is
nonlinear and varies depending on the specific share measure. In addition, increasing the
volatility of bilateral and multilateral exchange rates, the volatility of destination CPI and
the frequency of trade have ambiguous positive effects on unit value volatility. The effects of
these variables on ERPT are heterogeneous and highly nonlinear. Interestingly, I find that
both EPRT and unit value volatility are hump-shaped52 in a number of observed trading
periods.
3.5.1 Estimation procedure
The first two stages of the empirical procedure follow closely with the one introduced in
section 3.4.1. In addition, I explore and estimate the factors explaining the volatility of unit
values and compare them to the results on ERPT obtained in stage 2.
1. Stage 1:
52U-shaped from the importers’ perspective.
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(a) Identify a simple regression relationship between the dependent variable and
observable independent variables based on economic theory.
log(pi, f ,d,t) = a + b ∗ log(pi, f ,d,t−1) + c ∗ log(ed,t)
(b) Identify dimensions to be fixed as {i, f ,d, t, i f , id, f d, f t}. Run regressions and
collect coefficients {ai,bi, ci, a f ,b f , c f , ...}
(c) Create and select combinations of market share measures.53
Table 3.2 Classification of market share measures
Destination
Specific
Global Counterparts
Firm fdi_di fd_d & fi_i
Product fdi_fd fi_f & di_d
Destination fdi_fi di_i & fd_f
(d) Estimate GBRT model with supervisor log(p f ,s,d,t) on the policy variable log(ed,t)
and feature variables54
X1 := log(oneerd,t), log(cpid,t), log(pi, f ,d,t−1),
fdi_di, fdi_fd, fdi_fi, fd_d, fi_f, di_i,
ai,bi, ci, a f ,b f , c f , ....
and obtain fitted model1
(e) Numerical differentiation on predicted counterfactual bilateral exchange rates
pEst1f ,s,d,t = model1(ed,t + 0.5σed ,X1)
pEst2f ,s,d,t = model1(ed,t − 0.5σed ,X1)
ERPTEstf ,s,d,t =
log(pEst1f ,s,d,t)− log(pEst2f ,s,d,t)
σed
2. Stage 2:
Estimate GBRT model with supervisor ERPTEsti, f ,d,t on feature variables including volatil-
53Table 3.2 reclassifies the 9 economically meaningful measures. As these market share measures are inter-
dependent, one can find the minimal set of variables to represent the information of these 9 statistics. It can
be shown that it is sufficient to include three destination specific measures (fdi_di, fdi_fd, fdi_fi) and the
first column of global measures (fd_d, fi_f, di_i).
54oneerd,t indicates the orthogonal destination NEER which is constructed using quarterly data by the same
method introduced in the second chapter.
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ities of unit values and three macro price indicators (bilateral nominal exchange rates,
ONEER, Destination CPI), two measures of firm-product-destination level characteris-
tics (frequency of trade and observed trading periods), 6 market share measures and
controlling coefficients.
X2 := σpi, f ,d ,σed ,σoneerd ,σcpid ,Frequency of Tradesi, f ,d, Observed Trading Periodsi, f ,d
fdi_di, fdi_fd, fdi_fi, fd_d, fi_f, di_i,
ai,bi, ci, a f ,b f , c f , ....
and obtain fitted model2.
3. Stage Volatility:
Estimate GBRT model with supervisor volatility of unit values, σpi, f ,d , on the same set
of feature variables as in stage 2 excluding σpi, f ,d
XVola := σed ,σoneerd ,σcpid ,Frequency of Tradesi, f ,d, Observed Trading Periodsi, f ,d
fdi_di, fdi_fd, fdi_fi, fd_d, fi_f, di_i,
ai,bi, ci, a f ,b f , c f , ....
and obtain fitted modelVola.
3.5.2 Main results
Deploying the algorithm on a real custom dataset is computationally demanding.55 At this
stage, the graphs are still sensitive to the economic equation relationship being assumed in
step (a) of the first stage and the feature variables entering the first and the second stages of
the algorithm. The following graphs summarise my preliminary findings.
55The cleaned dataset has a size around 5 Gigabytes. In the proposed method, a large number of esti-
mated structural parameters need to be stored in the memory. As a result, it currently requires around 100
times the memory of the original dataset. My codes are running on a computational cluster CamGrid [see
http://help.uis.cam.ac.uk/supporting-research/research-support/camgrid/camgrid] which allows me to have
maximum 128 Gigabytes memory. The following result is based on a sample of 5% randomly selected firms in
the China’s Custom dataset.
The second practical issue is that the amount of computational resources needed increases exponentially with
the size of the dataset and the number of iterations to run. The computing time is mainly consumed in running
cross validation simulations. Ideally, the optimal number of iterations needs to be determined by the cross
validation simulations. By increasing the number of iterations, the within sample prediction error will always
decrease but the cross validation error may or may not decrease depending on whether the additional iteration
improves the fit for all parallel sub-samples. The optimal number of iteration is defined at the iteration where
cross validation errors stop decreasing. However, due to computational time limits, I force the program to stop
at 50,000 iterations before the optimal iteration is reached. With a 5% sample and 50,000 iterations, the program
takes around 1 week to complete. As can be seen in table 3.3, the rate of the decreasing squared error loss is
sufficiently low at the 50,000th iteration.
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Table 3.3 Cross validation and relative importance
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Note: The left panel presents cross validations of 3 models. The green and black line represent the cross-validation prediction error
and within-sample prediction error respectively. The blue dashed line shows the optimal iteration indicated by cross validation
errors. The right panel presents feature variables’ contribution in error reduction. The supervisors in these three models are logged
unit value, point estimate of ERPT and unit value volatility respectively. Unit value persistence and survival periods are measured
at firm-product-destination level proxied by the frequency of trades and the number of observed trading periods respectively.
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Table 3.4 Mapping firm-product-destination characteristics to ERPT (red) and unit value
volatility (blue)
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Note: The x-axis of each graph represents the percentile of market share measures, e.g. 1.0 equals 100th percentile. The
circled-dots represent the estimated ERPT and unite value volatility respectively. The dashed coloured line represents
the smoothed version using second order polynomials. A pass through value of 0.05 means that the RMB price goes up
by 0.05% in reaction to a 1% bilateral exchange rate shock, i.e. a 95% destination country pass through. The median of
the standard deviation of logged unit values at firm-product-destination level is around 0.36.
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Table 3.5 Mapping firm-product-destination characteristics to ERPT (red) and unit value
volatility (blue) (cont.)
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Note: The x-axis of the graphs for the three volatility measures represents the standard deviation of logged macro price
indicators. The x-axis of the group for the frequency of trade represents the period gap (in quarters) between two ob-
servations at the firm-product-destination level. The x-axis of the bottom two graphs represents the total number trade
records observed in the sampling period at the firm-product-destination level. The circled-dots represent the estimated
ERPT and unit value volatility respectively. The dashed coloured line represents the smoothed version using second
order polynomials. A pass through value of 0.05 means that the RMB price goes up by 0.05% in reaction to a 1% bilateral
exchange rate shock, i.e. a 95% destination country pass through. The median of the standard deviation of logged unit
values at firm-product-destination level is around 0.36.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper differs from existing methodologies in emphasizing a holistic approach to es-
timating ERPT and proposes a machine learning algorithm to study the heterogeneity in
ERPT at firm-level.
The core of the proposed algorithm consists of two elements. First, I find that the fact
that tree based algorithms are robust to monotonic transformations of its feature variables
can be exploited to control for unobserved components. Second, in a multi-dimensional
panel, estimates from structural estimations in a range of limited-dimensional spaces can
help to restrain the behaviour of unobserved components.
This paper extends Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and builds a multi-sector multi-country
model to study how markets reach equilibrium under Cournot competition. From the
simulated model, I construct a dataset that resembles available information in the real
custom database to test the performance of the algorithm under complicated scenarios. The
proposed method shows an extremely high accuracy rate on estimating firm-level ERPT and
approximating the relationship between ERPT and the destination market share.
Applying the algorithm to China’s custom data from 2000-2006, this paper documents
new evidence on the relationships among various market share measures, firm-product-
destination characteristics, unit value volatility and ERPT.
Appendix
Appendix 3.A Introduction to Classification And Regression Tree
and Gradient Boosting Models
Classification And Regression Tree (CART)56, a method of supervised learning, is a recursive
binary splitting algorithm producing nonparametric mapping functions from independent
variables (feature variables) to the dependent variable. Depending on the type of the depen-
dent variables, tree based models are divided into classification trees (discrete dependent
variable) and regressions trees (continuous dependent variable). Tree based methods are
excellent at accommodating interactions between variables and complex nonlinear structures
as well as handling outliers and missing observations. Modern decision tree algorithms are
introduced by Breiman et al. (1984) and Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani (2001).
In a decision tree algorithm, the dataset is binary partitioned sequentially until certain
stop criterion has been met. At each partition, the algorithm will search all possible splits for
all feature variables and select the split that minimises the prediction error. The procedure
of a basic decision tree algorithm is given as follows:
MPE = ∑
τ∈leaves(T)
∑
i∈τ
h(y−mc)
mc =
1
nc
∑
i∈τ
pi
A decision tree algorithm recursively binary splits/partitions data at the point which
minimises the mean prediction error (MPE) measured by criteria h(.)57. (1) The algorithm
starts a tree of single node containing all points. If all the points in the node have the same
value for all the input variables, stop. (2) Search over all binary splits of all variables for the
one which reduces MPE as much as possible. If the largest decrease in MPE is below some
56A commonly used alias is “decision tree” algorithm. In my following discussions, I will refer to this
algorithm as “decision tree” algorithm or tree based algorithm.
57Commonly used functions include h(.) = |pi −mc| and h(.) = (pi −mc)2.
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threshold, or one of the resulting nodes contains fewer than q points, stop. Otherwise, take
that split, creating two new nodes. (3) In each new node, go back to step 1.
Fig. 3.A.1 Predicting export unit values
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Note: Calculation is based on quarterly data of China’s import and export database 2000-2006. Unit values are
measured in US dollars. The number in the circled note represents the average unit value of the classified group.
The percentage below the number shows the proportion of data (counted by number of observations) located in
this classification. Light (dark) blue indicates low (high) average unit values.
Figure 3.A.1 shows the results from applying CART to analyse the factors explaining the
variation in export prices (unit values at firm-product level) of China’s exporters. Entered
feature/explanatory variables include the quantiles of market shares58, logged real bilateral
exchange rate, frequency of unit value adjustment at firm-product-destination level, number
of observed trading periods and number of exporting destinations (during the period 2000-
2006) at firm level. As can be seen from figure 3.A.1, the first split is made at the quantile
of market shares. The algorithm predicts a higher average unit value for firms with high
market shares among Chinese exporters. After the first split, several more splits are made
sequentially in each subgroup based on other feature/explanatory variables. There is an
interesting pattern for the last set of splits made for the left branch (market share quantile
< 0.66) and the right branch (market share quantile ≥ 0.66). The left branch suggests that the
unit value variation is mostly explained by market share and real exchange rates variations
for those firm-product combinations with small market shares, whereas the right branch
suggests that other firm-product characteristics, such as the number of exported destinations
58I use the classical market share measure at firm-product-destination level ≡ ∑t Vi, f ,d,t∑ f ∑t Vi, f ,d,t calculated among
China’s exporters.
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and the frequency of price adjustments, start to play a role after the first few splits for those
firm-product combinations with large market shares59.
There are three advantages of tree based algorithms.
First, the binary splitting rule represents a natural decision-making process and the
resulting tree structure is easy to understand and interpret.
Second, the recursive binary splitting feature makes decision tree methods a natural
nonlinear estimator. Interactions between variables are accounted from the sequential
feature of the partition process as the next partition depends on the previous partitions
being made. “Trees tend to work well for problems where there are important nonlinearities
and interactions.” Tree based algorithms can discover nonlinear patterns that conventional
econometric methods may fail to detect. More discussions can be found in Varian (2014).
Third, tree based models are robust to certain types of outliers and irregularities of data.
Due to the binary splitting structure, only ordinal information of explanatory variables is
used. Therefore, the resulting tree structure is robust to monotonic transformation of the
explanatory variables. As discussed in subsection 3.3.2, this property can be exploited to
control for unobserved variables.
Given these advantages, empirically applying a decision tree algorithm also has various
problems. First, finding the optimal decision tree in a large dataset is computationally
difficult60. Second, practical decision tree solutions often lead to a local rather than global
optimisation. Third, the algorithm is sensitive to small changes of the ordinal structure of
explanatory variables. The resulted tree structure is often sensitive to its initial splits. More
details and discussions of tree based algorithms can be found in Rokach and Maimon (2005).
The above problems can be overcome by various machine learning techniques includ-
ing bagging, stacking, model averaging, random forest and boosting, etc.61 The gradient
boosting model, introduced by Friedman (2002)62, is one of the most effective algorithms.
The boosting algorithm is based on the idea that adaptively integrating many small mod-
els can achieve and even outperform the predictive power of a single big model. Gradient
boosting regression tree (GBRT) algorithm combines elements of gradient boosting and deci-
sion tree algorithms. In GBRT, trees are grown sequentially: each tree is grown conditional
on the classification from previously grown trees. Adding the boosting procedure makes
tree based models more robust, less path dependent and easy to work with large datasets.
The procedure of a workhorse GBRT algorithm is given as follows. A GBRT algorithm is
a numerical optimisation technique with the objective to find the mapping f (x) to minimise
59Please note that these results represent statistical relationships between variables only. As these classifications
are not conditional on the characteristics of firms, products, destination competition environments, no further
economic inference should be made based on these results.
60There have been papers proving that finding an optimal decision tree from a given data is NP-hard or
NP-complete under different scenarios. See Hyafil and Rivest (1976) and Hancock et al. (1996)
61See Breiman (1996) and Breiman (2001)
62Freund and Schapire (1996) developed the first two-class boosting classification algorithm called AdaBoost.
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the expected loss function Ψ by sequentially adding a new tree that best reduces the gradient
of the loss function:
f̂ (x) = argmin
f (x)
Ey,xΨ(y, f (x)) (3.15)
The algorithm starts by initialising f̂ (x) to be a constant and iterating the following steps
until reaching the specified Itermax.
1. Compute the negative gradient as the working response
hi = − ∂
∂ f (xi)
Ψ(pi, f (xi))
∣∣∣∣
f (xi)= f̂ (xi)
(3.16)
2. Randomly select a fraction bf from the dataset (Random Forest/Bagging)
3. Fit a regression tree with inter.depth splits , g(x), predicting hi from the covariates
xi.
4. Update the estimate of f (x) as
f̂ (x)→ f̂ (x) + lr ∗ g(x) (3.17)
5. Repeat step 1-4 until Itermax
Φ iter inter.depth lr bf
Benchmark Normal
Cross
Validation
8 0.01 0.5
Robustness - 50,000 1-10
0.005,
0.001
0.3, 1
A GBRT model is calibrated with four parameters.63 First, the bagging fraction, bf.64
Second, a parameter controls the depth of interactions between variables, inter.depth.
Third, the shrinkage or the learning rate, lr controls the weight of each iteration and a higher
value means a quicker convergence rate. Fourth, the distribution Φ of the error term defines
the loss function Ψ.65
The optimal number of iterations is often selected by the cross validation process. The
model is first run with large number of iterations and the best iteration iter is then selected
with k-fold cross validations.
63Elith et al. (2008) provide a good introduction for modeling tuning practices. Ridgeway (2007) provides a
good guidance on modeling tuning for the gbm package in R.
64This parameter helps to ensure the robustness of the model and prevents overfitting. The conventional
value is 0.3− 0.5.
65For example, Gaussian implies a squared error loss function.
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It is worth noticing that the difference in ideology of modeling between machine learning
and economic models. Economic and most econometric models start with structural assump-
tions reflecting economists understanding of how the world operates. Machine learning
models, on the other side, assume that the true data-generating process is infinitely complex
and all variables in the model are correlated in a nonlinear manner. Machine learning
approaches try to maximally recover the ground truth by appointing a learning algorithm
(a classier) to learn the relationship between variables. More specifically, the objective of a
learning algorithm is to recover patterns among variables with the performance evaluated by
prediction/classification errors in a given dataset. The cost of such non-parametric ideology
of machine learning approaches is data driven, i.e. the ability of an algorithm to describe
the ground truth of the world depends critically on the quality of data being supplied. If an
important variable is not observed in the dataset, conventional machine learning approaches
fail to capture the information in this variable and the resulting model is less satisfactory. In
this aspect, it is worth designing an approach to integrate structural economic models and
machine learning algorithms.
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Appendix 3.B Proof of Proposition 1 and Simulations of Example
1
Proof of Proposition 1. The first split is made at the point m1. This implies
1
|{i : ai ≤ am1}| ∑i:ai≤am1
g[ f (ai)−
∑i:ai≤am1 f (ai)
|{i : ai ≤ am1}|
] +
1
|{i : ai > am1}| ∑i:ai>am1
g[ f (ai)−
∑i:ai>am1 f (ai)
|{i : ai > am1}|
]
<
1
|{i : ai ≤ aq}| ∑i:ai≤aq
g[ f (ai)−
∑i:ai≤aq f (ai)
|{i : ai ≤ aq}| ] +
1
|{i : ai > aq}| ∑i:ai>aq
g[ f (ai)−
∑i:ai>aq f (ai)
|{i : ai > aq}| ] ∀q ̸= m1
(3.18)
where g(.) is a loss function. Let {bn} = ℸ({an}).
aj > ai ⇒ bj > bi ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} implies
{i : ai < aj} ⊆ {i : bi < bj} and {i : ai > aj} ⊆ {i : bi > bj} ∀j ∈ {1, ..., N} (3.19)
Suppose that the transformation {bn} falls into the first category that aj > ai ⇒ bj >
bi ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} and the first optimal splitting point of {bn} is bm∗1 . As the splitting
criterion only uses the ordinal information, it can be written as
1
|{i : bi ≤ bm∗1}| ∑i:bi≤bm∗1
g[ f (ai)−
∑i:bi≤bm∗1
f (ai)
|{i : bi ≤ bm∗1}|
] +
1
|{i : bi > bm∗1}| ∑i:bi>bm∗1
g[ f (ai)−
∑i:bi>bm∗1
f (ai)
|{i : bi > bm∗1}|
]
<
1
|{i : bi ≤ bq}| ∑i:bi≤bq
g[ f (ai)−
∑i:bi≤bq f (ai)
|{i : bi ≤ bq}| ] +
1
|{i : bi > bq}| ∑i:bi>bq
g[ f (ai)−
∑i:bi>bq f (ai)
|{i : bi > bq}| ] ∀q ̸= m
∗
1
(3.20)
I want to prove m1 = m∗1 .
(3.18) and (3.20) imply
{i : ai < am1} = {i : bi < bm∗1} (3.21)
{i : ai > am1} = {i : bi > bm∗1} (3.22)
(3.19) implies
{i : ai < am1} ⊆ {i : bi < bm1} and {i : ai < am∗1} ⊆ {i : bi < bm∗1} (3.23)
{i : ai > am1} ⊆ {i : bi > bm1} and {i : ai > am∗1} ⊆ {i : bi > bm∗1} (3.24)
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(3.21) and (3.23), and (3.22) and (3.24) imply
{i : ai < am∗1} ⊆ {i : bi < bm∗1} = {i : ai < am1} ⊆ {i : bi < bm1} (3.25)
{i : ai > am∗1} ⊆ {i : bi > bm∗1} = {i : ai > am1} ⊆ {i : bi > bm1} (3.26)
From which, it can be derived that am1 = am∗1 and bm1 = bm∗1 . Because
{i : ai < am∗1} ⊆ {i : ai < am1} ⇒ am∗1 ≤ am1 (3.27)
{i : ai > am∗1} ⊆ {i : ai > am1} ⇒ am∗1 ≥ am1 (3.28)
(3.25) and (3.26) can be simplified as
{i : ai < am∗1} = {i : bi < bm∗1} = {i : ai < am1} = {i : bi < bm1} (3.29)
{i : ai > am∗1} = {i : bi > bm∗1} = {i : ai > am1} = {i : bi < bm1} (3.30)
which implies
{i : ai = am1} = {i : ai = am∗1} (3.31)
By the uniqueness of m1, we have (from 3.18)
{i : ai > am1} ̸= {i : ai > aq} ∀q ∈ {1, ..., N} ̸= m1 (3.32)
Therefore,
m1 = m∗1 (3.33)
The case where the transformation {bn} falls into the second category that aj > ai ⇒ bj <
bi ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} can be proved following a similar procedure. Recursively applying this
argument to the rest of splitting points am2 , ..., amk completes the proof.
Remark. Intuitively, since a binary splitting algorithm only uses ordinal information of
an explanatory variable in its splitting criteria, any transformation that preserves the ordinal
information of this explanatory variable should result in the same splitting points.
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Fig. 3.B.1 Simulation of example 1: the ordered case
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Fig. 3.B.2 Simulation of example 1: the randomly assigned case
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(a) Add index variable i
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(b) Add dummy variables of i
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(c) AddMi
whereMi = −|ϵ| if βd = 0 andMi = |ϵ| if βd = 1 ϵ;∼ N(0,1)
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Fig. 3.B.3 Simulation of example 1: the property of weak monotonic transformation
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
−2
0
2
0 50 100 150 200
First 200 observations
Va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l v
a
ria
bl
e
 
l lBeta = 0 Beta = 1
(a) Value ofM1d
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
0 50 100 150 200
First 200 observations
Va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l v
a
ria
bl
e
 
l lBeta = 0 Beta = 1
(b) Value ofM2i
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(c) AddM1d as control
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Fig. 3.B.4 Simulation of example 1: the property of weak monotonic transformation; increase
n to 2,000
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(b) Value ofM2i
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(c) AddM1d as control
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(d) AddM2i as control
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Appendix 3.C An Analytical Discussion of Simple Cases of the
Two Dimensional Example
The key issue here is to understand how and when adding estimated parameters from
structural estimations can help to control for the unobserved variables and estimate βd,t. In
the following subsection, I will discuss a simple case where the unobserved variable does
not appear in the outer part of the equation of pd,t.66 For the data generating process given in
equation (3.34) and (3.35), I want to estimate how the price pd,t changes under an exchange
rate ed,t shock conditioning on values of Mt and Xd,t. However, Mt is unobserved. The
objective is to understand how and when conditioning on values of coefficients b0t ,b
1
t ,b
0
d,b
1
d
and Xd,t could achieve the same result as conditioning on values of Mt and Xd,t.
pd,t = βd,ted,t (3.34)
βd,t = f (Xd,t, Mt) (3.35)
In the following discussion, I will try to express the true βd,t as a function of regression
estimated coefficients.67 In order to be clear about the information contained in estimated
regression coefficients, I take first order approximations to decompose the data generating
process into factors that only vary in one dimension. With this approximation, I will be able
to obtain analytical solutions expressing values of b1t and b
1
d as βd,t.
68 The gain in efficiency
by adding coefficients versus using the indices will depend on the complexity of the hidden
function implied by estimated coefficients versus the complexity of the hidden function
implied by indices.
The coefficients of obtained from step 1 can be written as:
b1t =∑
i
βd,twd,t b1d =∑
t
βd,tωd,t (3.36)
wd,t :=
ed,t(ed,t − et)
∑i(ed,t − et)2
ωd,t :=
ed,t(ed,t − ei)
∑t(ed,t − ei)2
(3.37)
where et = ∑i ed,t/nI with nI being the number of observations at dimension i.69 As I will
illustrate below, by conditioning on b1t and b
1
d, I am essentially conditioning on values of βd,t
with a particular weight.
66In this simple case, I only need to make counterfactual predictions of pd,t changing ed,t conditioning on the
value of βd,t. When the unobserved variable Moutert does appear in the outer part of the equation of pd,t, I will
need to make predictions conditioning on the values of both βd,t and Moutert . In general, the missing component
in the inner part of βd,t and the outer part Moutert need not take the same functional form nor the same value.
67More formally, I should define a multi-dimensional monotonic transformation measure. I leave this task for
my future work.
68In this simple case, I only need to use information provided by b1t and b
1
d. b
0
t and b
0
d will be used in more
complicated cases as in subsection 3.C.1.
69I assume that the panel is balanced. I use notations nI and nT rather than the conventional N and T.
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Case A: If weights wd,t = 1/nI and ωd,t = 1/nT and βd,t can be approximated by βd,t =
vd + vt + vd ∗ vt, then βt = vd(1+ vt) and βd = (vd + 1)vt, where vt := ∑t vt/nT.
b1t
vd
∗ b
1
d
vt
− 1 = vd + vt + vd ∗ vt = βd,t (3.38)
Case B: If βd,t = vd + vt + vd ∗ vt but wd,t ̸= 1/nI and ωd,t ̸= 1/nT, then
b1t =∑
i
(vd + vt + vd ∗ vt)wd,t =∑
i
vdwd,t + vt(∑
i
wd,t +∑
i
vdwd,t) (3.39)
b1d =∑
t
(vt + vd + vd ∗ vt)ωd,t =∑
t
vtωd,t + vd(∑
t
ωd,t +∑
t
vtωd,t) (3.40)
Notice ∑t vtωd,t = 0 and ∑i vdwd,t = 0
This is still too abstract. Let ed,t = kt + kd + kd ∗ kt. Then et = ∑i(kt + kd + kd ∗ kt)/nI and
(ed,t − et)2 = [kd − kI + (kd − kI) ∗ kt]2.
b1t =
∑i(vd + vt + vd ∗ vt)(kt + kd + kd ∗ kt)[kd − kI + (kd − kI) ∗ kt]
∑i[kd − kI + (kd − kI) ∗ kt]2
= vt + (1+ vt)
∑i vd(kt + kd + kd ∗ kt)[kd − kI + (kd − kI) ∗ kt]
∑i[kd − kI + (kd − kI) ∗ kt]2
(3.41)
b1d =
∑t(vd + vt + vd ∗ vt)(kt + kd + kd ∗ kt)[kt − kT + (kt − kT) ∗ kd]
∑t[kt − kT + (kt − kT) ∗ kd]2
= vd + (1+ vd)
∑t vt(kt + kd + kd ∗ kt)[kt − kT + (kt − kT) ∗ kd]
∑t[kt − kT + (kt − kT) ∗ kd]2
(3.42)
Define sample conditional covariance measures as70:
Covd(xd,t,zd,t) :=∑
i
(xd,t − xt)(zd,t − zt)/nI (3.43)
Vari(xd,t) := Covd(xd,t, xd,t) (3.44)
70These definitions are used to simplify my notation only and may not be a consistent measure of conditional
covariance.
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From the relationship ∑i xd,tzd,t/nI = Covd(xd,t,zd,t) + ∑i xd,t∑i zd,t/n2I , b
1
t and b
1
d can be
rewritten as:
b1t = [vt + (1+ vt)vd] + (1+ vt)
Covd{vd, (kt + kd + kd ∗ kt)[kd − kI + (kd − kI) ∗ kt]}
Vari(kd − kI + (kd − kI) ∗ kt)
(3.45)
b1d = [vd + (1+ vd)vt] + (1+ vd)
Covt{vt, (kt + kd + kd ∗ kt)[kt − kT + (kt − kT) ∗ kd]}
Vart[kt − kT + (kt − kT) ∗ kd]
(3.46)
Equations (3.45) and (3.46) can be expressed as71:
b1t = [vt + (1+ vt)vd] + (1+ vt)
Covd[vd, (ed,t − et)2]
Vari(ed,t − et)2 (3.47)
b1d = [vd + (1+ vd)vt] + (1+ vd)
Covt[vt, (ed,t − ei)2]
Vart(ed,t − ei)2 (3.48)
The last part can be further simplified as
Covd[vd, (ed,t − et)2]
Vari(ed,t − et)2 =
Covd[vd, (kd − kI)2]
Vari(kd)
=: c1 (3.49)
Covt[vt, (ed,t − ei)2]
Vart(ed,t − ei)2 =
Covt[vt, (kt − kT)2]
Vart(kt)
=: c2 (3.50)
In this example, due to the simple factorisation of ed,t, I assume that the last part is a
constant and does not vary along the other dimensions. This property no longer holds in a
more general factorisation process, e.g. ed,t = k1t + k
1
d + k
1
dk
2
t .
In general, I discuss three possibilities here:
Case B.1: If Covd[vd, (ed,t − et)2] = 0 and Covt[vt, (ed,t − ei)2] = 0, the true βd,t can be
expressed as a simple nonlinear equation of b1t and b
1
d as in Case A.
71Hint: rewrite kt + kd + kd ∗ kt = [kd − kI + (kd − kI) ∗ kt] + [kt + kI + kIkt]
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Case B.2: If Covd[vd, (ed,t− et)2] ̸= 0 and Covt[vt, (ed,t− ei)2] ̸= 0, but Vart
{
Covd[vd,(ed,t−et)2]
Vari(ed,t−et)2
}
=
0 and Vari
{
Covt[vt,(ed,t−ei)2]
Vart(ed,t−ei)2
}
= 0, vd and vt can be written as follows:
b1t = vt + (1+ vt)(vd + c1) (3.51)
b1d = vd + (1+ vd)(vt + c2) (3.52)
vt =
b1t − (vd + c1)
1+ (vd + c1)
(3.53)
vd =
b1d − (vt + c2)
1+ (vt + c2)
(3.54)
It is clear that βd,t can be expressed as a nonlinear function of b1t and b
1
d.
Case B.3: If Covd[vd,(ed,t−et)
2]
Vari(ed,t−et)2 ̸= c1 and
Covt[vt,(ed,t−ei)2]
Vart(ed,t−ei)2 ̸= c2 but Vart
{
Covd[vd,(ed,t−et)2]
Vari(ed,t−et)2
}
and
Vari
{
Covt[vt,(ed,t−ei)2]
Vart(ed,t−ei)2
}
are very small, the weak monotonic property will make it work.
This exercise gives me two interesting insights. First, variances of the bias at the other
dimension matter. As long as the bias of estimated parameters at one dimension is “well-
structured" in the other dimension, adding these estimated parameters will help to estimate
the desired βd,t.
Second, it is the covariance between elements driving βd,t and a local measure of second
moments of the policy variable (ed,t − et)2 and (ed,t − ei)2 that matters. Due to the linear
regression structure, first order terms are filtered out and only second order terms will
influence the bias. This is a very useful property for economics studies. Taking this property
into the context of my empirical ERPT question, exchange rates may be correlated with the
marginal cost of the exporter72, but it is less likely for the volatility of exchange rates to
be correlated with the level movement of the marginal cost of the exporter. Even if these
two terms are correlated, as long as the correlations (as a function of d) do not change
systematically across destinations, estimated parameters b1t and b
1
d will provide useful
information which can be analysed through a tree based machine learning algorithm.
In general, adding estimated parameters from regressions and/or other structural esti-
mations from a range of dimension-limited partition spaces should always be more efficient
than adding indices i and t or dummies related to the indices provided that the assumed
structural equation is not very far from the true specification.
3.C.1 The case where Mt appears in the outer part of the linear form
In this subsection, I discuss the case where Mt appears in the outer part of the linear form.
As not only βd,t but also Mt need to be backed up from the estimated parameters, I also need
72For example, the exporter may use imported inputs.
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to use information from b0t and b
0
d.
pd,t = βd,ted,t + Mt
βd,t = f (Xd,t, Mt)
Regression estimated parameters can be written as
b1t =
∑i[ f (Xd,t, Mt)ed,t + Mt](ed,t − et)
∑i(ed,t − et)2
=∑
i
βd,twd,t + Mt
b0t =∑
i
(pd,t − b1t ∗ ed,t)/nI
=∑
i
(βd,t −∑
i
βd,twd,t)ed,t/nI + Mt(1−∑
i
ed,t/nI)
b1d =
∑t[ f (Xd,t, Mt)ed,t + Mt](ed,t − ei)
∑t(ed,t − ei)2
=∑
t
βd,tωd,t +∑
t
Mt
ωd,t
ed,t
b0d =∑
t
(pd,t − b1d ∗ ed,t)/nT
=∑
t
(βd,t −∑
t
βd,tωd,t)ed,t/nT +∑
t
Mt(1−ωd,t)/nT
To visualise the underlying structure of these estimated parameters, I take the following first
order factorisation. Let
ed,t = kt + kd + kd ∗ kt
βd,t = vd + vt + vd ∗ vt
Mt = mt
Therefore,
b1t = [vt + (1+ vt)vd] + (1+ vt)
Covd[vd, (ed,t − et)2]
Vari(ed,t − et)2 + mt (3.55)
b1d = [vd + (1+ vd)vt] + (1+ vd)
Covt[vt, (ed,t − ei)2]
Vart(ed,t − ei)2 +
Covt(mt, ed,t)
Vart(ed,t − ei)2 (3.56)
b0t = Covd[βd,t, ed,t]− (
Covd[βd,t, (ed,t − et)ed,t]
Vari(ed,t − et) + Mt)et + Mt (3.57)
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where I have used the following relationship in deriving the expression of b0t .
∑
i
[βd,t(ed,t − et)ed,t]/nI = Covd[βd,t, (ed,t − et)ed,t] +∑
i
βd,t∑
i
[(ed,t − et)2]/n2I (3.58)
With the assumed factorisation,
Covd[βd,t, ed,t] = (1+ vt)(1+ kt)Covd(vd,kd) (3.59)
Covd[βd,t, (ed,t − et)ed,t] = (1+ vt)(1+ kt)2Covd[vd, (kd − kI)2] (3.60)
Covd[βd,t, (ed,t − et)ed,t]
Vari(ed,t − et) = (1+ vt)
Covd[vd, (kd − kI)2]
Vari(kd)
=: (1+ vt)c1 (3.61)
This is where it becomes complicated. The expression of b0t now involves a time-varying
factor kt of the observed policy variable ed,t.
b0t = (1+ vt)(1+ kt)Covd(vd,kd)− [(1+ vt)c1 + mt](kt + ktkI + kI) + mt (3.62)
Covd(vd,kd), c1, kI ,vd,vt are constants. This leaves vt,vd,mt,kt to be solved in 3 equations
(3.55), (3.56) and (3.62). The tricky part to figure out is how and when the conditional weak
monotonic transformation property in proportion 2 works in this case.
If I derive the expression of b0d, it would involve vd,kd. Together with ed,t, (3.55), (3.56) and
(3.62), there are 5 equations with 5 unknowns vt,vd,mt,kd,kt. If this problem can be solved
approximately, the efficiency gain in adding these estimated parameters should depend on
the complexity of these equations compared to the complexity of hidden functions of using
indices or related dummies.
Note that I discussed a general case here where the unobserved variable Mt needs not
necessarily be correlated with βd,t.73 If βd,t can be expressed as an explicit function of Mt
and some observed variables, the derivation will be easier.
73I did not impose any restrictions on mt and vt.
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3.C.2 Tests on alternative specifications
High Nonlinearity
Setting:
pd,t = 10+ βd,ted,t + msd,t −mct + ϵd,t
βd,t = (msd,t − 0.5)2 + sin(1000mct)mct
msd,t = ud,t + 0.1ed,t
mct = ut − 0.1et
et =
∑d ed,t
nd
nd = 2000; nt = 40
ud,t ∼N(0,1), ut ∼ N(0,1), ϵd,t ∼ N(0,0.01)
Fig. 3.C.1 High nonlinearity: the proposed algorithm
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Not Identifiable
Setting:
pd,t = 10+ βd,ted,t + msd,t −mcd,t + ϵd,t
βd,t = (msd,t − 0.5)2 + mcd,t
msd,t = ud,t + 0.1ed,t
mcd,t = ud,t − 0.1ed,t
nd = 2000; nt = 40
ud,t ∼N(0,1), ut ∼ N(0,1), ϵd,t ∼ N(0,0.01)
Fig. 3.C.2 Not identifiable: the proposed algorithm
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Larger Correlation
Setting:
pd,t = 10+ βd,ted,t + msd,t −mct + ϵd,t
βd,t = (msd,t − 0.5)2 + mct
msd,t = ud,t + 0.1ed,t
mct = ut − 1et
et =
∑d ed,t
nd
nd = 2000; nt = 40
ud,t ∼N(0,1), ut ∼ N(0,1), ϵd,t ∼ N(0,0.01)
Fig. 3.C.3 Larger correlation: the proposed algorithm
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Different Function of the Outer Part
Setting:
pd,t = 10+ βd,ted,t + msd,t −mc2t + ϵd,t
βd,t = (msd,t − 0.5)2 + mct
msd,t = ud,t + 0.1ed,t
mct = ut − 0.1et
et =
∑d ed,t
nd
nd = 2000; nt = 40
ud,t ∼N(0,1), ut ∼ N(0,1), ϵd,t ∼ N(0,0.01)
Fig. 3.C.4 Different function of the outer part: the proposed algorithm
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Arellano and Bond
Setting:
pd,t = 0.95pd,t−1 + βd,ted,t + msd,t −mct + ϵd,t
βd,t = (msd,t − 0.5)2 + mct
msd,t = ud,t + 0.1ed,t
mct = ut − 0.1et
et =
∑d ed,t
nd
nd = 2000; nt = 40
ud,t ∼N(0,1), ut ∼ N(0,1), ϵd,t ∼ N(0,0.01)
Fig. 3.C.5 Arellano and Bond: the proposed algorithm
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Reduce Sample Size
Setting:
pd,t = 10+ βd,ted,t + msd,t −mct + ϵd,t
βd,t = (msd,t − 0.5)2 + mct
msd,t = ud,t + 0.1ed,t
mct = ut − 0.1et
et =
∑d ed,t
nd
nd = 200; nt = 40
ud,t ∼uni f orm, ut ∼ uni f orm, ϵd,t ∼ N(0,0.01)
Fig. 3.C.6 Reduce sample size: dummies
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Fig. 3.C.7 Reduce sample size: the proposed algorithm
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Appendix 3.D Details of the Simulated Model
Fig. 3.D.1 Responses of firms in country A to an appreciation in country B
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Note: The left column presents the change of prices and market shares for domestic firms in country A.
The middle and right columns present the reactions of exporters from country B and C respectively.
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Fig. 3.D.2 Visualisation of simulated firms in country A
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Note: The top graph depicts the realised productivity of firms in country A. In each sector, there are three domestic firms
and two foreign firms from country B and C respectively (only the best firm in each sector exports). The bottom two graphs
depict the price and market shares of firms in country A. Exporters are firms with relatively high productivity and charge
relatively low prices and own larger market shares. The assumption that only the best firms export gives a realistic market
structure in this multi-country world.
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3.D.1 Case 1: only exchange rate shocks
Fig. 3.D.3 Case 1: Precision on price predictions
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cients
n
0 10 20 30 40 50
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
ln
_p
estimated ln_ptrue ln_p
SSR = 0.03, Error Rate = 0.00%
(b) the proposed algorithm
Fig. 3.D.4 Case 1: Without adding regression coefficients
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Fig. 3.D.5 Case 1: Point estimates of the proposed algorithm compared to true counterfactual
environments
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3.D.2 Case 2: adding productivity shocks
Fig. 3.D.6 Case 2: Precision on price predictions
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(a) GBRT without adding regression coeffi-
cients
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Fig. 3.D.7 Case 2: Point estimates of the proposed algorithm compared to true counterfactual
environments
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Fig. 3.D.8 Comparing naive, counterfactual and algorithm predicted ERPT estimates
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Note: Firm’s productivity is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with a persistence of 0.95. The red line
presents the ERPT estimates calculated using actual price changes of the simulated model. The green
line represents the model implied ERPT estimates in a counterfactual equilibrium where there is no pro-
ductivity shock in the next period. The black line represents ERPT estimates predicted by the proposed
algorithm.
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Algorithm 1 The Proposed Algorithm
Input data I,y,X,e
1: Obtain variable names of the index matrix I and the feature variable matrix X and save
them as inames and xnames respectively.
2: Calculate all non-repetitive combinations of dimension indices in inames and save as Si.
3: for s in Si do
4: Is ← I[inames ∈ s]
5: I˜s ← unique(Is)
6: for x in xnames do
7: xs ← 0
8: for is in 1 to nrow(˜Is) do
9: xs[Is = I˜[is]]← mean(x|Is = I˜[is])
10: end for
11: end for
12: end for
13: Calculate all non-repetitive binary combinations of Si and save as Sshare.
14: for s in Sshare do
15: (sa, sb)← s[sort(length(s[1], s[2]))]
16: for x in xnames do
17: xsa,sb ← xsaxsb
18: end for
19: end for
20: Observe dimensions in which the supervisor y and the policy/treatment variable e vary.
Identify a subset available for controlling unobserved variables and save as Sid.
21: for s in Sid do
22: Assume a possible (linear) structural equation based on economic rationale.
23: for j in 1:(number of parameters in the structural model) do
24: coe f js ← 0
25: end for
26: for ds in 1 to nrow(˜Is) do
27: Estimate the structural regression for the subset of data where Is = I˜[is]
28: for j in 1:(number of parameters in the structural model) do
29: coe f js [Is = I˜[is]]← parameterj
30: end for
31: end for
32: end for
33: Run GBRT with supervisor y on e,X,Xsa,sb ,coef
j
id and obtain model1.
34: yEst1 ← model1(e− 0.5std(e,X,Xs,coefjs)
35: yEst2 ← model1(e + 0.5std(e),X,Xs,coefjs)
36: betaEst ← yEst2−yEst1std(e)
37: Run GBRT again with supervisor betaEst on e,X,Xsa,sb ,coef
j
id and obtain model2.
Output: model1,model2,betaEst
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